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ABSTRACT 
 
KATHLEEN M. FOODY: Thinking Islam: Islamic Scholars, Tradition, and the State in 
the Islamic Republic Of Iran 
(Under the direction of Omid Safi) 
 
This dissertation explores the intersection of secular and historically Islamic 
forms in Iranian debates over the role of Muslim scholars in the modern world.  I draw on 
textual publications (both print and online) that are intended for public consumption and 
authored by government officials, classically-trained Islamic scholars, lay religious 
intellectuals, and journalists.  Drawing on recent theoretical interrogations of secular 
universalism, as well as postcolonial and decolonial studies, I argue that the engagements 
of both classically-trained Islamic scholars and new religious intellectuals in Iran 
highlight the imbrications of the secular and the Islamic in contemporary Muslim 
discourse.  Given these intersections, I propose in the conclusion that scholarship of 
Islam generally and of Muslim scholars in particular might disrupt boundaries between 
the academic enterprise of the Western academy and intellectual work arising elsewhere.  
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Chapter One: Thinking Islam 
 
One of the central questions that scholars of Islam have engaged with over the 
past several decades is how to represent modern Islam in relation to theories of 
modernity.  In earlier periods, teleological understandings of modernity located Muslim-
majority societies as “not yet” modern, a position that both validated colonial control of 
Muslim populations and outlined a unitary path for the future of those societies modeled 
on the European past;1 in short, becoming modern required becoming like the West.  
More recent scholarship has interrogated such universalist understandings of 
modernization. Scholars have argued instead for the inescapable modernity of Islamic 
forms of practice, political thought, conceptions of self, and religious debate.   
Scholars continue to struggle, however, to represent Islamic difference—the 
particularities of contemporary Islamic forms of reasoning, practice, and ways of being in 
world—alongside the participation and, at least partial, genesis of those forms in 
modernity.  In this sense the study of Islam has been part of a broader trajectory in the 
field of religious studies, where many scholars have begun to question the universality of 
the concept “religion,” related categories (such as “religious experience”), and the 
                                                 
1 For a discussion of the relationship between modern European understandings of history, progress, and 
colonial rule, see Dipesh Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe : postcolonial thought and historical 
difference, Princeton studies in culture/power/history (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2000), 8-
12. 
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imperial effects of those concepts. 2   In a 2011 address, American Academy of Religion 
president Kwok Pui-Lan highlighted this problem of native concepts for the study of 
religion.  She suggested that scholars of religion now  
live in an interconnected world and work in academic settings which value 
transnational and cross-cultural collaboration.…The field of religion will have to 
move beyond its European and American dominance to become global in nature, 
asking questions about new ways of conceptualizing ‘religion’ and about 
religion's roles in social and economic life and global culture.3   
While it would be easy to suggest that the study of Islam has always been “global in 
nature”, the point here is that for the most part such scholarship did not attend to the 
Euro-American provenance of its categories or the assumptions—embedded in Christian 
history—behind them.  An exception, which Pui-Lan cites, was William Cantwell Smith’s 
The Meaning and End of Religion, published in the 1960s.  Even there, however, while 
Smith interrogated the translatability of the category “religion” he continued to 
emphasize the interiority of religious experience, an assumption that marks certain 
Christian traditions, but is hardly universalizable.4 
For the study of modern Islam, a key problem is how to represent the imbrications 
                                                 
2 For a review of pertinent literature in the field, see Kwok Pui-lan, "2011 Presidential Address: Empire 
and the Study of Religion," Journal of the American Academy of Religion 80, no. 2 (2012): 285-303.  
Wilfred Cantwell Smith, The meaning and end of religion; a new approach to the religious traditions of 
mankind (New York,: Macmillan, 1963). 
3 Pui-lan, "2011 Presidential Address: Empire and the Study of Religion," 295-96. 
4 Smith, The meaning and end of religion; a new approach to the religious traditions of mankind.  For a 
critical reading of Smith, see Talal Asad, "Reading a Modern Classic: W.C. Smith’s ‘The Meaning and End 
of Religion," History of Religions 3(2001). 
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of historically Islamic forms of thought and practice with concepts and practices that 
arise out of modern and specifically colonial-era shifts.  Muslim scholarship in 
particular—whether the writings of new kinds of intellectuals arising out of universities 
or classically-trained Islamic scholars (the ʿulamaʾ) linked to the madrasa system —
presents difficulties for distinguishing and separating out concepts and categories unique 
to Islam; that is, specifically Islamic modes of reasoning.  This difficulty in large part 
revolves around Muslim incorporation of and thinking about specifically modern social 
and political forms, including the state, society, the public, citizens, and concurrent 
constructions of the individual subject. One reaction to such Muslim thinking is to 
identify “good” forms of “liberal” Islam, forms of Islamic thought that seem to align with 
democratic projects, the protection of minorities, equal rights for women, etc. At the same 
time, scholars worry that valorizing liberal Islam uncritically universalizes liberal norms 
and does violence against “traditionalist” Muslims who “‘except Islamic authority with 
few questions,’” but  “‘do not generally favor violence and terrorism.’”5 
In this dissertation I explore the possibilities of separating out and distinguishing 
Islamic and secular, or Western, concepts and categories in contemporary Muslim 
thinking.  I engage with recent work in the study of Islam that posits Western secularity 
and Islamic ways of life as distinct discursive traditions and compare those academic 
presentations to the ways in which contemporary Muslim scholars engage with the 
present.   In particular, I explore contestations over what constitutes the Islamic tradition 
itself by tracing public debates over the place of Islamic history and scholarship in 
contemporary Iran.  I draw on textual publications (both print and online) that are 
                                                 
5 Saba Mahmood, "Secularism, Hermeneutics, and Empire: The Politics of Islamic Reformation," Public 
Culture 18, no. 2 (2006): 333. 
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intended for public consumption and authored by government officials, classically-
trained Islamic scholars, lay religious intellectuals, and journalists.  In particular, I am 
interested in the ways classically-trained scholars participate in, produce, and are 
represented within debates over what constitutes authoritative Islam.   
Given the attention that Muslim political thought has played in constituting 
categories for representing modern Islamic thought (liberal Islam, traditionalist, Islamist, 
etc.), I attend in particular to debates in Iran over the relationship between Islam and the 
political at the level of the state, the citizen, and the scholar.  I do so for two reasons.  The 
first reason is that the notion of Islamic difference, as I discuss below, finds a tension 
with directly political discourse – discourses that, even when critical, engage with 
specifically modern concepts of sovereign states, institutions, and reason.  While Muslim 
political thought has played a central role in constituting academic categories of 
normative Islam, academic representations of Islamic continuity steer clear of 
“modernist,” “fundamentalist,” Islamist,” or “liberal” labels for Muslim thought that 
mark Muslim thinking as linked to specifically modern movements, political structures, 
and vocabularies. My second reason for focusing on political debates has to do with the 
place of Islamic institutions, specifically the juridical learning of classically-trained 
Islamic scholars (ʿulamaʾ) in the Islamic Republic of Iran itself.  Within Iranian debates 
many Muslim scholars are critical of the governing structures of the Islamic Republic and 
its claims to represent Islamic authority.  At the same times, the critiques of the 
government often extend, when voiced by secular or religious intellectuals, to the 
authority of classically-trained Islamic scholars themselves.  Islamic scholars also engage 
in these debates and attempt to circumscribe the authority of the state while continuing to 
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assert their own authority to offer learned opinions regarding Islamic meaning and the 
authority of Islamic prescriptions in general.  In this sense then debates over the authority 
of individual reasoning at times confounds claims to Islamic authority while, at the same 
time, claims to Islamic legitimacy substantiate and underscore the rights of citizens vis-à-
vis the state.   
These Iranian debates are part of larger conversations among Muslims globally 
over the ways in which various actors and forces—classically-trained Islamic scholars, 
new religious intellectuals, and governments—authorize and limit expressions of Islam.  
The nineteenth century was a transformative period for Muslims globally due to the 
intersecting effects of colonial empires and the impact of new technological, economic, 
and social regimes.6   During this period two major contests over religious authority took 
shape.  European-style educational institutions and the increased circulation of religious 
texts led to new classes of intellectuals who established their credentials to speak on 
behalf of and about Islam outside the previously normative institutions of Islamic 
learning.7  At the same time, centralizing states contested the authority of the classically-
trained religious scholars. As Muslims began to imagine new nation-states in the late 
                                                 
6 Some of these transformations were direct, such as the codification of Islamic legal practices.  Others, 
although linked to colonial influence, were less the result of colonial enforcement.  Charles Tripp, for 
example, has discussed the ways in which notions of “society” and the “social” impacted Muslim thinking 
about the self, the economy, and the political.  See, Charles Tripp, Islam and the moral economy : the 
challenge of capitalism (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006). 
7 See, Dale F. Eickelman and James P. Piscatori, Muslim politics, Princeton studies in Muslim politics 
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996); Robert Hefner, "Introduction: The Culture, Politics, and 
Future of Muslim Education," in Schooling Islam : the culture and politics of modern Muslim education, 
ed. Robert W. Hefner and Muhammad Qasim Zaman (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2007); 
Monica M. Ringer, Education, religion, and the discourse of cultural reform in Qajar Iran, Bibliotheca 
Iranica Intellectual traditions series (Costa Mesa, Calif.: Mazda Publishers, 2001); David Menashri, 
Education and the making of modern Iran (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992); Afshin Marashi, 
Nationalizing Iran : culture, power, and the state, 1870-1940, 1st ed., Studies in modernity and national 
identity (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2008). 
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nineteenth and early twentieth century the relationship between Islam and the state 
became a significant site of debate.8   Reified understandings of Islam, nationalist and 
nativist imaginaries of the self, and the possibilities of the secular resulted from these 
changes and transformed debates over religious authority in many Muslim-majority 
centers. 
In Iran itself Muslims debated the nature of Islamic authority, including the 
relationship between religious and political authority, long before the Iranian revolution 
of 1978-79 that gave rise to the Islamic Republic.  Indeed, it would be a mistake to 
suggest that any topic in Muslim centers had gone uncontested prior to the 
transformations of the last 150 years (as one example, I trace the history of Shiʿi 
theological debate over the relationship between religious and political authority in 
Chapter Two).  Certain aspects, however, mark more recent contestations in Iran as 
particularly modern.  One is the public aspect of these contestations and the extent of 
popular participation in them; in other words, what might have once been debates 
between well-located scholars and government officials9 in the late nineteenth and 
                                                 
8 See, Marashi, Nationalizing Iran : culture, power, and the state, 1870-1940; Hamid Algar, Roots of the 
Islamic Revolution in Iran : four lectures, Rev. and expanded ed. (Oneonta, N.Y.: Islamic Publications 
International, 2001); Talal Asad, "Secularism, Nation State, Religion," in Formations of the Secular: 
Christianity, Islam, Modernity (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2003); Said Amir Arjomand, ed. 
Authority and Political Culture in Shi`ism (Albany: SUNY Press,1988); Said Amir Arjomand, The shadow 
of God and the Hidden Imam : religion, political order, and societal change in Shi'ite Iran from the 
beginning to 1890, Publications of the Center for Middle Eastern Studies (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1984); Said Amir Arjomand, The turban for the crown : the Islamic revolution in Iran, Studies in 
Middle Eastern history (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988); Sami Zubaida, Islam, the people and 
the state : essays on political ideas and movements in the Middle East (London ; New York: Routledge, 
1989), 121-82; Peter van der Veer, Religious nationalism : Hindus and Muslims in India (Berkeley, CA: 
University of California Press, 1994). 
9 For an exemplary case from this earlier period, see Omid Safi, "The Shifting Politics of al-Ghazali," in 
The politics of knowledge in premodern Islam : negotiating ideology and religious inquiry (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2006), 105-24.  
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twentieth century became exposed in—and therefore transformed through— newspapers, 
journals, and other textual productions.  A second aspect, specifically in the post-
revolution period, is the degree of debate over precisely who has the ability to argue and 
in what forums such arguments should take place (I describe this textual flourishing and 
its connection to debate over religious authority in the Chapter Three).  The 
circumscription of public debate, in other words, is very much part of the debate over 
religious authority itself.  Finally, a third element that mark these contestations over 
religious authority as modern is their very theoretical engagement with the notion of 
modernity and the discontinuities between the present and the historical past (a topic I 
return to in Chapter Four).  In this sense what it means to be modern—that is, to exist in 
the historical, political, and technological space of the present—is an additional highlight 
of these Iranian debates.  While for some this new space of modernity requires moving 
away from religious authority in the public and political domains, for many others it 
requires rethinking Islamic concepts to address these new spaces.  In particular religious 
intellectuals and Islamic scholars identify different problems with the modern context 
(and locate that problem differently in relation to Islam, the operations of scholars, the 
functions of the space, and the qualities of citizens), yet for all—even proponents of an 
authoritarian vision of Islamic governance—there is an acknowledgment of the novel 
problems presented by technology, governance, and religious difference in the present.  
The work of classically-trained Iranian scholars, as well as of new religious 
intellectuals, highlights tensions in theorizing Muslim thinking in modernity.   In the 
Iranian contexts, both new religious intellectuals and classically-trained Islamic scholars 
rely on historically central concepts from Shiʿi Islamic scholarship to authorize re-
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thinking and contesting claims to Islamic normativity made by both state actors and other 
scholars, yet the relationship of these efforts to the modes of reasoning that mark an 
Islamic discursive tradition remains contested.  Scholars have located Iranian intellectual 
as harbingers of an “Islamic reformation,” transforming Islam to fit a liberal, democratic, 
and pluralist modernity.10  At the same time, scholars have seen them as external to 
Islamic tradition, engaged more in secular liberal arguments than in the practices and 
reasonings that typify Islamic tradition.11   
My goal in this dissertation is explore contestations over religious authority in 
Iran in order to think about the representation of  Islam and the limits such 
representations set on Muslim thinking in modernity.  My purpose here, however, is not 
simply to describe these Iranian contestations nor is it to validate the operations of liberal 
strands of Islamic thinking to which scholars of post-revolution Iran have devoted much 
space.  I argue instead that the engagements of both classically-trained Islamic scholars in 
Iran and new religious intellectuals in Iran not only highlight the imbrications of the 
secular and the Islamic, but that setting the secular apart from Islamic thinking limits 
representing Muslim thinkers as intellectually engaged with the contemporary world.   
My intent is to place these Iranian debates over religious authority and the 
operations of classically-trained Islamic scholars in conversation with theories of secular 
modernity12 that represent the “other” of Islamic tradition. Thus, my description of these 
                                                 
10 Michaelle Browers and Charles Kurzman, eds., An Islamic Reformation? (Lanham, Md.: Lexington 
Books,2004); B. A. Roberson, Shaping the current Islamic reformation (Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2003). 
11 Mahmood, "Secularism, Hermeneutics, and Empire: The Politics of Islamic Reformation." 
12 This opposition is not only evident in, as I detail below, academic work about Western and Islamic 
traditions, but also within Iran itself. At the end of this chapter I discuss scholarship on that “nativist” 
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Iranian debates will maintain a dialogue with understandings of modernity, the operations 
of secularism, and the formations of secular reason that locate Islamic thinking as an 
authoritarian—and potentially violent—force in the modern world system. In this sense 
my argument in this dissertation is not limited to Islamic thinking in particular, but rather 
extends to ways of religious thinking that draw on commitments and histories outside the 
normative understandings of secular modernity.       
Modernity and Tradition 
 
As I noted above, the mutual imbrications of historically Islamic concepts and 
Euro-American and/or secular categories in modern Muslim thought brings to light a 
tension in academic representations of a modern and contemporary Islam.  On the one 
hand, contemporary Muslims draw on histories, figures, and commitments that have long 
been part of the Islamic textual corpus.  On the other hand, they mobilize and rethink this 
corpus to defend and argue for concepts and practices—including the formations of the 
state, the rights and duties of citizens, and the power of the public—whose genealogies 
scholars elsewhere have traced to Western political theory and practice and that, 
therefore, are part of Western secular practices in the present rather than distinctly Islamic 
ones.   
In earlier periods of scholarship scholars would have marked this inclusion of 
secular categories as the modernization of Islam – a progressive development that ran 
counter to the assumed core of Islam itself.  In short, scholars assumed an oppositional 
relationship between Islam and modernity.   As historian Samira Haj has argued: "the 
                                                                                                                                                 
imagination in Iran, that is, understandings of the Iranian self constructed in opposition to understandings 
of the secular West. 
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theme 'to modernize Islam is to betray it' was quite popular among early scholars, 
especially among those who studied nineteenth- and early twentieth-century reformers. 
The most famous work is Albert Hourani's seminal and authoritative Arabic Thought in 
the Liberal Age, published in 1962 and still today one of the most frequently quoted 
works in the field.  Hourani uncritically embraced and elaborated on the orientalist notion 
of the invention of a modern fictitious liberal Islam... [and] blamed [the Egyptian scholar 
Muhammad] ʿAbduh for stripping Islam of its authentic tradition by conjuring new 
liberal meanings."13 
Later work disentangled modernity—largely identified with structural 
transformations, but also with a psychological element of uncertainty and displacement—
from modernism, a set of political and philosophical commitments.  In this sense, as 
Bruce Lawrence argued in the 1980s, even Islamic fundamentalism was the result of 
specifically modern transformations, it simply was not modernist in the sense of sharing 
secular liberal and democratic political commitments.14  From this perspective, scholars 
identified liberal, fundamentalist or Islamist, and even secular forms of Islam as the 
products of modern existence.  Significantly, the modernity of a fundamentalist or 
Islamist position is evident not simply in that it arises out of an encounter with colonial, 
Western, and/or modernist forces, but also its understandings of self.  Katherine Pratt 
Ewing, for example, has argued against a common academic practice of conflating 
Islamist opposition to the West with opposition to modernity.  She suggests that that 
                                                 
13 Samira Haj, Reconfiguring Islamic tradition : reform, rationality, and modernity (Stanford, Calif.: 
Stanford University Press, 2009), 199. 
14 Bruce B. Lawrence, Defenders of God : the fundamentalist revolt against the modern age, 1st ed. (San 
Francisco: Harper & Row, 1989).  
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“under the guise of rejection of certain aspects of Western practice and identification 
processes there is actually an incitement within many Islamist and other fundamentalist 
groups to modernize, through an array of practices that constitute a modern subject, 
which can be characterized by a reflexive, self-conscious interiority, a sense of rupture 
with a traditional past, and a global, even cosmopolitan, orientation.”15   
Scholars continue to contest various elements of Lawrence’s argument, however, 
including the extent to which he overstates the reactionary nature of modern 
fundamentalism.  Richard Martin and Abbas Barzegar, for example, suggest that the 
focus on modern transformation—or transmutation16—ignores the operations of Muslim 
societies themselves and earlier forms that continue in movements Lawrence labeled 
“fundamentalist.”17  Focusing on just these kinds of continuities, recent work on Islam 
and modernity has drawn attention to connections between post-colonial and pre-colonial 
                                                 
15 Katherine Pratt Ewing, "The Misrecognition of a Modern Islamist Organization: Germany Faces 
‘Fundamentalism’," in Rethinking Islamic Studies: From Orientalism to Cosmopolitanism, ed. Carl W. 
Ernst and Richard C. Martin (Columbia, SC: The University of South Carolina Press, 2010), 53.  
16 This debate in many ways extends back to the groundbreaking work of historian Marshall Hodgson 
whose history of Islamic civilization turned on the “great Western transmutation” of the sixteenth century.  
One of Hodgson’s central contributions was to highlight the strangeness of Western dominance brought on, 
in his reading, the “technicalization” of European society.  Hodgson’s project was instrumental in 
destabilizing readings of Muslim backwardness that hinged on the inevitable rise of the West.  At the same 
time, though it is outside the scope of my argument here, more recent work in decolonial studies, 
postcolonial studies, and global history unsettles Hodgson’s own assumption that modernity “began” in the 
West.  For Hodgson’s discussion of the “great Western transmutation,” see Marshall G. S. Hodgson, The 
gunpowder empires and modern times, His The venture of Islam v 3 (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1974), 176-215.   For assessments of Hodgson’s work, see Marshall G. S. Hodgson and Edmund 
Burke, Rethinking world history : essays on Europe, Islam, and world history, Studies in comparative 
world history (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1993); Bruce B. Lawrence, "Transformation," 
in Critical terms for religious studies, ed. Mark C. Taylor (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998).   
17 Richard C. Martin and Abbas Barzegar, "Formations of orthodoxy: authority, power, and networks in 
Muslim societies," in Rethinking Islamic studies : from orientalism to cosmopolitanism, ed. Carl W. Ernst 
and Richard C. Martin (Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina Press, 2010).  See also, Richard 
Martin, "Review Essays," Religious Studies Review 19, no. 4 (1993).  
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Muslim practices, writings, and movements.   In this sense Richard Martin’s argument in 
a 1993 review of Lawrence’s Defenders of God—that there may be forces other than 
“modernity and modernism…in which to interpret and understand” modern Muslim 
movements in many ways prefigured current work that emphasizes the continuity of 
Islamic practices through the colonial period and into the present. 
One of the most influential approaches to studying movements, modes of 
reasoning, and practices particular to Islamic modernity is anthropologist Talal Asad’s 
suggestion that scholars analyze Islam as a “discursive tradition.”  In a recent survey of 
the study of Islam Carl Ernst and Richard Martin focus on Asad’s contribution to 
rethinking the Eurocentric study of Islam. According to Ernst and Martin, the 
“fundamental insight of his critique of Orientalist and history of religions approaches to 
the study of Islam is his charge that the eighteenth-century Enlightenment was the 
fountainhead of academic conceptualizations of religion as well as secular matters.”  
Most significantly, Asad “argued forcefully that Muslim societies must be understood on 
their own terms and not a superimposed Western model.”18   
Asad first suggested that anthropologists study Islam as a “discursive tradition”  
in 1986.  Since then, the idea has been incredibly influential, as Ernst and Martin 
suggested, in the study of modern and contemporary Islam.19According to Asad, a  
                                                 
18 Carl W. Ernst and Richard C. Martin, Rethinking Islamic studies : from orientalism to cosmopolitanism, 
Studies in comparative religion (Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina Press, 2010), 9. 
19 Works that have drawn on this approach include, but are not limited to: Saba Mahmood, Politics of 
piety : the Islamic revival and the feminist subject (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2005); 
Brinkley Morris Messick, The calligraphic state : textual domination and history in a Muslim society, 
Comparative studies on Muslim societies (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993); Charles 
Hirschkind, The ethical soundscape : cassette sermons and Islamic counterpublics, Cultures of history 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2006); Haj, Reconfiguring Islamic tradition : reform, rationality, 
and modernity; Muhammad Qasim Zaman, The ulama in contemporary Islam : custodians of change, 
Princeton studies in Muslim politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002); Robert Thomas 
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tradition consists essentially of discourses that seek to instruct practitioners 
regarding the correct form and purpose of a given practice that, precisely because 
it is established, has a history.  These discourses relate conceptually to a past 
(when the practice was instituted, and from which the knowledge of its point and 
proper performance has been transmitted) and a future (how the point of that 
practice can best be secured in the short or long term, or why it should be 
modified or abandoned), through a present (how it is linked to other practices, 
institutions, and social conditions).20  
By an Islamic discursive tradition Asad means discourses in the present regarding how 
best to modify or maintain a practice that has been established in the past. Furthermore, 
he suggests since “reasons and arguments are intrinsic to traditional practice…it should 
be the anthropologist’s [or scholar of Islam’s] first task to describe and analyze the kinds 
of reasoning, and the reasons for arguing, that underlie Islamic traditional practices.”21  
Asad’s goal was to destabilize ways of thinking about Islam that were dominant in 
the academy during the mid-1980s.  The notion of a discursive tradition was meant to 
allow more fluid ways of identifying Muslim practice—of defining what it is that the 
anthropology of Islam should study—without falling into nominalism – in other words 
without suggesting that anything that someone who identifies as Muslim says is Islam 
                                                                                                                                                 
Rozehnal, Islamic Sufism unbound : politics and piety in twenty-first century Pakistan, 1st ed. (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2007); Lara Deeb, An enchanted modern : gender and public piety in Shi'i Lebanon 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006). 
20 Talal Asad, The idea of an anthropology of Islam, Occasional papers series / Center for Contemporary 
Arab Studies, Georgetown University (Washington, D.C.: Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, 
Georgetown University, 1986), 14. 
21 Ibid., 16. 
  
14 
 
should be taken by the anthropologist as Islam.  The idea of Islam as a discursive 
tradition attempted to see Muslims as reasoning subjects, allow for historical change and 
fluidity, but also to emphasize a continuity in Muslim practice that set such practices 
apart from other traditions, including that of the secular West.    
Drawing on Asad’s work, scholars of Islam have highlighted practices particular 
to Islamic modernity.  Historian Samira Haj’s excellent study of reformism in Egypt is 
one example of work that rests on Asad’s theorization of Islam. Contesting studies that 
positioned Egyptian modernism as the outgrowth of colonial contact, Haj argues that 
"contemporary Islamic revivalism is neither an innovation nor a novelty, for it is deeply 
embedded in the Islamic tradition, which conceptualizes human history as a continuum of 
renewal, revival, and reform (tajdid, ihyaʾ, and islah).”22  Haj’s goal in her study of the 
Egyptian modernist Muhammad Abduh (1849 - 1905) was to situate "ʿAbduh's reform 
project within an intellectual genealogy of tajdid-Islah [renewal-reform], a form of 
reasoning internal to the Islamic discursive tradition" and to thereby "demonstrate that 
`Abduh's rationalism was indigenous."23  Haj’s study then focuses on the continuity of 
Islamic discourses – Abduh’s responses in the late nineteenth century are modern because 
of their context and questions, but not, Haj argues, divorced from earlier modes of 
Islamic reasoning.   
Work such as Haj’s has added considerably to the study of modern Islam; yet, there are 
two problems or tensions in the emphasis on continuity that marks Asad’s own 
theorization of Islam as well as other scholarship that grounds itself in the idea of Islam 
                                                 
22 Haj, Reconfiguring Islamic tradition : reform, rationality, and modernity, 7.  
23 Ibid., 71. 
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as a discursive tradition.  The tensions, I suggest, raise significant questions for the study 
of modern Islam and, in particular, contemporary Muslim thought.   
Tensions in Tradition 
 
The first tension I see in the study of Islam as a discursive tradition is that the 
attempt to distinguish Islamic traditions from secular-Western often involves defining, 
inadvertently, what “counts” as Islam.   This problematic echoes concerns within the 
study of religion more broadly.  As I discussed above, the imperial history of religious 
studies, and the limited purvey of its defining term, “religion” has led many scholars to 
differentiate Westernized or secularized forms of “religious” practice and thought from 
more intrinsically “Islamic” ones.  The attempt to identify concepts and practices 
particular to Islam marks much of the present work in the study of modern Islam and 
often involves tracing the continuity of Islamic modes of reasoning and practice from the 
pre-colonial period through the present.  Yet, at the same time, academic attempts to 
analyze Islamic modes of reasoning in the present run up against the problem of, at times 
inadvertently, defining Islam while delimiting a field of study.   
This emphasis on continuity limits, even if only rhetorically or as a heuristic 
device, what counts as Islamic.  In this sense Asad elaborates that studying Islam as a 
discursive tradition means highlighting the kinds of reasoning that draw authority from 
the Qurʾanic scripture or the received record of the Prophet Muhammad’s practices.24  
These particular kinds of reasoning are one element that divorce that study of Islam as a 
discursive tradition from an anthropological nominalism, simply accepting that what a 
                                                 
24 Asad, "Reading a Modern Classic: W.C. Smith’s ‘The Meaning and End of Religion," 205-22. 
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self-identified Muslim thinks is Islamic as such and, therefore, an aspect of the study of 
Islam.  In addition, Asad suggests that ideally the study of Islam—when the study of a 
discursive tradition—focuses on the “practices of unlettered Muslims” rather than the 
“programmatic discourses of ‘modernist’ and ‘fundamentalist’ Islamist movements.”25 In 
this sense while Asad asserts that “contestation” is essential to any living discursive 
tradition, that contestation—when an aspect of the Islamic discursive tradition—is 
limited, most clearly, by the modes of reasoning it draws on and, ideally, by the realm of 
debate. Within this framework, some Muslims do not contest Islamic tradition—a 
practice Asad insisted is integral to any living tradition—but rather “subjugate Islamic 
modes of exegetical reasoning to a certain Western one”26 allied with Western imperialist 
projects.27 
As the Islamic Studies specialist Bruce Lawrence argued in 2010, on-going 
debates over the category of “religion”—and its Christian provenance—“cannot escape 
the central preoccupation with boundary drawing, that is, the effort to find the core of 
what is deemed to be authentic and Muslim….What are the distinctions between 
orthodox, normative, and ‘folk’ Islam?  Where is the center? What are the peripheries?”28  
                                                 
25 Asad, The idea of an anthropology of Islam, 15. Asad here attempts to circumvent defining Islamic 
authenticity (although, as I will discuss shortly, I am less certain he is successful), but instead to suggest the 
parameters of an academic discipline.   
26 Ovamir Anjum, "Islam as a Discursive Tradition: Talal Asad and His Interlocutors," Comparative 
Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East 27, no. 3 (2007): 663. Emphasis mine. 
27 Mahmood, "Secularism, Hermeneutics, and Empire: The Politics of Islamic Reformation," 329. 
28 Bruce B. Lawrence, "Afterword: Competing Genealogies of Muslim Cosmopolitanism " in Rethinking 
Islamic Studies: From Orientalism to Cosmopolitanism, ed. Carl W. Ernst and Richard C. Martin 
(Columbia, SC: The University of South Carolina Press, 2010), 303.    
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It is actually somewhat unclear whether Lawrence intends this statement to describe 
debates among Muslim practitioners or the academic analysis of such practices and I do 
not intend here to delve into fraught politics of insider’s and outsider’s study of Islam.  
Instead, I simply suggest that in the second sense—as an academic enterprise—the 
concern that defining the study of Islam in fact defines, unintentionally perhaps, the 
operations of Islam itself echoes concerns with the broader study of religion.29   
The second tension I see revolves around the question of “the secular” and its 
limits as a historical force.   To what extent are we to understand Islamic modes of 
reasoning and practice in the present as set apart from—or impacted by—certain 
elements of distinctly modern transformation?  In recent work, scholars speak of these 
transformations as operations of the “secular.”  As in the notion of a discursive tradition, 
Asad’s work has been central in thinking the secular constitution of modernity.  He 
argued that “It is easy to think of …[secularism] simply as requiring the separation of 
religious from secular institutions of government, but that is not all it is;” instead “what is 
distinctive about ‘secularism’ is that it presupposes new concepts of ‘religion,’ ‘ethics,’ 
and ‘politics,’ and new imperatives associated with them.”30     
As anthropologist of Islam John Bowen suggested, this understanding of “the 
secular” is intended to mark  
                                                 
29 See, for example: Russell T. McCutcheon, Manufacturing religion : the discourse on sui generis religion 
and the politics of nostalgia (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997); Richard King, Orientalism and 
religion : postcolonial theory, India and 'the mystic East' (London New York: Routledge, 1999). Timothy 
Fitzgerald, The ideology of religious studies (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000). Daniel 
Dubuisson, The western construction of religion : myths, knowledge, and ideology (Baltimore, Md.: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 2003). Tomoko Masuzawa, The invention of world religions, or, How European 
universalism was preserved in the language of pluralism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005).  
30 Asad, "Thinking about Secularism," 1-2. 
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a general historical condition. It is a product of modern sovereignty, or of the 
Enlightenment, or of the division of labor….Focusing on the rise of state 
sovereignty leads to an emphasis on power; it can, but need not, also engender a 
notion of the secular as a self-contained object, evolving as it goes, with its own 
logic and reasoning. Focusing on the rise of Enlightenment rationality leads to an 
emphasis on belief and also on a modern consciousness of pluralism. Focusing on 
the development of the division of labor leads to an emphasis on the trajectories 
of religious and political institutions31   
If the secular marks a global historical condition, as Bowen suggests above in his 
reading of Asad, then how to distinguish or separate distinctly Islamic modes of practices 
from that shift?  Are we to understand Muslim discussions of secularism—for the sake of 
argument, a political division between either institutions or commitments marked as 
“religious”—as aspects of a historical Euro-American tradition distinct from an Islamic 
tradition, as representations of a global secular transformation, or—as these Muslims 
might themselves say—as part of a debate over what constitutes Islamic tradition itself?  
Anthropologist David Scott raised similar questions regarding the tensions in 
Asad’s own work and his perhaps dueling theoretical commitments.  Scott draws 
attention to Asad’s competing debts to Michael Foucault’s genealogical approach and 
philosopher Alasdaire MacIntyre’s traditionalism.  According to Scott,  
if Asad is incited by a Nietzschean skepticism regarding power's knowledges 
(especially modern power's universalist knowledges) and is ever urged in 
                                                 
31 John Bowen, "Secularism: Conceptual Genealogy or Political Dilemma?," Comparative Studies in 
Society and History 42, no. 3 (2010): 681. 
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consequence to interrogate their conditions and effects, he is also prompted by a 
counter-preoccupation with the ways in which historical forms of life, binding 
experience to authority, are built up over periods of time into regularities of 
practice, mentality, and disposition, and into specific conceptions of the virtues, 
and distinctive complexes of values."   
These “counter-preoccupations,” as Scott names them, invest Asad’s writings with an 
“unresolved tension” between a genealogical approach to modernity and a traditionalist 
one. 32      As much as genealogy "often appears as an attitude of writing against, as a 
fundamental act of undoing, as an absolute break with the established or conventional 
modes of understanding or idioms of inquiry,"33 traditionalism, in contrast, concedes to 
genealogy’s dismissal of transcendental truth, but argues against genealogy "not to 
dismiss grounds per se, but to reformulate our understanding of them as being internal to 
traditions and a requiring investigation on those terms."34   
For Asad, these competing commitments mark both an ethical concern and an 
anthropological inquiry.  In a study of Muslim minorities in Europe, Asad offered this 
summation of the ethical and theoretical impetus behind his work:  
I have been arguing on the one hand that Europe’s historical narrative of itself 
needs to be questioned, and on the other that the historical narrative produced by 
so-called ‘minorities’ needs to be respected.  This apparent  inconsistency is 
                                                 
32 David Scott, "The Tragic Sensibility of Talal Asad," in Powers of the Secular Modern, edited by David 
Scott and Charles Hirschkind (Stanford: Stanford University Press, ed. David Scott and Charles Hirschkind 
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006), 140. 
33 Ibid., 141. 
34 Ibid., 144. 
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directed partly by a liberal concern that time and place should be made for weaker 
groups within spaces and times commanded by a dominant one….But my 
comments also reflect an unresolved tension: how can respect for individuals be 
ensured and conditions be fostered that nurture collective ‘ways of life’? This 
concern is not merely a matter of recognition…It is also a matter of embodied 
memories and practices that are articulated by traditions, and of the political 
institutions through which these traditions can be fully represented.35  
Many scholars of Islam echo Asad’s concern with both Western dominance and viability 
of distinctly Muslim “ways of life.”  One example is Saba Mahmood’s Politics of Piety, 
an exceptionally thought-provoking study of Egyptian Muslim women that echoes Asad’s 
commitments and questions.  Here, I want to explore this tension between the continuity 
and discontinuity of Islamic tradition—as well as its conceptual limits—by focusing on 
Mahmood’s work and its reception by other scholars of Egyptian Islam.   
 In the Politics of Piety Mahmood examined a contemporary Muslim women’s 
piety movement in Egypt.    Drawing on Asad, Mahmood argued that the women of the 
piety movement  
understood their activities in terms of a recuperation of a set of traditional 
practices they saw as grounded in an exemplary past and in classical notions of 
Islamic piety.  The modality of instruction through which they honed their skills 
involved a type of argumentation that was critically dependent on various types of 
historical reference.  Yet, while certain continuities with earlier practices were 
                                                 
35  Talal Asad, "Muslims as a ‘Religious Minority’ in Europe," in Formations of the Secular: Christianity, 
Islam, Modernity (Stanford, CA: Stanford California Press, 2003), 178-79.  
  
21 
 
evident, it was also clear that the modern adaptations of classical Islamic notions 
did not mirror their historical precedents, but were modulated by, and refracted 
through, contemporary social and historical conditions.36   
Mahmood focused, however, less on these “modulations and adaptations” and more on 
the ways the women understood their actions in light of “an exemplary past and in 
classical notions of Islamic piety;” that is, as part of a historical Islamic tradition.   
By counterpoising this Islamic tradition to liberal models of agency, Mahmood 
rather brilliantly highlighted liberal feminist assumptions  regarding agency, subjectivity, 
and resistance and the limited utility of those categories for understanding women's—
specifically Muslim women's—relations to pietistic practice.  She asked,  
Given the overwhelming tendency of mosque movement participants to accept the 
patriarchal assumptions at the core of the orthodox Islamic tradition...What were 
the terms the mosque participants used to negotiate the demands of the orthodox 
Islamic tradition in order to master this tradition?  What were the different 
modalities of agency that were operate in these negotiations? What difference 
does it make analytically if we attend to the terms internal to this discourse of 
negotiation and struggle? And what challenges do these terms pose to notions of 
agency, performativity, and resistance presupposed within liberal and 
poststructuralist feminist scholarship?37   
In this work, Mahmood’s focus on an Islamic discursive tradition provides an 
important corrective to feminist theories that locate Muslim women as either resisting 
                                                 
36 Mahmood, Politics of piety : the Islamic revival and the feminist subject, 116-17. 
37 Ibid., 153. 
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domination or being dominated.  The terms of the women’s piety practice, in particular 
their embodied engagement with Islamic tradition, suggests a different model of agency.  
In this sense, Mahmood described the operations, subjectivites, and embodied practices 
of the Egyptian piety movement in order to demonstrate what would be lost if feminist 
discourses won over these Muslim women.  She suggested that  
the questions I have come to ask myself again are: What do we mean when we as 
feminists say that gender equality is the central principle of our analysis and 
politics?...Are we willing to countenance the sometimes violent task of remaking 
sensibilities, life worlds, and attachments so that women of the kind I worked 
with may be taught to value the principle of 'freedom'? Furthermore, does a 
commitment to the ideal of equality in our own lives endow us with the capacity 
to know that this ideal captures what is or should be fulfilling for everyone else? 
If it does not, as is surely the case, then I think we need to rethink, with far more 
humility than we are accustomed to, what feminist politics really mean.38   
Significantly, Mahmood did not intend to intervene in debates over feminism among 
Muslim women, or to valorize Muslim feminists; instead, she located the practices of the 
Muslim women she studied as external to discourses of feminism and engaged in a 
radically different life world, one that would be destroyed if remade into a liberal model.  
As much as Mahmood’s attention to the Islamic “tradition” adds to her study of 
Egyptian women’s piety, it also limits the complexity of her study.  In particular, what 
does Mahmood mean to suggest by the “orthodox Islamic tradition”, where are the lines 
drawn—and who is drawing them—between the “internal … discourse of negotiation and 
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struggle” and the external?  Much of the criticism of Mahmood’s work has focused on 
her disavowal of a feminist project.  For example, Professor of Arabic Literature Sameh 
Salim took issue with Mahmood’s withholding of political judgment: “My point here is 
that once daʿwa is placed within the context of a larger and bitterly contested field of 
power in contemporary Egyptian society, Mahmood’s argument for scholarly neutrality in 
the name of a postmodern cultural relativism becomes quite problematic, for it obscures 
an ongoing political struggle and forecloses the possibility of active commitments and 
solidarities; of ‘taking sides,’ so to speak. In an increasingly conservative and conformist 
US academic environment, the implications of this argument are especially troubling.” 39   
A different set of criticisms, however, are more pertinent for my own project; that 
is, concerns from other scholars of modern Egyptian Islam that Mahmood circumscribes 
her study too neatly and defines too dogmatically what constitutes Islamic contestations 
in Egypt. Salim expressed her concerns with this aspect of Mahmood’s work as well: 
“The women’s mosque movement simply cannot be seen in isolation from the rise, in the 
1990s, of a multi-million dollar Islamic media industry (best personified perhaps by the 
charismatic young preacher ‘Amr Khalid) that deliberately took the politics out of Islam 
and preached an ethics of personal cultivation quite similar to the one Mahmood 
describes in her book to the country’s new private-sector elites, particularly its women.” 
In this sense, the movement’s “broad appeal to embattled and impoverished middle and 
working class women has actively facilitated the steady shrinking of the space in which 
Egyptian women have historically struggled to achieve full citizenship and equality under 
                                                 
39Book Review: Politics of Piety: The Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject, by Saba Mahmood, 
Jadaliyya, October 13, 2010,  http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/235/book-review_politics-of-
piety_the-islamic-revival-;  
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the law, whether at home, in the workplace, or on the street….In this sense, then, da’wa is 
not the ‘natural’ expression of an ontological form of Egyptian women’s agency 
grounded in ‘sentiments…and sensibilities’ that are finally untranslatable in terms of 
progressive ‘western’ ideals, but an active political movement that explicitly strives to 
convert—or expel—the other.”   
Salwa Ismail, a professor of politics and international relations who focuses on 
contemporary Egypt, echoes Saleh’s concerns: “Mahmood is to be commended for 
suspending judgment derived from her feminist ideals to rethink her mode of inquiry and 
interpretation of the practices of the women in the piety movement, but a more critical 
view of the authoritarian civilities that these practices consecrate is essential.” 
Significantly, Ismail questions “Mahmood’s argument that while the scholarly arguments 
deployed by the preachers and the women mosque attendees are transformed by the 
context, they remain bound by the discursive logic of the tradition. This formulation does 
not fully account for questions relating to the dynamics of change within a tradition. This 
raises the question of what, precisely, overrides differences in argumentation, 
interpretation, and practice and helps recover coherence and restates the shared 
positions?”40  
The tension Ismail raised between the coherence of a tradition and contestation 
over the tradition is one that Asad himself inscribed in his definition of Islam as a 
discursive tradition; however, in the study of modern Islam the emphasis on continuity 
                                                 
40 Salwa Ismail, "Politics of Piety: The Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject," American 
Anthropologist 108, no. 3 (2006): 603-04. Ismail’s own work has been part of the debate over the nature of 
an Islamic discursive tradition in Egypt.  For a comparison of the different ways in which Ismail and 
anthropologist Charles Hirschkind deploy the notion of a discursive tradition to analyze the work of 
Egyptian literary theorist Nasr Abu Zayd, see Anjum, "Islam as a Discursive Tradition: Talal Asad and His 
Interlocutors," 656-72.  
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seems most often to override this element of debate.  In the Iranian context in particular, 
one of the most complicated questions to arise out of the Islamic Republic, is how to 
locate the work of political dissidents who, on the one hand, draw on Islamic 
commitments and, on the other, increasingly seem to defend liberal categories and 
concepts whose geneaologies arise out of liberal Euro-American history.  How are these 
writings located in relation to an Islamic discursive tradition, to understandings of 
modern power, and to the global—but perhaps not universal—secular forms? 
Secular Universalism and Iranian Studies 
  
Scholars of post-revolution Iran have echoed Saleh’s concern with the political 
ramifications of undermining liberal universality, but little work has analyzed Muslim 
Iranian discourses from the perspective of a discursive tradition.  In contrast, scholarship 
on modern Iran has tended to support the universality of modern democratic and secular 
principles over claims to particular values and practices drawn from Islamic traditions.  
For such work, it is significant that the Islamic Republic in many ways bases its 
legitimacy on claims to such difference – the possibility, that is, that not only are 
“Islamic” ways of political organization and social life viable, but that they should be 
implemented at the state level. I discuss the theory behind the Islamic Republic in 
Chapter Two; here, however, I want to attend to discussions of Iranian religion more 
broadly and the ways in which current scholarship contests claims to Islamic difference.    
Over the last fifteen years, scholars within Iranian studies have organized this 
debate around the competing conceptions of “nativism” and (at times, religious) 
“modernism.”   This reading of Islamic politics took seriously claims—such as Bruce 
Lawrence’s argument in Defenders of God—that Islamic (and other) forms of 
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“fundamentalism” were a reaction to modernity and arose out of it.  Drawing on this 
understanding of religious fundamentalism’s modernity, authors such as sociologist 
Merzahd Boroujerdi suggested that political Islam in Iran was arose out of and continues 
to be grounded in a particularly modern mis-formed conception of the self.  According to 
Boroujerdi “modern Iranian intellectuals’ concept of ‘self’ has been historically 
constrained by their perception of a dominating Western other.”41 This sense of constraint 
is recent—brought on by the global domination of Euro-American colonialism and 
imperialism—and the response from Iranian intellectuals draws roots not, Boroujerdi 
argues, from core Islamic commitments, but instead from “the ideas of Rousseau, Marx, 
Heidegger, Sartre, and the like.” This turn to western thinkers—and the concepts of 
culture and self they articulate—“should  not be considered counterintuitive….The 
cultural-ideological dilemma of the Iranian (and to generalize, most Third World) 
intellectuals emanates from their excruciating role as intermediaries between two 
cultures;” that is, between a global modernity that began in Europe and the particulars of 
Iranian history and experience.42    Boroujerdi’s core argument is that Islamic political 
discourse in Iran is marked by a “nativist” concept of culture – a “reverse orientalism” in 
which the binary of Eastern and Western difference is taken as historical, social, and 
political truth.    
Despite Boroujerdi’s insightful analysis of Islamic discourse in Iran, his 
understanding of “religion” is somewhat limited.  Significantly, he at once undercuts the 
                                                 
41 Mehrzad Boroujerdi, Iranian intellectuals and the West : the tormented triumph of nativism, 1st ed., 
Mohammed El-Hindi series on Arab culture and Islamic civilization (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University 
Press, 1996), 176. 
42 Ibid., 177. 
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claim to a unique Islamic self and, at the same time, attributes a unique and timeless 
character to religious people and commitments.  In Boroujerdi's analysis, a “fatalism” 
marks the "language of Confucius, Buddha, or Prophet Muhammad,’” an element that 
explains why intellectuals increasing turn to “Rouseau, Marx, Heidegger, Satre, and the 
like” who are imbued instead with “resistance and activism.”43  In short, Boroujerdi 
critiques Iranian intellectuals for taking too seriously an East-West divide and assumes a 
necessary universal modernity.  While accepting that this modern project does not, for 
Boroujerdi, require the complete eclipse of Iranian culture, its acceptance is required if 
Iranians are to move past nativist conceptions of self and the political. 
Boroujerdi’s assumption of a universal modernity is echoed by Farzin Vahdat’s 
study of modern Iranian formations of subjectivity.  Vahdat argues that “Iran’s century-
and-a-half experience with modernity should be understood in terms of a dialectical 
process, involving aspects of modernity conducive to emancipation, on the one hand, and 
those more conducive to domination, on the other.”  Vahdat’s analysis of this dialectic is 
useful in that he does not overemphasize the importance of Islamic discourses as 
“conducive to domination;” instead, their modern articulations are part of broader 
“positivist and instrumental sides of modern civilization” that begin to affect Iran decades 
before the Iranian revolution of 1978-79 and the formation of the Islamic republic. 44  In 
this sense, Vahdat locates some Islamic Iranian discourses as potentially contributing to 
discourses of emancipation, while others underscore authoritarianism.   
                                                 
43 Ibid., 176-77. 
44 Farzin Vahdat, God and juggernaut : Iran's intellectual encounter with modernity, 1st ed., Modern 
intellectual and political history of the Middle East (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2002), xii. 
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In contrast to the readings of Muslim practice offered by scholars such as 
Mahmood, however, the Iranian discourses Vahdat locates as emancipatory are simply 
those that echo Western liberalism, in particular models of a free individualistic self. 45 
For Vahdat, modernity gives rise to new forms of subjectivity; in particular, it modernity 
heralds the transformation of “the primary relationships of domination and subordination, 
proto-typically, the relationship between the transcendental God of monotheism and 
human worshippers.”  It is the weakening of this primary monotheistic relationship that 
subsequently “weakened all other types of primary relationships: between priest and 
parishioner, between sovereign and vassal, and most notably between parent and child.”46  
While religion may take on a modern form, for Vahdat it not only requires reformation in 
order to be fully modern, but his dialectical vision of Iranian discourse requires that the 
options for modern Muslims are either liberal enlightenment or authoritarianism.  A form 
of “mediated subjectivity” bridges these two extremes, but it is only comprehensible as a 
midway point between either authoritarianism—the denial of subjectivity—or an 
emancipated subject.  He forecloses entirely Islamic ways of being outside of this 
paradigm. 
Significantly, both Boroujerdi’s framing of Islamic Iranian nativism and Vahdat’s 
argument for a universal liberal subjectivity are at odds with the MacIntyrean impulse in 
the notion of Islam as a discursive tradition as well with the ethicial commitments behind 
studies of Islamic tradition; that is, as Asad summarized, the notion that space should be 
made for Islamic commitments and identities in the context of global Western hegemony.  
                                                 
45 Ibid., 215.   
46 Ibid., xiv. 
  
29 
 
While Boroujerdi critiques Iranian nativists for concluding that “non-Western societies 
were facing not individual Westerners but a unified West” and should be concerned with 
“the destiny of the West itself,” 47 critics of secular universalism—such as described 
above—might attend to such analysis instead as a critical engagement from within 
Islamic traditions and an identification of Islamic difference.48  In other words, there 
seems little difference between, on the one hand, the “nativist” discussions Boroujerdi 
critiques or the notions of “mediated subjectivity” that Vahdat seeks to surpass and, on 
the other hand, the notions of Islamic tradition that Mahmood draws on and affirms or 
MacIntyre’s own argument that the failures of the Western Enlightenment should be 
remedied  by “religious and socials practices of the premodern world, still working, and 
indeed thriving, in post-Enlightenment societies.”49  The problematic, Boroujerdi or 
Vahdat might reply, is complicated by the political realities of the Islamic Republic.  
Indeed this an argument that sociologist Ali Mirsepassi brings against Asad and which I 
detail below.  (I return to this discussion in the Epilogue).      
 Mirsepassi directly engages with Asadian theories of Islamic and secular 
difference and critiques not only the theoretical grounds, but also the political effects of 
                                                 
47 Boroujerdi, Iranian intellectuals and the West : the tormented triumph of nativism, 161.  
48 Indeed, in many ways the nativist discourses that Boroujerdi analyzed in the 1990s seem to foreshadow 
work in the 2000s in decolonial and postcolonial studies.  Beyond arguing that the West is a mere figment, 
for example, such work has positioned the West instead as a discursive force with real, often imperial, 
power.  See Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe : postcolonial thought and historical difference. Amr G.E. 
Sabet, on the other hand, takes this sort of argument to an extreme and argues that not only was Ruhollah 
Khomeini’s vision of government anti-colonial, but that it was in fact decolonial – a direct critique of the 
modern world system (see Amr G. E. Sabet, Islam and the political : theory, governance and international 
relations, Decolonial studies, postcolonial horizons (Ann Arbor, MI: Pluto Press, 2008).)    I am not 
suggesting here that I agree with Sabet’s analysis, but rather than the framework of thinking Islamic 
discourses is more complicated than attributions of nativism allow.   
49 Ernst and Martin, Rethinking Islamic studies : from orientalism to cosmopolitanism, 10. 
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any distinct understanding of Islamic tradition separate from secular modernity.  
Mirsepassi situates his own reading of Iranian-Islamic nativism within a broader critique 
of “political Islam” and anti-Westernism.  He argues that nativist discourses demonstrate 
“a larger crisis of security rooted in the decentering experiences of modernity and a 
consequent will to project a future based on some vivid imagining of a stable and 
authentic past.”50   Mirsepassi warms “against political definitions of nation or religion 
centered on authenticity and thus based inevitably on the exclusion and denial of other 
ideas and experiences” and for “open and democratic societies [that] avoid the imposition 
of a narrative of authenticity as a principle or basis for inclusion and exclusion within 
modern society.”51   
While Mirsepassi views nativism as a problem of postcolonial or non-Western 
societies generally, he is concerned in particular with the type of nativism Boroujerdi 
identified with Islam – that is Islamism or political Islam.  It is the Iranian experience 
with Islam that forms the central chapter of Mirsepassi’s argument and through which the 
problem of nativism is expressed.   There, “contemporary Iranian discourses of 
authenticity … express a crisis of inner security and a bid for ‘wholeness’ [that] 
depend[s] on the use of certain notions whose meaning is taken as self-evident: the West, 
universalism, tradition, nativism.  As a result the level of debate is contained on a simple 
level of binaries (inside/outside, East/West) and does not extent to the more serious level 
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York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 13.  
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of debate at which these very concepts in themselves contested and were redefined.”52  
Mirsepassi asserts that “modern ideologies of closure” such as “religious fundamentalism 
(a totalizing millennial promise)” that seek a “salvational modernity” full of “existential 
certainty and rootedness” ignore “that modern reality and imagination can offer us a 
home only if we can dare to leave behind what is familiar and make a home in whatever 
new and troubling situations we are tossed into.”53 
It is in this sense, as a denial of modern dislocation and call for authenticity, that 
Mirsepassi locates Asad’s work on deconstructing the secular and positing Islamic modes 
of reasoning and practice in the present.  Specifically, Mirsepassi sees Asad’s project as 
legitimizing political Islam, in particular the types of Islamic commitments that ground 
the Islamic Republic in Iran.  He takes aim at a critique of secularism that, in its “crudest 
form, takes the position that secularism is a fundamentally Western or even Christian 
contribution, and insists on the impractical and undesirable nature of any effort to force 
Islamic societies to secularize against their will.  Modernity, secularism, and even 
democracy, the most vulgar form of this view urges, are alien to the Muslim 
sensibility.”54  He continues: “This line of argument is made by Islamist intellectuals and 
radical anti-Enlightenment theorists.  The most recent and theoretically most eloquent 
example of this argument is Talal Asad’s, Formations of the Secular…Asad in fact avoids 
defining the secular as a rigid and essentialized category, and attempts to think beyond 
the binary of religion and the secular.  However, for him secularism emanates from the 
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Western experience and cultural tradition and is ultimately incompatible with Islam.”55  
 I am not concerned here with the extent to which Mirsepassi misreads Asad—although I 
believe he does—but rather that his concern with discourses of authenticity underline 
many of the critiques of work that draws on Asad’s model of Islam as a discursive 
tradition.  In this sense work on contemporary Islam has not sufficiently engaged with the 
problematic that Mirsepassi presents – that is, how to make sense of shifts in Islamic 
thinking such that secularism and democracy are possible to think as part of an Islamic 
discursive tradition? Is such a move desirable? How does it conform with Asad’s 
overwhelming concern with “embodied memories and practices that are articulated by 
traditions, and of the political institutions through which these traditions can be fully 
represented”?   
Another recent work by Mirsepassi, Democracy in Modern Iran: Islam, culture, 
and political change, highlights the stakes of a reified tradition in the Iranian context 
specifically.  Indeed, Mirsepassi grounds his first chapters in a critique of Asad and other 
“radical Enlightenment theorists”56 who, he suggests, take “the position that secularism is 
a fundamentally Western or even Christian contribution, and insists on the impractical 
and undesirable nature of any effort to force Islamic societies to secularize against their 
will.  Modernity, secularism, and even democracy, the most vulgar form of this view 
urges, are alien to the Muslim sensibility.”57  He stresses the need to defend the “elements 
                                                 
55 Ibid., 193-94. 
56 Ali Mirsepassi, Democracy in Modern Iran: Islam, Culture, and Political Change (New York: New York 
University Press, 2010), 193n2. 
57 Ibid., 25. 
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within the liberal secular tradition which provide nonviolent means of conflict resolution 
for a modern multicultural society.”  Asad, he argues, “downplays these in favor of 
either/or scenarios of imperialist interventionism or emancipating political reforms.”58  
 Here, Mirsepassi mistakes the normative impulse of Asad’s project.  Asad 
consistently disavows interest in the types of political transformations Mirsepassi focuses 
and, instead, focuses on the discursive constructions of the secular present.   In this sense, 
Asad’s scholarship is not without politics - he is intent on both affirming difference and 
on decentering Western narratives of its self; yet his writing contain little if any 
normative proposals for future action or remaking of the current formation. 
Yet, Mirsepassi’s concern is that linking secular epistemologies, political 
secularism, and the politics of authenticity might be—and is—mobilized by the Islamic 
Republic itself – a move perhaps most obvious in the Islamic Republic’s sustained attack 
on the universities’ humanities curricula as a site of westernization and secularization.59  
Indeed, that the Islamic Republic’s critiques of the humanities and social sciences within 
Iran echoes critiques of liberalism’s universalism outside of Iran raises serious questions 
for how scholars represent both Islamic tradition and secular modernity.   
Throughout the following chapters I explore debates over the nature of Islamic 
tradition under the Islamic Republic of Iran.  Muslim scholars in Iran continued to debate 
the nature of Islamic authority throughout the first three decades of the Islamic Republic.  
For many of these scholars, Islam authorizes their ability to speak against formations of 
                                                 
58 Ibid., 63. 
59 See Charles Kurzman, "Reading Weber in Tehran," The Chronicle of Higher Education(2009), 
http://chronicle.com/article/Social-Science-on-Trial-in/48949/. I explore these debates in more detail in 
Chapter Three. 
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power in the Islamic Republic and on behalf of alternative imaginaries of Islamic politics, 
ethics, and authority.  Significantly, as I outline in the following chapter, the place of 
classically-trained Islamic scholars in Iran destabilizes representations of Islamic 
tradition immune to modern formations of the political.    These Iranian Islamic scholars, 
I suggest, occupy a contested space not only within Iran, but within theories of secular 
reason and Islamic tradition.   
Outline of Chapters 
 
The nature of Islamic reasoning, the limits of appropriate Islamic practice, and the 
relationship between Islamic modes of life and secular ones are significant subjects of 
debate both among analysts of Muslim modernity and among Muslim practitioners 
themselves.  Representing these debates highlights tensions in thinking Islam as a 
continuous discursive tradition.  In the Iranian contexts, debates over what constitutes 
normative Islam take on a particularly significant cast given the Islamic Republic’s own 
claim to represent Islam and to institutionalize the authority of Islamic scholars.  In the 
chapters that follow, I attend to particular issues of these debates.  I do not attempt a 
comprehensive study of debate over the place of Islam in modern Iran and have found it 
useful instead to focus on a few themes that highlight debate over religious authority in 
particular.  Again, I argue here that these Iranian debates highlight the mutual 
imbrications of Islamic modes and secular ones, a comingling that calls into question the 
utility of this differentiation for representing contestations over Islamic normativity in 
Iran.   
In Chapter Two, I attend to debates over the relationship between Islamic 
leadership and political authority.  The new Islamic Republic that arose in the aftermath 
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of the Iranian revolution of 1978-79, as well as the Islamic symbolism of the revolution 
itself, shocked Euro-American observers.  Whereas secularization theorists had assumed 
that the gradual removal of religion from public and political life was an inevitable 
feature of modernity, the Iranian revolution and Islamic Republic shook the foundations 
of that understanding of the universal secularity of modern life.    I attend to the ways in 
which religious intellectuals, state authorities, and Islamic scholars drew on long-standing 
Shiʿi Islamic texts and traditions to construct competing theologies of divine justice and 
guidance with attention to the powers of the modern state.  The very manner in which 
classically-trained Islamic scholars question the governance of the Islamic Republic 
highlights their own institutional authority within the context of Shiʿi Islam.  At the same 
time, however, these debates both address and are themselves figured by novel political 
situations.   
 In Chapter Three, I extend my analysis of statist readings of Islamic law and Shiʿi 
political theologies from the previous chapter to focus on a series of debates over the 
relationship between Islamic law—as the outcome of religious scholars’ reasoning—and 
the political.  In particular, I focus on Muslim thinking about the relationship between 
Islamic law (shari’a), state law, and an individual believer’s practice of Islam.  Writers 
critical of the Islamic Republic contest the theory of Islamic law that authorizes the 
Islamic Republic, one that prioritizes legalistic understandings of Islam and the authority 
of Islamic legal scholars.  One way in which both religious intellectuals and classically-
trained Islamic scholars undermine the state’s reading of Islam is to draw on long-
standing debates among Muslims that prioritize inner states and self-conscious (rather 
than merely bodily) practice over legal authority.  My goal in this chapter is to explore 
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how Muslim dissidents attempt to undermine the Islamic Republic’s fusion of state law 
and Islamic jurisprudence by drawing on non-legal Islamic disciplines that, in their view, 
prioritize interiority over bodily worship.   This rethinking of the interior aspects of Islam 
demonstrates both the impact of broadly secular concerns on contemporary Muslim 
thinking and, at the same time, commitments to and continuations of earlier Islamic 
discourses of the self. 
In Chapter Four, I delve more deeply into contestations over the place and 
constitution of Islamic scholarship in modnerity.  I examine Muslim Iranian debates over 
the nature of Islamic reason and the role of critique in modern scholarship.    In particular, 
I focus on the ways ḥawzah (madrasa or seminary) journals incorporate notions of 
criticism to define the practice of modern Islamic scholarship.  While in the previous 
chapters Muslim scholars drew on the memory of the Shiʿi Imams to think about justice 
and non-legal Islamic disciplines of learning to undermine a state-sanctioned reading of 
Islamic jurisprudence, in this chapter I explore how Muslim scholars conceive the 
practice of scholarship itself and compare these Islamic understandings of scholarship to 
debates over “secular critique” in the Euro-American academy.  In so far as the 
assumption of a secular critical stance defines our academic enterprise—as well as the 
construction of both the political and thinking subject within post-Enlightenment 
theories—these Iranian Islamic debates suggest the need to reassess the academic 
representation of modern Muslim thinking60and its relationship to Islamic tradition.    
                                                 
60 My use of “thinking” draws from Walter Mignolo’s understanding of “border thinking” through which he 
critiques the notion that true knowledge is an Occidental achievement.  Mignolo wants to see other 
knowledges as sustainable and holding the potential to show the limits of modern epistemology.  In this 
sense, he suggests scholars look at other cultures not as loci of translation or mere information but for 
knowledge – a proposition which requires rethinking the distinction—among others—between faith and 
knowledge.  See Walter Mignolo, Local histories/global designs : coloniality, subaltern knowledges, and 
border thinking, Princeton studies in culture/power/history (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 
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 Following these three thematic discussions, I turn in the Afterward to highlight 
their commonalities and how they might impact the study of Islam and non-Western 
religious traditions more broadly.  In particular, moving beyond thinking about modernity 
and Islam, I turn to work from decolonial studies.  Recent examining in decolonial and 
postcolonial studies provides avenues for representing contemporary Muslims as 
theoretically engaged, not only in argument over Islamic norms, but in analyzing 
modernity at large.   
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
2000). Mignolo’s project echoes sentiments found in Dipesh Chakrabarty’s understanding of “Bengali 
reason” in Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe : postcolonial thought and historical difference.  as well as 
Richard King’s “ethno critique” in King, Orientalism and religion : postcolonial theory, India and 'the 
mystic East'. 
  
 
Chapter Two: Thinking Politics and Religious Authority 
 
“It is because of us, the initiated Guides 
That the sky does not come crashing down to earth, 
That the beneficent rain falls from the sky 
That mercy is spread… 
The earth will engulf its inhabitants 
If one of us is not upon it” 
~ Imam ʿAli b. al-Husayn1 
 
In this chapter I focus on Muslim Iranian debates over the relationship between 
Islamic authority and political practice.  As I discussed in Chapter One, a tension runs 
throughout much Western theorizing of Islamic modernity; that is, attempts to delimit a 
specifically Islamic tradition founders on addressing the engagement and context of that 
tradition in the present.  I suggested that greater attention should be paid to the ways in 
which historically Islamic and novel modes of reasoning and practices intertwine in the 
present; a move, I argued, that expands the possibilities for representing Muslim thinking 
about modernity.  Similarly, in this chapter I consider how debates over political authority 
in the Islamic Republic depend upon both historically Islamic categories and secular 
transformations.  Specifically, I explore how classically-trained Shiʿi Islamic scholars 
(the ʿulamaʾ) draw on Islamic models of authority to think about just government and 
democratic citizenship. In the space that follows, I first provide background on Shiʿi 
Iranian understandings Islamic authority, including hierarchies between trained Islamic 
scholars and the general population of Muslim believers that at times legitimize the 
                                                 
1 Quoted in Mohammad Ali Amir-Moezzi, The divine guide in early Shiʿism : the sources of esotericism in 
Islam (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), 61. 
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Islamic Republic’s own claims to authority.   Second, I examine the sources classically-
trained scholars draw on to think the construction of just politics in Iran.  Finally, I relate 
these Muslim engagements with Islamic histories to theories of secular modernity.   
As I outlined in the previous chapter, attempts to demonstrate the continuity of 
Islamic modes of reasoning and practice tend to isolate those forms from conversation, 
influence, or cross-pollination with “secular” or “non-Western” forms.  Debates over 
political authority in Iran engage with categories and concepts that root in long-standing 
Muslim texts and commitments.  In addition, the very manner in which classically-trained 
Islamic scholars question the governance of the Islamic Republic highlights their own 
institutional authority within the context of Shiʿi Islam.  At the same time, however, these 
debates both address and are themselves figured by novel political situations.  
Significantly, the re-formation of political theology in Iran includes claims to the center 
of Islamic authority, the scholastic and legal apparatus of the classically-trained Islamic 
scholars.     
In other chapters I examine contests over the limits of Islamic jurisprudence and 
the relationship between classical learning and modern scholarship.  Debate over 
religious authority runs throughout these contestations and, as I discuss below, this debate 
is particularly fraught in contemporary Iran as the Islamic Republic lays claim to the 
central authoritative office of Shiʿi Islam.  This claim is not, however, uncontested.  Both 
religious intellectuals and classically-claimed scholars counter the Islamic Republic’s 
claims to legitimacy with novel political theologies embedded in what they see as 
centrally Shiʿi commitments to just rule.          
  
40 
 
The Guardianship of the Jurist 
During the 1960s, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini (1902-1989) constructed a novel 
theory of Shiʿi Islamic politics called the “guardianship of the jurist” (vilāyat-i faqīh).  
The “guardianship of the jurist” extended the authority of Islamic scholars to include 
political oversight of the Iranian government.  In short, it asserted the singular position of 
Shiʿi Islamic scholars both to oversee and to determine state law.2  I return to this legal 
construction of juridical authority in the subsequent chapter.  Here, I focus on the ways in 
which the guardianship of the jurist extends and remakes specifically Shiʿi Islamic 
distinctions between the authority of classically-trained religious scholars and the 
common believer.       
The Iranian constitution—ratified in 1980 and then reconfigured drastically 
following Khomeini’s death in 1989—solidified key aspects of the new state.  Notably, it 
wove together democratic elements—the freedom of the press, the right to vote, and a 
popularly elected parliament—with a hierarchical reading of the Islamic jurists’ political 
authority. The constitution validated the supreme authority of religious scholars to vet, 
oversee, and limit the authority of citizens.     The Preamble to the Constitution locates 
                                                 
2 See Michael M. J. Fischer, Iran : from religious dispute to revolution (Madison: University of Wisconsin 
Press, 2003); Ruhollah Khomeini and Hamid Algar, Islam and revolution : writings and declarations of 
Imam Khomeini (Berkeley, Calif.: Mizan Press, 1981); Ervand Abrahamian, Iran between two revolutions, 
Princeton studies on the Near East (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1982); Roy Mottahedeh, 
The Mantle of the Prophet: Religion and Politics in Iran (New York: Pantheon, 1985); Arjomand, The 
turban for the crown : the Islamic revolution in Iran.  For analysis of Khomeini’s theory in relation to 
Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh), see Robert Gleave, "Political Aspects of Modern Shi`i Legal Discussions: 
Khumayni and Khu`i on ijtihad and qada'," in Shaping the current Islamic reformation, ed. B. A. Roberson 
(London ; Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2003), 95-114. 
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the guardianship of the jurist within the central categories of Shiʿi Islamic theology and 
jurisprudence: 
In keeping with the principles of governance (vilāyat-i amr) and the 
perpetual necessity of [divinely-guided] leadership (imāmat), the 
Constitution provides for the establish of [political] leadership (rahbarī) 
by a holy person possessing the necessary qualifications and recognized as 
a [political] leader (rahbar) by the people (this is in accordance with the 
saying: ‘The direction of affairs is in the hands of those who are learned 
(ʿulamaʾ) concerning God and are trustworthy in matters pertaining to 
what He permits and forbids’).3 
This presumed relationship between political leadership, the guardianship of the 
Islamic scholars, and the divinely-guided leadership of the Shiʿi Imams (imāmat) 
marks the novel terrain of the Islamic Republic’s guiding political theory.   
Most significant is that the Islamic Republic legalizes, through the mechanisms of 
the state, the religious oversight of Islamic scholars and the theological necessity of 
continuous divine guidance.  The necessity of the imāmat, the leadership of the twelve 
Shiʿi  Imams (imamat) referenced above—is the distinguishing characteristic of Shiʿi  
Islam.  The Imams are divinely-guided leaders, sinless, and perhaps infallible, all 
descended from the Prophet Muhammad through his cousin and son-in-law Ali.  For Shiʿi 
Muslims, the divine guidance of the Imams is a necessary aspect of divine justice and 
                                                 
3 An English translation of the constitution can be found here: 
http://www.iranchamber.com/government/laws/constitution.php.  See also, Asghar Schirazi, The 
constitution of Iran : politics and the state in the Islamic Republic (London ; New York: I.B. Tauris, 1997). 
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order.4   The doctrine of the Imams was largely developed in the ninth century, according 
to which “Mankind is in permanent need for a divinely guided Imam as authority in 
religious matters.  He is impeccable (maʿsum) but does not receive divine messages 
(wahy).  Each Imam was installed by his predecessor by an explicit appointment (nass) 
and whoever rejects the Imam of his age is an infidel (kafir).”5 
This theory of guidance sets Shi’i theology and historical memory apart from 
Sunni Islam.  According to Shiʿi histories, the Prophet Muhammad appointed his 
cousin and son-in-law Ali to lead the Muslim community after him.  The majority 
of the community disobeyed this order and three other leaders—the first of the 
Four Sunni Caliphs—led the community before Ali was elected the fourth Caliph.  
His tenure was marked by civil war and a band of discontented followers 
eventually assassinated him.6  While certain branches of Shiʿism—the Ismailis in 
particular—at times ruled empires, the majority of Shiʿi Muslims lived as a 
minority largely outside of political centers until the early sixteenth century.     
It is quite impossible to overstate the marked strangeness of Khomeini’s theory of 
                                                 
4 See, Abdulaziz Abdulhussein Sachedina, The Just Ruler (al-Sultān al-ʿᾹdil) in Shīʿite  Islam : the 
comprehensive authority of the jurist in Imamite jurisprudence (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988); 
Hossein Tabataba`i Modarressi, Crisis and Consolidation in the Formative Period of Shi`ite Islam 
(Princeton: Darwin Press, 1993); Shi'ism, ed. Etan Kohlberg, The formation of the classical Islamic world ; 
v. 33 (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2003); Amir-Moezzi, The divine guide in early Shiʿism : the sources of 
esotericism in Islam; Hamid Dabashi, Shiʿism: A Religion of Protest (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 2011).  
5 Paul Luft and C. Turner, Shi'ism (New York: Routledge, 2008), 152-53. 
6 With Ali’s death the family of Muhammad, the rightful leaders of the community, was even further 
removed from political power.  Muʿawiya, a late follower of Muhammad who had fought the prophet for 
most of his life, gained control of the community and sent armies to kill Ali’s son and Muhammad’s 
grandson Hussain.  Both Sunni and Shiʿi Muslims mourned the death of Hussain and disdained Muʿawiya’s 
actions.  For the Shiʿi Muslims this martyrdom is particularly significant and I return to it later as it arises 
in the writings of contemporary Islamic dissidents.  For a recent American formulation of Shiʿi liberation 
theology that draws on this history, see Dabashi, Shiʿism: A Religion of Protest. 
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rule in light of both the historical practice and intellectual traditions of Imami—or 
Twelver—Shiʿism.7  The Imams were politically sidelined following Ali’s death and 
often engaged with their communities only under the eye of ruling Sunni authorities.    
Shiʿi theories of unified religious and political rule became even more disconnected from 
daily praxis in the tenth century when the Twelfth Imam, Muhammad al-Mahdi, went into 
occultation (ghayba).  Shiʿi Muslims believe that he will return at the end of time to 
establish a reign of justice, a belief that at times has given rise to millenarian movements 
and, at others, to a quietist stance.8   
A library of theological texts supporting this quietism arose since the 
disappearance of the Imams and revolves in large part around binaries of unjust and just 
rulers.  For several centuries—at least until the 1500s—the majority of Shiʿi Muslims 
held that the only just ruler was the Imam, and the community would have live under—
though not support—unjust regimes until the end of time when he returns.   Sheikh al-
Murtada (1044), an early Shiʿi scholar, summarized the centrality of the Imams: “Reason 
(ʿaql) requires that there should be a leader at all times, that this leader should be 
infallible [and that he is such that-A.S.] one is secure against his committing any bad 
deed.”9 (Sachedina 2008 44)  “the people, if neglected without any [such – K.F.] leaders, 
would go into excess in doing evil deeds and their condition would thus become corrupt 
                                                 
7 This is despite a tendency in writings on post-Khomeini Iran to label religious scholars’ claims to political 
authority as “traditional.”  Historically speaking, it is not traditional. It is novel to the extent of being 
unprecedented prior to the twentieth century.  
8 For competing theories of the Shiʿi Islam as inherently politically quietist or politically dissident, see 
Amir-Moezzi, The divine guide in early Shiʿism : the sources of esotericism in Islam; Dabashi, Shiʿism: A 
Religion of Protest.   
9 Luft and Turner, Shi'ism, 45. 
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and their order faulty.”  Yet even during the time al-Murtada wrote, the Twelfth Imam 
was already in occultation, absent from the community of Muslims, and unable to rule.   
The absence (ghayba) of the Imams presented a complicated problem for Shiʿi  
political theology. 10  Leading Twelver Shiʿi  scholars acquiesced to a largely autonomous 
realm of political authority for several centuries following the death of Muhammad.  
Scholars often validated the powers of these rulers—whether they ascribed to a different 
school of Shiʿi sm (such as the eleventh century Buyids in Baghdad), Sunni Islam (such 
as the Seljuks who controlled much of the modern day Middle East and Central Asia in 
the twelfth and thirteenth centuries), or Twelver Shiʿi sm itself (such as the Safavid Shahs 
who controlled greater Iran from the sixteenth to the early eighteenth century).  They did 
not view these rulers as external to Islamic understandings of community, economic, or 
political life.  However, neither did they equate the ruling powers with their own 
specifically religious authority nor with the Shiʿi political ideal in which a sinless “divine 
guide” would lead the community. 
Instead, following the absence of the Imams, Shiʿi Islamic scholars began to 
assert their deputyship (niyabat) on behalf the Imams; yet this was deputyship was 
greatly limited.  In the sixteenth century, for example, scholars debated heavily whether 
                                                 
10 There was a marked debate in Shiʿi studies over the evolution of juridical authority.  Whereas Abdulaziz 
Sachedina has argued that post-occultation legal discussions regarding the guardianship of jurists set a 
framework for the jurists’ political authority, Hossein Modaressi Tabatabaʿi has argued instead that 
Sachedina misreads those early sources in order to purposefully construct a groundwork for the twentieth 
century theory of juridical authority.  In particular, Modaressi contests the notion that the delegates of the 
Imams were particularly learned and, therefore, any connection between the Imams’ delegation of authority 
and that status of scholars (Hossein Modarressi, "Review: The Just Ruler or the Guardian Jurist: An 
Attempt to Link Two Different Shiʿite Concepts," Journal of the American Oriental Society 111, no. 3 
(1991): 549-62.)  
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one could even lead Friday prayers – a position historically reserved for the Imam.11  
Instead, the “guardianship of the jurist” that legitimizes the Islamic Republic draws on 
later transformations in Shiʿi practice; in particular, it is predicated upon an 
understanding of Islamic scholarship wherein the general believer requires the Islamic 
learning of scholars in order to practice correctly.12  In some ways this distinction arises 
from thirteenth and fourteenth century debates within Islamic legal theory during which 
Shiʿi scholars incorporated the notion of “independent reasoning” (or, ijtihād) into their 
theorization of Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh).  Robert Gleave has argued that the very 
notion of independent reasoning implied a division between the Islamic legal scholars—
who have the authority and training to assess the sources of law—from non-scholars.13 
                                                 
11 Andrew Newman argued in article focused on Safavid scholar Mohsen Fayd al-Kashani (1598-1680) 
that the contested issue among Shiʿi scholars of the period was less the question of general deputyship and 
more the question of the proper relationship to the state.  In this sense, authors such as Fayd al-Kashani 
argued for the ʿulamaʾ’s role in leading Friday prayer not on the basis of deputyship in the absence of the 
Imam (a claim that, as an Akhbari, he would not support) but on the basis of needing to maintain 
relationships with the ruling authority.  Newman argues that these Safavid-era relationships to the state, 
even though not argued in terms of deputyship, set the stage for later developments in Shiʿi  Islam by 
greatly increasing the authority of the ʿulamaʾ (Andrew Newman, "Fayd al-Kashani and the Rejection of 
the Clergy/State Alliance: Friday Prayer as Politics in the Safavid Period," in The Most Learned of the 
Shi’a: The Instiuttion of Marja’taqlid, ed. Linda S. Walbridge (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 
34-52. 
12 Ahmad Kazemi Moussavi and Abbas Amanat both argue that theories of emulation—stemming from the 
division between muqallid and mujtahid—were more significant for the eventual formation of the Islamic 
Republic than sixteenth century debates over the general deputyship of the jurists (niyaba al-amma).  See, 
Ahmad Kazemi Moussavi, Religious authority in shi'ite Islam : from the office of mufti to the institution of 
marja' (Kuala Lumpur: International Institute of Islamic Thought and Civilization, 1996); Abbas Amanat, 
"In between the Madrasa and the Marketplace: The Designation of Clerical Leadership in Modern 
Shi`ism," in Authority and Political Culture in Shi`ism, ed. Said Amir Arjomand (Albany: SUNY Press, 
1988), 149-78.  
13 Gleave, "Political Aspects of Modern Shi`i Legal Discussions: Khumayni and Khu`i on ijtihad and 
qada'," 96-116. These theories arise out of debates over the nature of reason, revelation, and interpretation 
among Shiʿi scholars.  In brief, while some nineteenth century scholars—the Usuli—differentiated between 
scholars and the remainder of Muslims, Akhbari scholars disputed this division.  Since the nineteenth 
century the Usuli position has dominated Shiʿi discussions.  These debates, although important  historically, 
are outside the immediate purview of my discussion.  For an overview see, Hamid Algar, Religion and 
State in Iran, 1785-1906: The Role of the Ulama in the Qajar Period (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1969); Kazemi Moussavi, Religious authority in shi'ite Islam : from the office of mufti to the 
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Nineteenth and twentieth century developments further institutionalized and 
reformed this division, in particular around the notion of “emulation” (or taqlīd).14  
According to theories of emulation the general practitioner (or muqallid) must direct his 
or her questions regarding correct practice to a ranking Islamic scholar who is able to 
practice independent reasoning.  The practitioner then emulates that scholar’s opinions 
and practice.  Significantly, not all Islamic scholars attain the rank of reasoning 
independently regarding the sources of law and one who does so is referred to as a 
mujtahid.  Even lower ranking Islamic scholars must emulate the practice of a mujtahid.  
Both the general body of Muslims and lower ranking scholars choose whom to emulate 
from among scholars of the highest-rank.  These can not only reason independently, but 
are among the most learned and pious.  A scholar of this rank, deserving of emulation, is 
known as a Source of Emulation (marjaʿ-i taqlīd) .15 
As I discuss shortly, the Islamic Republic embeds this hierarchy in the legal 
authority of the state; however, it would be a mistake to assume the Islamic Republic’s 
model marks a necessary evolution of this authoritative relationship.  Scholars of Shiʿism 
                                                                                                                                                 
institution of marja'; Abbas Amanat, "From ijtihad to wilayat-i faqih: The evolving of Shiʿi Legal Authority 
into Political Power," in Apocalyptic Islam and Iranian Shi'ism (New York: I.B. Tauris 2009); Juan Ricardo 
Cole, Sacred space and holy war : the politics, culture and history of Shi'ite Islam (London: I.B. Tauris, 
2002), 58-77.  
14 For competing assessments of the relationship between religious authorities and the Qajar state in the 
nineteenth century, see Algar, Religion and State in Iran, 1785-1906: The Role of the Ulama in the Qajar 
Period; Amanat, "From ijtihad to wilayat-i faqih: The evolving of Shiʿi Legal Authority into Political 
Power." 
15 The periodization of this institution is complicated.  It seems that nineteenth century scholars who, 
during the twentieth century, were identified as Sources of Emulation were not granted that designation 
during their lifetimes.  They were discussed instead in terms of riyasat - a more diffuse concept of 
leadership largely related to the clerical establishment itself.  See, Kazemi Moussavi, Religious authority in 
shi'ite Islam : from the office of mufti to the institution of marja'; Amanat, "In between the Madrasa and the 
Marketplace: The Designation of Clerical Leadership in Modern Shi`ism."  
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in fact have noted “democratic” elements of this practice prior to the Islamic Republic’s 
legalization of the Islamic scholar’s authority.  On the one hand, until the jurists’ 
authority was institutionalized in the Islamic Republic the decision to select which Source 
of Emulation to follow and, to a large extent, whether to follow his opinion was largely in 
the hands of regular believers16; on the other hand, Islamic scholars themselves largely 
selected the pool of possible authorities to emulate through designating one as a mujtahid 
and affirming his scholarship and piety.   
Beginning in the twentieth century, scholars drew on this hierarchy to make 
claims regarding the correct form of government for the new Iranian nation-state.  Some 
scholars argued during the constitutional revolution of 1905-1911 that all matters should 
be based on the emulation of ranking Islamic authorities and, therefore, that democratic 
government was illegitimate.17  Khomeini’s own theory of the guardianship of the jurist 
transformed this division, not only by connecting the authority of scholars to the state (a 
move suggested during the earlier constitutional debates), but by prioritizing knowledge 
of Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) over other categories of scholarship and piety that had 
previously marked the Sources of Emulation.18 (In the subsequent chapter I explore 
critiques of the Islamic Republic that focus on this legal model of authority and attempt 
to destabilize it by arguing for the pre-eminence of other, non-legal, forms of Islamic 
scholarship.)  
                                                 
16 Amanat, "In between the Madrasa and the Marketplace: The Designation of Clerical Leadership in 
Modern Shi`ism." 
17  Kazemi Moussavi, Religious authority in shi'ite Islam : from the office of mufti to the institution of 
marja'. 
18 Gleave, "Political Aspects of Modern Shi`i Legal Discussions: Khumayni and Khu`i on ijtihad and 
qada'." 
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Between the Islamic Republic’s first constitution—ratified in 1981—and 
its second—ratified in 1989—Khomeini extended his theory of rule to suggest 
even greater authority for the governing jurists.  It is remarkable that Khomeini 
argued against the notion that the Islamic Republic operated within the confines 
of Islamic, suggesting that such a theory  
“is completely  contrary  to my words.  The government can 
unilaterally abrogate legal [sharʿi – S.A.] agreements that it has 
made with the people....The  government  can—when  it sees fit to 
contravene  the good of the  Islamic  country-prevent  the  
pilgrimage,  which  is one of  the important divine duties…If  the 
government can exercise  its  authority only  within the  bounds  of 
the  peripheral  divine  laws,  then  the  bestowal  of the divine  
ordinances through absolute deputyship upon the Prophet…would 
be hollow and meaningless.”19 
Significantly,   Khomeini argued that the government—for the “good of the Islamic 
country”—is sovereign not only in that it dictates and enforces law, but that it is capable 
of superseding any regulation dictated by Islam.  Scholars identify this new theory of 
authority—not only to contravene previous understanding of divine law, but also 
universally acknowledged “divine duties”—as the “absolute guardianship” of the jurist 
                                                 
19 Shahrough Akhavi, "Contending Discourses in Shi'i Law on the Doctrine of Wilāyat al-Faqīh," Iranian 
Studies 29, no. 3/4 (1996): 264. For further discussions of this statement from Khomeini, see Chibli Mallat, 
The renewal of Islamic law : Muhammad Baqer as-Sadr, Najaf, and the Shi'i International, Cambridge 
Middle East library (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993); Olivier Roy, "The Crisis 
of Religious Legitimacy in Iran," Middle East Journal 53, no. 2 (1999): 201-16. 
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(vilāyat-i faqīh-i muṭlaq).20 This political theory suggests that even duties mandatory for 
individual Muslims are secondary to the needs of the Islamic political system itself.  In 
this sense, the “logic behind  the absolute empowerment  notion  is  that the  
establishment  of an  Islamic  state  supervenes  in its importance  every other  facet of  
Islam, because without such a state, the very existence of  Islam itself  is  in  question.”21   
This need for an Islamic state—and its processes during the first three 
decades—reforms Shiʿi  theologies of divine guidance and juridical authority 
along statist and absolutist lines.  Those who follow Khomeini in linking the 
divine guidance of the Imams to present-day political life both present themselves 
(or the Leader) as necessary substitutes for the Imams during the occultation 
and—if not sinless—at least unquestionable authorities in both political 
governance and religious meaning.22 
                                                 
20 Akhavi, "Contending Discourses in Shi'i Law on the Doctrine of Wilāyat al-Faqīh," 264. 
21Ibid., 267.  Akhavi perceptively argued that Khomeini’s theory of rule prioritized the Imamate over all 
other aspects of Shiʿi thought and practice.  Akhavi did not elaborate upon this point and later work has 
done little to explore its implications.  Yet, it seems that Akhavi meant to suggest that Khomeini’s emphasis 
on the political necessity of “divine guidance” demanded the total reformation of Shiʿism in line with this 
singular commitment.  In other words, Khomeini argued not only that divine guidance defined Shiʿism, but 
that its importance was such that all other commitments and concerns were null. 
For a discussion of parallel developments—and the contravening concerns of Pakistani religious scholars—
see Zaman, The ulama in contemporary Islam : custodians of change, 87-110. 
22 These Iranian developments exemplify Talal Asad’s argument that the “statism” of post-colonial Muslim 
discourses—whether “Islamist” or “liberal”—distinguishes them from earlier Islamic understandings of 
political and ethical life (Asad, "Secularism, Nation State, Religion," 181-204.).  While early analysis of the 
Islamic Republic marked it as a “return” of Islamic tradition, more recent works have highlighted its 
modernity.  See, in particular, Vanessa Martin, Creating an Islamic State: Khomeini and the Making of a 
New Iran (London: I.B. Tauris, 2003). For an analysis that compares Iranian developments to Arab Muslim 
politics, see Tripp, Islam and the moral economy : the challenge of capitalism.   
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Just Hierarchies: The System and the Scholar 
Debate over what constitutes “just rule” in the absence of the Imams has been part of 
Shiʿi thinking for centuries; yet, in the setting of contemporary Iran, scholars craft 
competing theologies of divine justice and just rule to argue the limits of democratic 
citizenship.  Unlike Sunni Muslims, Shiʿi Muslims do not classify their practices and 
doctrines into the “five pillars,” which include pilgrimage, witnessing to Islam, daily 
prayer, almsgiving, fasting during Ramadan.  These components are present in Shiʿi 
thought and practice, but are discussed as “pillars” per se; instead, the central focus of 
Shiʿi theology are the fundamentals of religion, or usūl al-dīn.  These fundamentals 
include prophecy, resurrection and judgment, and the unity of God (tawhid).  For the 
purposes of this chapter, however, the most significant of the five fundamentals of 
religion are Imamate—discussed above—and divine justice (adl).23  In one sense the 
debates of Islamic scholars seem devoid of imbrications in secular discourses and 
programmatic politics in so far as their writings on justice are defined by long-standing 
debates over and theologies of divine justice; yet, in another context, these debates over 
justice become distinctly political theology, wherein scholars theorize a contemporary 
system of Islamic governance by constructing novel linkages from the justice of god and 
just politics.   
The writings of Grand Ayatollah Ja`far Sobhani (b. 1930) not only represents what 
Iranian reformists themselves label “traditionalist jurisprudence” (fiqh-i sunnatī), but also 
the intersection of Shiʿi and secular discourses.  Sobhani’s writings on justice in 
                                                 
23 For brief summaries of these principles and their differences from Sunni theology, see Seyyed Hossein 
Nasr, Hamid Dabashi, and Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, eds., Shi`ism: doctrines, thought, and spirituality 
(Albany: State University of New York Press,1988), 1-9. Moojan Momen, An introduction to Shi'i Islam : 
the history and doctrines of Twelver Shi'ism (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985), 176-78.   
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particular demonstrate an attempt to think the political through Shiʿi categories 
transformed by the context of a secular, though Islamic, state.  Specifically, Sobhani 
engages with theories of justice in order to inscribe Iranian politics within a political 
theology that prioritizes the continuation of an Islamic “system (niẓām),” that is, the 
Islamic Republic.     
  One site in which Sobhani has written about Shiʿi  theories of justice is in the 
book A Charter of [Shiʿi ] Imami Beliefs (manshūr-i ʿaqāid-i imāmiyya), which he wrote 
in Persian “with the intention of presenting to a non-specialist audience a concise but 
wide-ranging overview of the principle tenets of Twelver Shiʿi  Islam.”24  A Charter of 
[Shiʿi ] Imami Beliefs was first published in Qom in 1997 by the Institute of Imam 
Sadiq’s Teachings and Inquiries (Muassasah-i Ta`limat-i va Tahqiqati-i Imam Sadiq) 
under the direction of the Ministry of Culture and Guidance.25 The Ministry of Culture 
and Guidance has many divisions, some focused explicitly on domestic issues, such as 
managing (and limiting) publishing permits for newspapers, films, and books.  The 
reformist former President Muhammad Khatami even served as the Chair of the Ministry 
in the late 1980s and early 1990s.  During that period he allowed increased publications 
which, in retrospect, many suggest opened up public debate and helped galvanize the 
Iranian reform movement of the 1990s.  I am not suggesting, however, that the Ministry 
itself has a “reformist” program, quite the opposite.   
                                                 
24  Reza Shah-Kazemi, "Translator's Foreword, in Doctrines of Shiʿi Islam : a compendium of Imami 
beliefs and practices "  (New York, NY: I.B. Tauris, 2003), xi-xvii. 
25  Little academic work has been done on Ministry of Culture and Guidance.  While the American Foreign 
Policy Institute suggests its main function is “exporting terrorism” and facilitating the “infiltration of—and 
terrorist recruitment within—local Muslim populations in foreign nations,” this is a rather limited view of 
the Ministry’s work as I discuss above.   “Islamic Republic of Iran,” World Almanac of Islamism 2011 
(Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2011).   
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In 2010 the Ministry of Culture and Guidance distributed 100,000 copies of 
Sobhani’s text to university students.26 The publications and circulations of The Ministry 
of Culture and Guidance should not itself be taken as representing the singular stance of 
the Islamic Republic’s government or political leaders.27 However, the fact that the 
Ministry disseminated Sobahni’s text so widely does suggest that the books serves—and 
perhaps was meant to serve—as the textbook for the Ministry’s official take on the 
contemporary theology of Shiʿi  Islam.   
On first read, Sobhani’s analysis of divine justice (ʿadl) in A Charter of [Shiʿi ] 
Imami Beliefs seems distinct from political uses of Islam or theories of state authority, an 
understanding of the work that, as I discuss below, the English translator affirms; yet his 
writings on justice in practice—as a mode of living—demonstrate the imbrications of 
Shiʿi  scholastic reasoning in the problems of political governance.  Sobhani explains in A 
Charter of [Shiʿi ] Imami Beliefs that “All Muslims believe that God is just and that 
justice is one of the divine attributes….The basis of this belief is the Qurʾan ic negation 
of any possibility of injustice on the part of God, referring to Him as being ‘upright in 
justice’….In addition to the evidence provided by these verses, the intellect can discern 
the justice of God with utmost clarity.”28  Revelation, Sobhani continues, is an example 
                                                 
26 "The distribution of one hundred [copies of] A Charter of [Shiʿi ] Imami Beliefs in the universities 
(tuzi`-i sad hezar-i manshur-i ʿaqayid-i imamiyya dar daneshgah)," Mashreq News November 3, 2010 
(Aban 12, 1389).  
27 The government apparatus of the Islamic Republic is a fractured one.  Not only is the relationship 
between second-term President Ahmadinejad and the Supreme Leader himself acrimonious, the Iranian 
armed forces are an increasingly independent entity. 
28 Ja far Subhani, Doctrines of Shi`i Islam : a compendium of Imami beliefs and practices (Qom, Iran: 
Imam Sadeq Institute, 2003), 48. 
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of divine justice: “God created man, and this creation has a purpose.  This purpose is that 
man attain the plentitude of all that the human soul can aspire to, doing so by means of 
the graces realized through devotion to God….Without this divine help, the creation of 
man would be lacking any means of realizing the purpose of creation.  It is for this reason 
that Messengers were sent to mankind, providing them with both explanations and 
miraculous acts.”29  While God sent messengers and prophets to make humanity aware of 
divine commandments and prohibitions, humanity is not compelled to follow those 
commands.  Indeed, Sobhani argues, “the religious commands and prohibitions, promises 
and threats, rewards and punishments, would all be utterly meaningless” if humanity did 
not posses free-will.   Yet despite that “liberty,” humanity cannot be understood 
independent of God.  “The principle of free will,” Sobhani explains, “does not allow us to 
conclude that man possesses absolute liberty, and that God exercises no influence over 
his actions.  For such a belief, called tafwīḍ, contradicts the principle of man's eternal 
dependence upon God; it also restricts the sphere of power and creativity proper to 
God.”30   
Interestingly, the English translation of Sobhani’s monograph argues that the work 
represents “what one might call ‘mainstream’ religious thinking in the official religious 
                                                 
29 Ibid., 53. 
30 Ibid., 58-59.  Sobhani further explains the problem of "absolute liberty" follows a rather standard 
presentation of Shiʿi perspectives as a golden mean between Sunni Ashari and Mutazali schools.  He argues 
that “After the passing away of the Holy Prophet, one of the questions that engaged Muslim thinkers was 
that of the nature of human action.  One group adopted the viewpoint of determinism (jabr), regarding man 
as an intrinsically constrained agent; another group took the diametrically opposite position, conceiving of 
man as an entity delivered up entirely to his own resources, his actions having no connection at all with 
God....There is, however, a third perspective, the one upheld by the Holy Imams of the ahl al-bayt.  Imam 
Ṣādiq stated: ‘Neither compulsion (jabr) nor complete freedom (tafwid): rather, something between the 
two.'  In other words, although action devolves upon man, it is also dependent upon God; for the action 
proceeds from the human agent, but since in reality the agent, along with his power, is created by God, how 
can one consider the action of such an agent to be independent of God?," 59-60. 
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establishment in Iran today; given the diversity of views and opinions within ‘official’ 
religious circles, however, it would probably be more circumspect to say that it is at least 
broadly representative of significant elements within the religious establishment.”31  
Again, according to the translator, Sobhani  
upholds the validity of Shiʿi  perspectives by rational argument on the basis, 
principally, of the Qurʾan  and the Sunna of the Prophet; and he does so in a 
manner that, refreshingly, steers clear of polemics….the author himself welcomes 
debate over differences, and pleads for an end to intra-Muslim diatribes and ill-
considered anathematization by one school or the other….he asserts, ‘the only 
basis upon which one can legitimately accuse someone of being a kāfir 
[unbeliever] is if he denies one of the three fundamental principles of Islam: 
attestation of the oneness of God; belief in the message of the final Prophet 
[Muhammad]; and belief in the Resurrection in the hereafter.’ (Article 121).  
Where differences of opinion on matters of secondary [religious] importance do 
exist, Sobhani calls for Muslims to resort to ‘reasoned debate, based on scholarly 
research.’32 
The translator’s goal in introducing, compiling, and translating Sobhan’s work seems to 
be to disabuse readers of the notion that Muslim Iranian religious scholars refuse all 
debate or difference of opinion and to provide access to contemporary Shiʿi theology, a 
drastically understudied area of research.  However, within the context of Sobhani’s work 
                                                 
31 Shah-Kazemi, "Translator's Foreword, in Doctrines of Shiʿi Islam : a compendium of Imami beliefs and 
practices ", ix. 
32 Ibid., xi-xii. 
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itself, one might analyze more closely Sobhani’s suggestion that “Muslims resort to 
‘reasoned debate, based on scholarly research.’”   
Given the normative hierarchy between classically-trained Islamic scholars and 
general Muslim population—as well as the ways in which the Islamic Republic 
legitimizes itself through that division—one might ask: which Muslims? And in which 
venues?   One of the salient points of contestation in post-revolutionary Iran is exactly 
this: to what extent are the possibilities of debate which are (or were) allowed historically 
among Islamic scholars a model to be extended to the public at large?   
Significantly, Sobhani has indicated his opinion on the necessary circumscription 
of debate in the Islamic Republic and, in doing so, fleshed out what he sees as the 
application of divine justice in contemporary Islam.  As one news site reported: 
"Ayatollah Ja`far Sobhani ...in an interview with the reporters of Fars [newspaper] put 
forth some points from the Islamic perspective about the news and the manner of 
spreading information [which were that] it is good if we hold off on [spreading 
information].”33  Sobhani suggested, “‘each piece of news does not need to be broadcast 
publically, and if it happens that some news does reach the public knowledge of the 
people, [then] the conditions of the society must determine the perspective [of that 
news].’… In his perspective, although ‘Lying is forbidden (ḥarām), telling the truth is not 
                                                 
33 "Spreading news to the nation [should] depend on the expediency (maṣlaḥat) of the state," Newsbaan 
July 19, 2009. Newsbaan is a media blog begun by an Iranian journalist and devoted to critiquing Iranian 
media presentations.  For more information about this site, see:  “Iranian journalist launches independent 
site to monitor media,” International Journalists’ Network, July 14, 2010, http://ijnet.org/stories/iranian-
journalist-launches-independent-site-monitor-media, accessed April 1, 2012.  However, a number of news 
outlets reported this story.  See, for example, Sobhani’s own outlet, 
http://tohid.ir/ar.php/page,AAr2879.html   
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required (vājib).’”34   
An online venue affiliated with Sobhani, Tohid, explicitly linked the 
dissemination of knowledge to the hierarchical position of Islamic scholars over the 
general population.  Tohid reported that Sobhani “highlighted some verses of the noble 
Qurʾan concerning the way for Muslims to spread information and broadcast news” in an 
interview with reporters for the newspaper Fars.  Sobhani himself argued that “‘The 
Qurʾan orders Muslims to give information to the commanders first so that they can 
publicize it if it is useful for the condition of Islam and for Muslims.’”35  According to 
Tohid,  
This Source of Emulation [Sobhani]—highlighting some information that was 
spread during the beginning of Islam and that gave rise to the mourning and 
despair of Muslims—stated that ‘the people of learning (ahl-i fikr) must decide 
what information is expedient (maṣlaḥat) to be published.’ Explaining that it is 
forbidden to spread rumors in the true religion of Islam, he stated that ‘they must 
guard themselves against spreading rumors [when] reporting activities in the 
Islamic Republican system.’36 
In contrast with Sobhani’s affirmation of debate over “secondary religious importance” in 
his theological primer, in the context of the national media, Sobhani is less concerned 
with debate and, instead, with the security of the political system.   
                                                 
34 Ibid. 
35  "For broadcasting news the conditions of the society must determine the perspective”,"  in Tohid 
(http://tohid.ir/ar.php/page,AAr2879.html). 
36 Ibid. 
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Significantly, for Sobhani this kind of censorship and oversight links directly to 
the question of justice and, in particular, how divine justice relates to justice in society 
and the state.  According to an Islamic scholastic journal in Iran, for example, Sobhani is 
among those Islamic scholars for whom “there is no commandment in Islam except that 
its goal is to realize justice in the social life of humanity….[For them,] justice is both the 
foundation of religious commandments and its goal.  A commandment that is not just is 
not religious. There is no [state] law (qānūn) in the Islamic system (niẓām) [i.e., the 
Islamic Republic] that does not arise from justice.  Justice in Islam is among the 
principles (uṣūl) that is not for specific purposes (takhsīs),” but for all conditions. 37  
Whereas, in The Charter of [Shiʿi ] Imami Beliefs Sobhani’s explanation of divine justice 
seems to draw seamlessly on categories, concepts, and modes of reasoning central to the 
historical Islamic tradition, in practice he links notions of divine justice to the social 
needs of societies, needs that—in Sobhani’s view—accord with supporting the needs of 
the Islamic system (niẓām) identified with the Islamic Republic.   
Just Models: Citizenship and Shiʿi History 
Writings from dissident Islamic scholars in Iran offer another set of possibilities 
for Islamic scholastic thinking about justice (ʿadl), the Islamic system of government 
(niẓām), and the hierarchical relationship between Islamic scholars and believers.  Since 
the inception of the Islamic Republic the nature of justice—both theological and 
practical—has been a source of constant debate and tension.  As discussed above, the 
                                                 
37 ‘Abdolreza Ahmadi, "Imam `Ali, peace be upon him, and Justice," Payam-i Hawzah 26(1379 / 2000-
2001).  
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state presents itself as the legitimate successor to the Shiʿi Imams and works to establish 
on earth a just polity which, in most earlier periods, would have been theologically 
delayed until the return of the Mahdi. This intervention into Shiʿi eschatology provides 
the backdrop to on-going debates among Islamic scholars in Iran over the nature of just 
government in a modern society.  In this context, any assumption of clerical coherency—
including the everyday understanding of the Islamic Republic as a theocracy—overlooks 
key ways in with Shiʿi  scholars both protested and distanced themselves from the centers 
of political power under the supposedly hierocratic and theocratic Islamic Republic. The 
Shiʿi ʿulamaʾ in Iran do not entirely represent nor are they represented by the system of 
government in place.38 Instead, classically-trained Islamic scholars have offered public 
criticisms of the state’s legitimacy from the first days of the Islamic Republic.  This 
dissent is particularly significant given not only the system’s own foundations in Islamic 
scholastic authority, but also continuing practices of emulation throughout the majority 
Shiʿi population.39  In that sense, the Shiʿi scholars draw on their authority—and the 
authority of the Imams—to contest state practices and to inscribe, in their place, novel 
political theologies. 40 
                                                 
38 Statements from the reformist figure Hasan Yousefi Eshkevari are illuminating on this point.  See, Hasan 
Yousefi Eshkevari, Ziba Mir-Hosseini, and Richard Tapper, Islam and democracy in Iran : Eshkevari and 
the quest for reform, Library of modern Middle East studies (London ; New York: I.B. Tauris, 2006), 118-
29. 
39 Numerous scholars have shown that Shiʿi Muslims, in both Iran and Iraq at least, do still practice taqlid 
in both distinctly religious and overtly political matters (see Linda S. Walbridge, "The Counterreformation: 
Becoming a Marja in the Modern World," in The Most Learned of the Shi’a: The Instiuttion of 
Marja’taqlid, ed. Linda S. Walbridge (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 230-46; Juan Cole, The 
Ayatollahs and Democracy in Iraq (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2006).  
40 These Iranian engagements with Shiʿi authority align in some ways with movements among Muslims 
globally.  As Salvatore and Levine argue, “contemporary Muslim socio-religious movements attempt to 
formulate and implement discourses of common good that aspire to legitimate specific forms of political 
community, based on distinctive methods of public reasoning.  These discourses are often in tension with 
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Ayatollah Shariatmadari (1905-1986) was one significant critic of linking political 
power and the ʿulamaʾ’s authority during the period surrounding the Iranian revolution.  
Shariatmadari was the highest-ranking religious authority in Iran prior to the revolution 
and had long held a quietist stance in relation to the Shah’s government.  Yet, leading up 
to the Iranian revolution of 1978-79, Shariatmadari declared the actions of security forces 
un-Islamic after government forces killed seminary students.41 As the revolution 
concluded, Ayatollah Shariatmadari argued that religious authorities should occupy some 
place in government, but insisted the new government be democratic and not position 
classically-trained scholars as overseers of all legal processes.  He opposed as well, based 
on his rank and religious standing, the notion that Khomeini or any single religious 
authority should sit at the head of the new government, an argument that caused a major 
crisis in 1979 when revolutionary guards forcefully dispersed supporters of Shariatmadari 
who had rallied to denounce Khomeini, and what they viewed as his usurpation of the 
constitutional process. 42   Following this conflict, Shariatmadari remained “virtually 
                                                                                                                                                 
modern liberal conceptions of the public sphere; specifically, they remain unbounded by the strictures of 
liberal norms of publicness premised on atomistic views of the social agent and contractually based notions 
of trust, by a strict interpretation of the dichotomy between private and public spheres, and by the ultimate 
basing of public reason on private interest” (Armando Salvatore and Mark LeVine, "Socio-Religious 
Movements and the Transformation of ‘Common Sense’ into a Politics of ‘Common Good'," in Religion, 
social practice, and contested hegemonies : reconstructing the public sphere in Muslim majority societies, 
ed. Armando Salvatore and Mark LeVine (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 29. 
41  Charles Kurzman, The unthinkable revolution in Iran (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 
2004), 200n38. 
42 Fischer, Iran : from religious dispute to revolution. For extended discussions of Shariatmadari’s role in 
the revolution and debates over the formulation of the Islamic Republic, see Fischer, Iran, 181-231 and 
David Menashri, "Shi`ite Leadership: In the Shadow of Conflicting Ideologies " Iranian Studies 13, no. 1/4 
(1980): 119-45. 
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under house arrest.”43 
Examples of dissenting scholars did not disappear as the Islamic Republic 
consolidated authority—a processed that took place of the course of the 1980s and 
coincided with the Iran-Iraq war.  This divergence of opinion among Shiʿi  scholars over 
the relationship between political and religious authority was perhaps most clearly 
demonstrated in the need for constitutional revisions following Khomeini’s death in 1989.  
The original constitution of the Islamic Republic—ratified in 1979—held that the state’s 
highest authority, the Supreme Leader, must also be among Sources of Emulation - the 
highest ranking living religious authorities whom each individual Muslim man and 
woman must follow in religious matters.  At the time that constitution was ratified, not a 
single living Source of Emulation supported the theory of the rule of the jurist.44  
Following Khomeini’s death, supporters of the system altered the constitution so that it 
no longer required the ruling scholar (the Faqīh, or Jurist) to be a Source of Emulation.45   
Rather than silencing dissent, this split in the religious-political authority of the 
state, on the one hand, and the supreme religious authority of those outside the state has 
been a source of tension and, at times, has legitimized dissenting and reformist views.  
The conception of guidance in both Khomeini’s theoretical writings and the state 
constitution differ radically from not only earlier understandings of religious guidance, 
but also occupy a markedly contested space among contemporary Shiʿi  scholars.   
                                                 
43Menashri, "Shi`ite Leadership: In the Shadow of Conflicting Ideologies ": 136. 
44 Eshkevari, Mir-Hosseini, and Tapper, Islam and democracy in Iran : Eshkevari and the quest for reform, 
19. 
45 For a detailed discussion of post-Khomeini transformations in legal practices, see Schirazi, The 
constitution of Iran : politics and the state in the Islamic Republic. 
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Ayatollah Ali Montazeri (1922-2009) is the best known example of that dissent after the 
revolution.  Montazeri supported the new government following the revolution and was 
next in line to succeed Khomeini as its ruling authority.  He became disillusioned, 
however, with a series of mass executions in the 1980s and spoke out on the need for fail 
trails of political dissidents.  Following his public spat with Khomeini, Montazeri was 
demoted and placed under house arrest.  He remained, however, a significant voice of 
protest in Iran through the 2009 presidential elections and his critiques have been taken 
up—since the 1990s—by his student Mohsen Kadivar (1959 - ), I return to the interplay 
between Montazeri and Kadivar’s critiques, and their uses of Shiʿi models of authority, 
below.46     
Montazeri and Kadivar are not isolated voices.  Other significant individual 
ʿulamaʾ who have protested the actions of the Islamic Republic in the 2000s include 
Ayatollah Kazemi Boroujerdi (1958 - ) and Grand Ayatollah Dastgheyb (1935 - ).  
Ayatollah Boroujerdi has critiqued what he views as the “politicization of religion” in 
Iran, a stance that led to his arrest in 2006.47   According to an Amnesty International 
report the “prosecution initially sought the death penalty for him and 17 of his followers 
                                                 
46 See, Payam Akhavan, "Ayatollah Montazeri's Brave Struggle for Justice," in The people reloaded: the 
green movement and the struggle for Iran's future, ed. Nader Hashemi and Danny Postel (Brooklyn: 
Melville House Pub., 2010), 16n8 and throughout; Ahmad Sadri and Mahmoud Sadri, "Delegitimizing the 
Islamic Republic of Iran with a Fatwa: The Significance of Ayatollah Montazeri's Post-Election Legal 
Ruling of July 2009," in The people reloaded : the green movement and the struggle for Iran's future, ed. 
Nader Hashemi and Danny Postel (Brooklyn, N.Y.: Melville House Pub., 2010); Farhang Rajaee, Islamism 
and Modernism: The Changing Discourse in Iran (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2007); Mehran 
Kamrava, Iran's Intellectual Revolution (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008).For a critical 
assessment of Montazeri's politics, see Shahrough Akhavi, "The Thought and Role of Ayatollah Hossein`ali 
Montazeri in the Politics of Post-1979 Iran," Iranian Studies 41, no. 5 (2008): 645-66; Fischer, Iran : from 
religious dispute to revolution.  
47 See, "Ayatollah Borujerdi: Iranians Are ‘Opposed to the Politicization of Religion and its Exploitation 
by a Group That Has Nothing to Do With True Islam ",  in The Middle East Media Research Institute 
(http://www.memri.org/report/en/0/0/0/0/0/0/1908.htmOctober 13, 2006). 
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on vaguely-worded charges including ‘enmity against God’, but this was later dropped. 
He was convicted and sentenced to 11 years in prison, banned from practicing his clerical 
duties and his house and all his belongings were confiscated.”48    In 2010, seven of 
Ayatollah Boroujerdi’s followers were arrested, a sign of his continued influence as an 
oppositional figure.   Grand Aytollah Dastgheyb is an even higher ranked Islamic 
authority and served in the government as a member of the Assembly of Experts – the 
body that appoints and (at least in theory) monitors the activities of the highest authority 
in the Iranian state system, the Supreme Leader.  Ayatollah Dastgheyb resigned from this 
position in 2010 and made his reasons clear in a letter sent to the head of the Assembly of 
Experts itself:  
Your Excellency Mahdavi Kani, what offense have the political prisoners 
committed? Why are they not given fair trials? Why are they deprived of 
even their most basic rights? Is opposition to a [single] person [Khamenei] 
tantamount to opposing the holy Qurʾan  and the Prophet? If this continues 
and no changes are made, [if] the political prisoners are not freed, the 
press is not allowed its freedom, and [the democratic articles of] the 
Constitution are not implemented, the only conclusion will be that 
members of the Assembly of Experts put their seal of approval on anti-
                                                 
48 "Iran: Supporters of Ayatollah Boroujerdi Arrested,"  in Amnesty International, Urgent Action Report 
(http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE13/112/2010/en/b0cd62cd-cce1-471f-ac73-
b570bfc81aeb/mde131122010en.html.  2010).  The report continues, “On 27 September 2010, Ayatollah 
Boroujerdi wrote an open letter to the UN Human Rights Council calling on the United Nations “to 
investigate the abuses taking place in Iran and the Middle East as a consequence of intervention of religion 
into politics thus paving the way for the passage of a resolution supporting the separation of state from 
religion’….Ayatollah Sayed Hossein Kazemeyni Boroujerdi has been repeatedly denied medical care. In 
mid-October 2010 he was subjected to beatings for protesting about his prison conditions, including a lack 
medical attention and the denial of family visits.”  Ayatollah Boroujerid’s letter is available here, 
http://www.bamazadi.org/2010/09/boroujerdis-open-letter-to-un-human.html#more.   
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religious and illegal acts, [in effect] surrendering their power.49  
Aytollah Dastgheyb continued his calls for fair elections, fair trials, and the 
freedom of the press throughout 2011.50 
Outside of these individual voices, however, the clearest evidence of the threat 
that Islamic scholars themselves pose to the Islamic Republic was the creation of the 
Special Court for Clergy (Dadgah-i Vizheh-ye Ruḥaniyyat) in 1991, a body that continues 
to operate today.51  Charles Kurzman is one of the few scholars of contemporary Iran to 
highlight the on-going institutional—rather than merely individual—contestation over 
religious authority between seminary scholars and the Islamic Republic.  According to 
Kurzman,  
Seminary intellectuals are now among the greatest threats to the Islamic 
Republic of Iran. Every few months for the past several years, the regime 
has prosecuted dissident seminarians in the Special Clergy Court for 
espousing a view that has been dominant for two centuries among Iranian 
Shiʿi s: the view that properly trained seminary intellectuals have a right to 
debate and contest interpretations of Islamic law. The constitutional order 
of the Islamic Republic of Iran, founded in 1979, establishes limits on this 
                                                 
49 "Grand Ayatollah on the Deteriorating State of Affairs in Iran,"  in PBS Frontline 
(<http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbureau/2011/10/dastgheib-and-mahdavi-
kani.html#ixzz1vbSr6AjB>).  
50 See Ayatollah Dastghayb’s personal website: http://www.dastgheib.ir/index.php. 
51 See, Mirjam Künkler, "The Special Court of the Clergy (Dādgāh-Ye Vizheh-Ye Ruhāniyat) and the 
Repression of Dissident Clergy in Iran," http://ssrn.com/abstract=1505542 ; Majid Mohammadi, "Special 
Court for the Clergy: Raison d’être, Development, Structure and Function " (New Haven: Iran Human 
Rights Documentation Center 2010).  
  
64 
 
right, granting the nation's jurist-ruler (vali-ye faqih) the countermanding 
right of interpretive closure; that is, the right to end debate on a subject. In 
recent years, the state has attempted to use this right of interpretive closure 
to silence the growing numbers of seminarians who are at odds with the 
regime on issues such as democracy and gender. Some dissident Islamic 
scholars responded with critiques of interpretive closure, and in so doing 
have become among the strongest and most well-known critics of the 
Islamic state in Iran.52   
The Special Court for Clergy’s sentences do not, however, silence those they 
prosecute.  In 1998, Mohsen Kadivar—a student of Ayatollah Montazeri—was 
called before the court.  He presented a long defense of his position in court that 
was published within weeks of his trial.53 By two thousand nine the original 
publisher had printed a third copy54 and, by 2000, a different publisher had 
reached its fifth edition.55  In 1999 another scholar, Abdullah Nuri, received 
similar treatment.  The first edition of his defense—entitled The Hemlock of 
Reform—sold 10,000 copies in a day.56 Nuri’s defense similarly reached three 
                                                 
52 Charles Kurzman, "Critics Within: Islamic Scholars' Protest Against the Islamic State in Iran," 
International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society 15, no. 2 (2001): 341-42. 
53 Ibid., 349. 
54 Zahra Rudi, ed. The Price of Freedom: Mohsen Kadivar's Defense Statement in the Special Court for 
Clergy (Baha-ye Azadi: Dafa`iyat-i Mohsen Kadivar dar Dadgah-i Vizheh-ye Ruhaniyat), 3rd ed. (Tehran, 
Iran: Nashr-i No,1999). 
55 The Price of Freedom: Mohsen Kadivar's Defense Statement in the Special Court for Clergy (Baha-ye 
Azadi: Dafa`iyat-i Mohsen Kadivar dar Dadgah-i Vizheh-ye Ruhaniyat),  (Tehran, Iran: Nashr-i Nay, 2000). 
56 Kurzman, "Critics Within: Islamic Scholars' Protest Against the Islamic State in Iran," 350. 
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printings in a single year57 and its eleventh printing by a year later.58  
The possibilities of this authoritative dissent took clearer shape in protests 
following the presidential elections of 2009.  Like supporters of the Islamic Republic, 
critics among the Islamic scholars draw on the notion of just rule—captured in the 
persons and statements of the Shiʿi  Imams—to think the nature of modern political 
governance.  Again, just as Sobhani drew on theological categories of divine justice to 
think the political and social instantiation of justice59, for contemporary Sources of 
Emulation—as well as more junior scholars—Islamic teachings have social and political 
import.60  In particular, classically-trained Islamic scholars who oppose the Iranian 
government draw on their authority as Islamic leaders and their own authoritative 
readings of Islamic texts to suggest alternative models of political governance.    
In assessing the proper limits of state power, these scholars articulate a modern 
formulation of Shiʿi  political ethics and embed their critics in key texts from within the 
                                                 
57Abdollah Nuri, The Hemlock of Reform: `Abdollah Nuri's Defense Statement Together iwth the Opinion 
of the Special Court for Clergy, (Shukran-e Eslah: Defa`iyat-e `Abdollah Nuri be Peyvast-e Ra'ye dadgah-e 
Vizheh-ye Ruhaniyat), 3rd ed. (Tehran, Iran: Tahr-i No, 1999).  
58 Abdollah Nuri, The Hemlock of Reform: `Abdollah Nuri's Defense Statement Together iwth the Opinion 
of the Special Court for Clergy, (Shukran-i Islah: Difa`iyat-i `Abdollah Nuri bi Piyvast-i Ra'ye dadgah-i 
Vizhih-ye Ruhaniyat) vol. Tarh-i No (Tehran, 2000). 
59 This move from divine justice to social justice is a testament to the impact of notions of “society” in 
modern of Islam.  For a discussion of how such understandings of “society” impacted twentieth century 
Muslim thought, see Tripp, Islam and the moral economy : the challenge of capitalism. 
60 For an argument—against Kadivar and other religious scholars and intellectuals—that the Green 
Movement not be “Islamized” see, Hamid Dabashi, The green movement in Iran (New Brunswick, N.J.: 
Transaction Publishers, 2011), 30-33.  For alternative perspectives on the ways in which the Green 
Movement has already incorporated the memory of the Shiʿi  Imams, see Michael M. J. Fischer, "The 
Rhythmic Beat of the Revolution in Iran," Cultural Anthropology 25, no. 3 (2010): 497-543; Charles 
Kurzman, "Cultural Jiu-Jitsu and the Iranian Greens," in The people reloaded : the green movement and the 
struggle for Iran's future, ed. Nader Hashemi and Danny Postel (Brooklyn, N.Y.: Melville House Pub., 
2010), 7-17. 
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tradition – including the statements of the Shiʿi  Imams—and the instructive struggles of 
the early Shiʿi  community.  Their engagement with the Imams’ words and histories 
produce critical assessments of the significance of Islamic political institutions, the limits 
of political power, and the role of citizens in modern governance.  Running throughout 
these interrogations is a commitment to justice (ʿadl) and to reading the Imams and 
Shiʿism as intrinsically and inherently forces that, in their proper formulation, work 
against the injustice (ẓulm) manifested in state practices of violence and coercion.  
Among the seminary scholars who support them, arguments that the state is unjust and 
illegitimate similarly draw on a distinctively Shiʿi  conceptual apparatus including the 
early martyrdom of the third Imam Hussain as well as the directives of the first Imam 
`Ali.  They frame protest against state-violence and contravening of citizens’ rights within 
the Islamic Republic as mirroring—or at least understandable through—the early battles 
of the Shiʿi community. 
One site scholars have looked to in order to critique the Islamic Republic, is the 
statements and histories of the Shiʿi Imams themselves.  Scholars draw on the just 
example of the Imams to contest the Islamic Republic’s claim to represent that very 
lineage of rule, as well as the claim that the system itself is just.  The regime, they argue, 
mirrors the height of injustice in Shiʿi history.  Dissidents identify the state with the early 
Muslim leader Muʾawiya, who unjustly fought Imam Ali and ordered the death of the 
Prophet Muhammad’s grandson, the third Imam Hussain.  The state, when violently 
suppressing protests, is on the “path of Muʾawiya.”61   Like Muʾawiya, the Islamic 
                                                 
61 Mohsen Kadivar, "Questioning the Leader (Istīzāḥ-i Rahbar) "(July 17, 2010). 
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Republic contravenes Islamic commandments, “weakens” Islam and “inflicts blows” on 
Shiʿism.62   
 In a public letter issued during the summer of 2010, Kadivar laid out three sets of 
obligations that the Supreme Leader, according to Kadivar, had failed to meet: 
This letter is a request for an explanation from the Leadership of his 
religious, ethical, and national duty.  The religious duty is:   a matter of 
commanding the good and forbidding evil, the commandment of advising 
(naṣīhat) [each other] [given by] the Imams of the Muslims and 
supervising one of the most important common duties of the agents of the 
public sphere.   The ethical duty is: a matter of the responsibility for the 
conscience of every human in relation to oppression (ẓulm) and injustice. 
The national duty is a matter of the responsibility that each Iranian citizen 
feels in the face of heedlessness towards the national interests.63 
The religious duty of advice-giving is here a duty held in common (mushāʿ).  In contrast 
to both the ethical and the national duties, it speaks neither to every human individual as 
human nor to individual citizens of a country; rather, it is a duty of Muslims to be taken 
up as Muslims in relation to other Muslims, a specifically Islamic obligation.  
 Kadivar goes on to acknowledge the addressees may consider it inappropriate to 
undertake such a public interrogation of the state’s leading religious authority and he 
                                                 
62  ibid. The complete text of the letter can be found in Persian on numerous internet blogs and news sites.  
One example: http://bayaniye02.blogspot.com/2010/07/blog-post_3924.html  An excerpt and coverage of 
the letter can be found, for example, at the Green Movement (Rah-i Sabz) news site: 
http://www.rahesabz.net/story/19664 
63 Ibid., http://kadivar.com/?p=45.  
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works to support such criticism as an ethical and religious duty: “I bear witness [to] some 
statements from the Prophet of God (pbuh) and Imam Ali (pbuh) on the permissibility—
perhaps even the necessity—of questioning those who—surrounded by power--consider 
the leader above such interrogation.”  He provides three proof texts: one a hadith of the 
Prophet, and two from Imam Ali each of which Kadivar sees as supporting the right of 
people to question their leaders and uphold the necessity of leaders to be open to advice 
and criticism.   
 The first of these is from Imam Ali’s letter to Malik al-Ashtar – one of the most 
significant Shiʿi political texts.  Drawing on Ali’s letter, Kadivar argued: “‘The people 
will consider your work in the same way that you consider the work of the rulers before 
you and they will speak about you in the same way that you speak about those [who came 
before].  [Imam Ali] the Commander of the Faithful (peace be upon him) told Malik al-
Ashtar to take seriously ‘responding to’ the questions and objections (pursesh-ha va 
iʿtirāzat) of the people….‘If your community suspects you of injustice, openly explain 
your reasoning to them and, through this explanation, their bad views of you will 
disappear.”  The second proof text from Ali is from a letter to his commanders. The 
excerpt Kadivar cites outlines duties of rules: 
“Understand, the right (haqq) you have over me is that I keep nothing from you, 
except secrets of war.  I do nothing without consulting you, except carrying out 
God’s commandments.  I will not put off fulfilling your rights, nor will I rest until 
I fulfill [those rights], and all your rights will be equal before me.  If I behave in 
this way, then you should thank God for his favor and follow the order I gave. 
(The Peak of Eloquence, letter 50).”    
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In this sense, Kadivar does not suggest that the people disobey the government; rather, he 
argues that the people only owe the government obedience as long as it is follows the 
dictates on just rule outlined by Imam Ali’s letter.  The remainder of Kadivar’s forty page 
missive proceeds to outline the numerous ways in which the Islamic Republic has failed 
to meet these standards – and therefore the permissibility of dissent and protest.   
Kadivar explains the difference between the four offenses of the Supreme Leader: 
“[1] tyranny and dictatorship, [2] injustice (ẓulm va jūr), [3] law breaking and subverting 
the Islamic Republic, and [4] finally, weakening Islam and disgracing Shiʿi sm.”  These 
four offenses, Kadivar argues, are “woven together, connected, and intertwined.”  
Tyranny and dictatorship, for example, is defined in part by the lack of freedom of the 
press and of public reasoning (afkār-i ʿumūmī) while injustice is defined as “the 
deliberate opposition to the religious laws, the criteria of reason and the contracts of a 
nation.”   Yet, despite these different valences, Kadivar argues that “in reality, they are 
four different aspects of one misfortune.”  Here, law-breaking, denying the free speech 
and other rights of citizens, and weakening Islam are presented as linked manifestations 
of unjust rule.  Kadivar’s letter from 2010 draws on an earlier statement of Ayatollah 
Montazeri’s – a restatement that further authorizes Kadivar’s letter.  Not only does he 
draw on his own learning as an Islamic scholar to censure the Islamic Republic’s 
practices, but he further validates his claims through the writings of a Source of 
Emulation.      
For Montazeri as well the writings of the Imams provide sources for these 
contestations as well.  Montazeri begins his comments with the Qurʿanic verse: “And 
soon will those who commit injustice know what vicissitudes their affairs will take!” 
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(26:227),64 a verse of the Qurʾan  that Shiʿi  commentators generally take to describe the 
eventual fate of “the unjust tyrants and persecutors of the …[Shi`a], Yazid bin 
Mu’awiyah being the most accursed among them, [who] will be wiped out as if they 
never existed.”  Ayatollah Montazeri, like Kadivar, drew on Imam Ali’s sermons during 
the summer of 2009 to condemn the government’s response to peaceful protests: “The 
commander of all faithful Imam Ali, even though he is infallible…says: ‘…don’t think 
that it is difficult for me to hear what is right and I don't expect you to consider me as 
grand because it would be doubly hard for one who can’t stand to hear what is right and 
just to carry them out. Therefore don't stop stating what is righteous and guiding to justice 
as I don’t consider myself to be beyond and immune to error unless God guides me to be 
that way.’”65  
These critics suggest the outlines of a vaguely democratic, theory of just 
governance.  According to Montazeri: “If any of the qualifications …[to rule, which 
include being fair, honest, competent, and having the vote of the majority of the people], 
which religiously and reasonably govern the conditions for occupying the official 
position for serving the public, is no longer met by the person who occupies the 
position [to serve the public], that person, automatically and without any need for 
                                                 
64 Mahdi Pooya, Mahdi and Ali S. Ahmed. The Holy Qurʾan  (Elmhurst, N.Y.: Tahrike Tarsile Qurʾan , 
2004). 
65 A fatwa included in Montazeri’s collected works on his website is even more forceful.  Titled “Even Ali 
(pbuh) did not consider Himself above Criticism,” the fatwa reads: “In the Peak of Eloquence, our lord 
Hezrat Ali ordered: ‘By no means spare me from true words and reminders or just counsels - I do not 
consider myself incapable of error and I do not trust that all my actions are free from error, unless God 
keeps me from errors and missteps.’  When a person such as Hezrat Amir (pbuh) – who is at the level of 
innocence (ismat) – understands himself as open to critique (naqd) and advice (nasiha) and as welcoming 
that, it’s obvious that all of us have a duty as followers of Hezrat [Ali] to follow the model of that great man 
and to welcome criticism and advice.”  I discuss the relationship between critique (naqd) and advice 
(nasiha) in chapter four.   
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dismissal, is sacked, which also means all the orders issued by him are no longer valid. 
But, [even] if the conditions are such that they are not religiously and reasonably 
necessary for taking up the position, but the people have mutually agreed upon them and 
the person [taking the position of leadership violates those conditions, then]…. the people 
can dismiss him.”   A regime that contravenes these commandments is “condemned and 
unworthy before [the tribunal of] religion, reason and the world’s wise observers.”66 
 Significantly, the rights of the people here include the right to engage in public 
debate to interrogate political leaders.  The seminary critics not only position themselves 
as exercising this right, but extend it to citizens at large and ground it in broadly Islamic 
as well as specifically Shiʿi  understandings of social and political ethics.  For both 
Kadivar and Montazeri to “command the good” requires taking up public debate and 
refusing to accept the directives of the state as authoritative on their own terms.   
Elsewhere, scholars of Iran have suggested that the Iranian state use the directive to 
“command the good and forbid evil” in order to authorize its surveillance of citizens’ 
personal and public lives (Article 8).67  Yet, for Montazeri and others, the ethical-
religious requirement to “command the good” requires instead defending the peoples’ 
rights.  "Enjoining to righteousness and dissuading from evil” is a "general duty…that 
applies to everyone regardless of social position" and requires making sure the 
government abides by these conditions and calling for its dismissal if it does not.  
                                                 
66 This fatwa was recently translated into English and so I cite that translation here, Sadri and Sadri, 
"Delegitimizing the Islamic Republic of Iran with a Fatwa: The Significance of Ayatollah Montazeri's Post-
Election Legal Ruling of July 2009," 161.  
67 Mehrangiz Kar, "The Invasion of the Private Sphere in Iran," Social Research: An International 
Quarterly 70, no. 3 (2003). 
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Islamic authority remains significant here – both in the personal authority 
of living scholars and the relevance of religious mandates for social and political 
life.  Montazeri, for example, has never been identified as a secularist, but instead 
continued to support a more limited “guardianship of the jurist” in theory while he 
critiqued the absolute guardianship of the jurist – arguing that the Leader should 
attend only to “’religious and juridical’” matters.68     
In direct contrast to Sobhani’s support for the system as the representative of 
divine justice, the Source of Emulation Ali Montazeri argued that the defense of “the 
system (niẓām)” is not in itself a religious imperative.  Instead, “Protection of the regime, 
in itself, is neither essential nor, per se, obligatory; particularly when the regime is 
equated with a [single] person,” that is, the Leader Khamanei.  Instead, the “very need for 
[an Islamic – M.S.] regime is based on the necessity of rendering justice and protecting 
rights, or, to put it more succinctly, the implementation of Islamic commandments.”  
Kadivar weighed against such an understanding of Shiʿi justice as well, and argued that 
such a position demonstrated the influence of Sunni Islam.  According to Kadivar, 
prioritizing the system and expediency at the expense of citizens’ rights to question the 
                                                 
68Quoted in Akhavi 2009.  Differently, the scholar Yousefi Eshkevari has argued for the political 
disestablishment of the seminary system from the state; additionally, Eshkevari suggests that it would be 
best if—under that system of disestablishment—the Sources of Emulation would refrain from giving 
opinions on “political” matters.  Yet for Eshekvari too the Sources of Emulation and other seminary 
scholars remain significant forces for social Islam and, most significantly, their political restraint, in his 
writings, is meant to allow Muslims to themselves determine the contours of a social Islam rather than to 
remove Islamic commitments from the public and political realm.  For a selection of Eshkevari’s writings in 
English, see Eshkevari, Mir-Hosseini, and Tapper, Islam and democracy in Iran : Eshkevari and the quest 
for reform. 
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government echoes “the Sunni Ashari jurists” who emphasize “security and order” 
instead of “justice.”69   
In contrast to Khomeini’s argument that the needs of the Islamic state trump even 
mandatory religious duties, the seminary critics suggest an understanding of justice that is 
not subservient to political expediency.  Their reading of justice—and the demand that it 
be based in the authoritative traditions of the Imams—draws on the same sources and 
models as those who support authoritarian renderings of the jurists’ authority.  However, 
justice, in their reading, demands that the state is not an end in itself—regardless of its 
“Islamic” commitments—and instead must be held accountable to higher criteria.   
In these dissident writings, the category of justice remains the marker for the 
legitimacy of governance.  Scholars not only locate violence within the framework of a 
Shiʿi historical memory of injustice, they also suggest the outlines of a theory of just 
governance.  They turn the rhetoric of supporters of the state on its head – instead of what 
duties the people must perform, the question becomes one of the duties of the ruler over 
the ruled.  Here, they draw on the statements of Imam Ali as well as the directive to 
“command the good” to support the civil authority of citizens and to limit state power, a 
religious duty which requires the public input of citizens, supporting their legal rights, 
and upholding Islam. 
                                                 
69 Kadivar, "Questioning the Leader (Istīzāḥ-i Rahbar) ". The Source of Emulation Sanaei, an advocate for 
women’s rights in Iran and potential successor to Montazeri as religious leader of the Green Movement, 
draws on these frameworks as well.  In a speech to a body of students in 1388/2010 he drew attention to 
state practices of torture and argued that students must remain vigilant in combating and contesting those 
practices.   He argued: “If we make ourselves small then the injustice of the unjust (zolm-e zalemin) will 
become greater; we are Shi`a and our family/people [are] gathered [together] in patience and persistence for 
the truth (haqq) of the Sinless/Innocent Imams, peace of God upon them….We must not forget that being 
subservient to and propagating injustice (zolm) is forbidden (haram).”   
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Conclusion 
In this chapter I examined debates over political authority in the Islamic Republic.  
I showed that, based on Shiʾi understandings of “just rule,” classically-trained Islamic 
scholars both demand limits on citizens’ autonomy and construct novel political 
theologies to limit state power. I argued that debates over political authority in the Islamic 
Republic depend upon both Islamic categories and secular transformations; that is, 
classically-trained Shiʿi Islamic scholars (the ʿulamaʾ) not only draw on Islamic models 
of authority passively in the context of the state and the legalization of Islamic 
jurisprudence, but they draw on those models to construct correct models of political 
governance and Muslim citizenship.   In other chapters I explore how the Islamic 
Republic’s grounding theory produces secularizing critiques of Islamic jurisprudence and 
how scholars, in response, frame their relationship to the modern public.   
Here, however, these Muslim critiques of political governance suggest a need to 
think differently about public and political Islam and the role of Islamic scholars—
whether university educated or classically-trained—in reconstituting religious models for 
justice and citizenship.    I outlined in the preceding chapter a continuing slippage in 
academic portrayals of Iranian religion and political between, on the one hand, religious 
authority and, on the other, political authoritarianism.  Yet, these Muslim Iranian 
debates—which interrogate the relationship between just government and religious 
power, ask in varied formulations how to delimit and define the spheres of the religious 
and the political, of free expression and mandatory submission—are misrepresented if 
positioned merely as nativist, or self-orientalizing, misreading of Islamic modernity.   
Political theorist Elizabeth Hurd summarized the requirements for a new 
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theorization of what is often glossed as simply “Islamism”70 or “political Islam”: 
The presence of democratic dissenters from Khomeini’s program then—
and from Khamenei’s now—offers a glimpse of the potential represented 
by a third path. The actions of these dissenters represent the irreducible 
element of today’s movement….to discern this element in today’s events 
requires a nuanced, imaginative approach to the interplay between religion 
and political authority that is too often hindered by rigid construals of the 
secular-religious dichotomy reflected and reproduced in conventional 
accounts of the revolution and of today’s protests. Such an approach 
requires engaging dissidents and reformers working outside the 
oppositional discourses—“tradition” versus “modernity,” “Islamic” versus 
(Western) “secular”—that the shah, Khomeini, and his successors 
effectively monopolized”71 
Shiʿi attempts to think the nature of divine guidance and authority in the present is 
not productive only of absolutism, but—in the works of these “critics within”—provides 
space for thinking the nature of civil authority and the limits of state power as well.  On a 
popular level, the Green Movement arising out of the 2009 election protests has 
positioned itself clearly within the rhetorics of Shiʿi history. The anthropologist of Iran 
Michael M.J. Fischer evoked the metaphor of the drums used in Iranian passion plays to 
                                                 
70 On the limitations of this term—as well as its utility—see, Richard C. Martin and Abbas Barzegar, 
Islamism : contested perspectives on political Islam (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2010). 
71 Elizabeth Shakman Hurd, "Iran, in Search of a Nonsecular and Nontheocratic Politics," Public Culture 
22, no. 1 (2010): 31. 
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describe the uses of Shiʿi history in recent protests.  He suggested that the protests wove 
together multiple melodies from Iranian history:   
The decades- and century-long social revolution unfolding in slow bass 
percussion is one melody line; another important melody line is the yearly passion 
plays of Muharram, of the death of the third Imam, Ali, who sacrificed himself at 
Karbala as a call of witnessing against injustice so that later generation would 
take up his challenge to establish social justice in this world and not just the next. 
They articulate together, but not as you might think—not with traditionalists 
holding the second melody line while the modernists hold the first.... it is 
precisely the modernists who are calling the Karbala tune, wresting it from being 
a repressive state ideology. 72 
 Indeed, as Fischer suggests, Montazeri and others drew on long-standing 
theological debates since the Occultation, to argue that the people owe no allegiance to 
the Islamic Republic as long as it operates unjustly; in direct contrast to Khomeini’s 
argument discussed above—that the preservation of the Islamic system outweighs even 
“divine duties.”  For Khomeini’s theory of an Islamic state, and those like Sobhani who 
support the “system,” the ideal of justice is defined by the maintenance of the regime 
itself.  Others, including Islamic scholars and religious intellectuals in Iran have 
coalesced since the late 1990s at least in identifying and responding to state-sponsored 
violence. They suggest the outlines of a different Shiʿi theory of just rule, one that takes 
form negatively against practices of state-sponsored violence.  
Yet, at the same time, the ascription of “modernism” does not fully represent the 
                                                 
72 Fischer, "The Rhythmic Beat of the Revolution in Iran," 500-1.  
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intricacies of these Iranian debates.  As Hurd suggested, dichotomies of religious and 
secular, or traditional and modernist, make little sense of these contestations over the 
nature of justice in contemporary Islam.      
Significantly, to situate these debates in relation to both Shiʿi history and 
contemporary political theory it is necessary to see them not only as drawing on Islamic 
commitments, but also as distinctly secular.   The distinction between secular and 
secularist, as I noted in Chapter One, is significant and one of Talal Asad’s major 
contributions in theorizing modernity.  Whereas the secular points to formations of 
knowledge and subjectivity, secularism highlights a political division.  Even self-
described “Islamic” systems of government, such as the Islamic republic, are marked by 
the secular in terms of how the government operates, which legal claims are adjudicated, 
and how they are adjudicated.  
In this sense, Asad notes that the sidelining of religious law that took place under 
colonial and postcolonial authorities in Muslim-majority centers has been read differently 
depending on political persuasion – to secularists, this removal of religion from state 
denotes progress, while for Islamists it denotes regression. What Asad highlights is that 
regardless of whether the appropriate relationship between religion and state is 
understood as removing religion further in private realms or grounding the state apparatus 
in religious knowledge and legitimacy, both these groups look to the legal apparatus of 
the nation-state to enact a civilizing mission upon society and uphold the appropriate 
relation between religion and (state) law.73  As Islamic scholars in Iran construct political 
theologies to engage the present, they inevitably engage with the formations of the state, 
                                                 
73 Asad, "Secularism, Nation State, Religion," 198-99. 
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and the constructions of state law, that mark the secular.  They do so, however, through 
their authority as Islamic scholars and while drawing on their knowledge of Shiʿi history, 
categories, and commitments.  Regardless of political persuasion, historically central 
categories of just rule and divine guidance figure contemporary Islamic theories of 
political governance.      
Focusing on the operations of Islamic scholars in particular, Muhammad Qasim 
Zaman extends Asad’s argument that the relationship between law and the state 
characterizes the modern project.  For Zaman, the codification of shariʿa throughout the 
majority of Muslim societies—including Iran after the formation of the Islamic 
Republic—is the prime example of the rupture that marks modernity.  Zaman and Asad 
differ, however, in their conceptions of modernity and its relationship to Islamic tradition.   
For Asad modernity is not a “verifiable object” but a project involving “constitutionalism, 
moral autonomy, democracy, human rights,...and secularism.”74 For Zaman, in contrast, 
modernity is the rupture of the colonial period.  In this sense, while Zaman attempts to 
locate debate over the shariʿa as itself part of a discursive tradition rather than attention 
to a fixed code of laws, he follows Marshall Hodgson in arguing as well that "modern 
Western societies have managed to retain a much deeper, more coherent, and more 
integral relationship with their traditions than have Muslim societies.”75 That Zaman 
marks the codification of Islamic law as a modern rupture raises an interesting question: 
whether attempts to separate “law” and the “state” might be at once secularizing and 
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deeply traditional.  Indeed, this a contestation within the Islamic Republic that I explore 
in the next chapter.  
   
  
Chapter Three: Thinking Ethics and the Law   
 
In this chapter, I extend my analysis of how “secular” formations pervade 
contemporary Islamic thought.  My discussion here focuses on a series of debates over 
the relationship between Islamic law—as the outcome of religious scholars’ reasoning—
and the political.  In particular, I focus on Muslim thinking about the relationship 
between Islamic law (shari’a), state law, and an individual believer’s practice of Islam.  
While in the previous chapter Muslim scholars drew on the memory of the Shiʿi Imams 
to create novel constructions of justice, here too Muslim Iranians navigate and remake 
Islamic sources to debate the relationship between Islam and the political.  Writers critical 
of the Islamic Republic contest the theory of Islamic law that authorizes the Islamic 
Republic, one that prioritizes legalistic understandings of Islam and the authority of 
Islamic legal scholars.  One way in which both religious intellectuals and classically-
trained Islamic scholars undermine the state’s reading of Islam is to draw on long-
standing debates among Muslims that prioritize inner states and self-conscious (rather 
than merely bodily) practice over legal authority.  The writings of dissident intellectuals 
highlight a historically a contested relationship between faith (īmān), shariʿa, 
jurisprudence (fiqh), and the political as specifically modern categories of “religious 
experience” and secularist arguments for the differentiation of Islamic jurisprudence and 
state law.  
In the previous chapter I suggested that debates among classically-trained Islamic 
scholars within the Islamic Republic represent a statist reading of Islamic law as well as 
integrally Shiʿi political theologies.  The necessity to form a government—as an Islamic 
commitment—as well as the Islamic legal scholar’s position—as head and overseer of the 
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government—are both novel additions to a long-standing debate over the nature of 
government in Shiʿi  Islam.  Here, I look to a different set of discourses that, rather than 
affirming the authority of classically-trained Islamic scholars, contests their relationship 
to the political.   Specifically, these debates center on the application of Islamic 
jurisprudence to state law.   
One key feature of modern Muslim writings—beyond the Iranian context—is the 
recasting of shariʿa and Islamic jurisprudence into the frameworks of modern state law.  
In this sense both liberal Muslims and Islamists not only put forth “statist” arguments, as 
I suggested in the previous chapters, but also novel understandings of shariʿa.    Asad, in 
describing discursive changes in Egyptian concepts of law during the colonial period, 
noted that Egyptian reformists often left out “ethics” from their reconstructions of Islamic 
jurisprudence.  For Asad, this blindness to ethics represents the modern secular state’s 
assumption of the sphere of ethics (now, democracy and citizenship) previously under the 
authority of religious logics.136  This legal element is significant for Asad as he argues 
that “basic preconditions for secular modernity” involved “the legal constitution of 
fundamental social spaces in which governance could be secured through” the nation-
state, market, and family.  He suggests that the “distinction between law (which the state 
embodied, produced, and administered) and morality (which is the concern ideally of the 
responsible person generated and sustained by the family)” was central to this legal 
constitution.137 
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Asad cites the early twentieth century writings of Egyptian Ahmad Safwat as an 
example of these transformations.  Safwat transforms Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) so that 
it is no longer treated as “deontology – a system of religious and moral duties” but as 
“real law, with changing implications for everyday life.”138  In constructing this 
transformation, Safwat distinguishes “the positive rules of law from those of morality, 
which in the Koran are mixed together.”  Safwat’s treatises alter previously held Islamic 
conceptions of law, as connected to personal ethics, and clears space for secular ethics 
punishable by civil law.139   
Asad’s discussion focuses on legalistic understandings of Islam and is particularly 
significant for the Iranian context, in which the state lays claim to authority by drawing 
on a statist reading of Islamic jurisprudence.  Yet, this context—and the history Asad cites 
of the reformation of shariʿa into law, complicates the representation of Muslim 
arguments against such legalist readings of shariʿa.  In this context, we must attend to the 
ways in which secularist re-formations represent not solely the march of the secular, but 
also contestations over Islamically defined authority and practice.  In this sense, while 
Asad points to the broad transformations of the secular—that is, theories and practices of 
state law---in the Iranian example evident as well are local histories through which actors 
have engaged with the broad transformations.   
My goal in this chapter is to explore how Muslim dissidents attempt to undermine 
the Islamic Republic’s fusion of state law and Islamic jurisprudence by drawing on non-
legal Islamic disciplines that, in their view, prioritize interiority over bodily worship.   
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This rethinking of the interior aspects of Islam demonstrates both the impact of broadly 
secular concerns on contemporary Muslim thinking and, at the same time, commitments 
to and continuations of earlier Islamic discourses of the self.  Rather than prioritizing 
theories of privatization or secularization to overwhelm these Islamic discourses, 
however, in this section I position these Muslim scholars as also attempting to manage 
the legal paradigms of the modern state that already—prior to their perhaps liberal 
intervention—have transformed Islamic discourses of practice, law, and faith.         
Significantly, Asad has suggested that “whereas ethics could at one time stand 
independently of a political organization…in a secular state it presupposes a specific 
political realm – representative democracy, citizenship, law and order, civil liberties, and 
so on.”140  This statement echoes an earlier observation by Hamid Enayat, an Iranian 
expert on Muslim politics, in his seminal Modern Islamic Political Thought that 
“politics,” as a distinct realm of intellectual activity, became part of Muslim 
conversations only with the encroachment of European (and later American) powers.141  
Whether governance is opposed to, outside of, or determined by shariʿa is therefore a 
long-standing debate in Shiʿi Islam.  The Iranian debates I survey below attempt to come 
to terms with this political realm. 
Islamic Law: Practice and Politics 
 
                                                 
140 Ibid., 255. 
141141 H. Enayat, Modern Islamic political thought : the response of the Shiʿ i and the Sunni Muslims to 
the twentieth century (London: I.B. Taruis, 1982), 3. Abbas Amanat echoes Enayat’s claim that pre-modern 
Muslim scholars did not attend to politics as singular topic and has argued that in pre-modern contexts a 
jurisprudence of neither punishment nor politics (al-fiqh-i al-siyāsī) existed.  See, Abbas Amanat, "review 
of Abdulaziz  Abdulhussain Sachedina’s The Just Ruler: The Comprehensive Authority of the Jurist in 
Imamate Jurisprudence," The Journal of Religion 72, no. 2 (1991): 309. 
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In contemporary Persian, the political is rendered as “siyāsat.”  One dictionary 
published in 2004/2005 (1383 of the Iranian calendar), called Farhang-e Ruz-e Sokhan, 
defines siyāsat as “matters connected to the administration of a country and its relations 
with foreign states,”142 a definition that aligns with governance (generally nizam, 
hukumat, or tadbir) as much as with “politics” per se.  Yet the historical uses of the term 
siyāsat in Islamic scholarship foreshadows contemporary debates over the relationship 
between Islamic jurisprudence and the political.   
An Encyclopedia of Islam entry summarizes three different sets of discourses on 
siyasa in Islam.143  One, is the category of “siyasa shar’iyya,” identified as a “Sunni 
constitutional and legal doctrine…calling for harmonization between the law and 
procedures of Islamic jurisprudence…and the practical demands of governance (siyasa).”  
Associated with Ibn Taymiyya (d.728/1328CE), this theory advanced “a more expansive 
vision” for Islamic jurisprudence than had previously been articulated by Muslim 
scholars.144  In contrast, the noted contemporary scholar Muhammad Hashim Kamali 
suggests in his study of Islamic jurisprudence (in obvious contrast to Shabestari’s 
categorization), that Muslim scholars classify religious “orders and prohibitions” 
according to only two categories: matters of worship (‘ibadat), which include such things 
as daily prayer, and matters of transactions or social duties (mu’amalat).145 The question 
                                                 
142 "Siyasat,"  in Farhang Rūz-i Sukhan, ed. Hassan Anvari (Tehran, Iran: Intisharat-i Sohan, 1385 / 2005-
2006). 
143 "Siyasat,"  in Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition. (Brill Online , 2012.). 
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145 Mohammad Hashim Kamali, Principles of Islamic jurisprudence, 3rd rev. and enl. ed. (Cambridge, 
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of the political, or governance, he leaves out entirely.   
However, little research has been done on specifically Shiʿi  views on Islamic 
Jurisprudence.  One of the few is Hossein Modarressi Tabataba’i An Introduction to Shiʿi  
Law: A Bibliographical Study.  Tabataba’i suggests that a variety of approaches exist in 
both Shiʿi  and Sunni legal circles and points to Fayd-i Kashani as having a unique 
approach. Fayd-i Kashani (d. 1679 ), one of the seminal figures in Shiʿi  legal and 
theological debates, divides Islamic jurisprudence  into two sections: “one on acts of 
devotion and social duties (al-‘ibadat wa’l-siyāsat) and the other on ordinary affairs and 
transactions (al-‘adat wa’l-mu’amalat).”146  
 The second usage suggested by the Encyclopedia of Islam is a limited usage given 
the term by Muslim philosophers, such as al-Farabi (d.950CE), who drew on Greek 
philosophy and prioritized rationalist philosophical ends, such that they “often elevated 
siyasa above sharī`a in importance.”147  In this sense, the early philosophers such as al-
Farabi understood siyasa as the “‘art of ruling or managing the city’” and regarded it “as 
an important and separate branch of philosophy….Accordingly, political life is 
susceptible to philosophical scrutiny, and its principles may be established by reason, 
independently of fiqh [Islamic jurisprudence] and kalām [dialectical theology]”. 
The third meaning of siyasa that the Encyclopaedia of Islam includes is “in the 
sense of statecraft, the management of affairs of state and eventually,” in modern 
contexts, “that of politics and political policy.” 148  The article highlights Ibn al-Mukaffa’ 
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(d.757CE) as the most significant element of siyasa as “statecraft” in the early periods of 
Islamic history.  Ibn al-Mukaffa’ suggests, “siyasa is the discretionary authority of the 
ruler and his officials, one which they exercise outside the framework of the shari’a, the 
authority conferred on the caliph and his delegates by divine sanction. There further 
develops from this an additional sense of siyāsa in Arabic, and thence in Persian and 
Turkish usage, that of punishment, extending as far as capital punishment, the violence 
which the ruler has to use in order to preserve his authority.” 149    Frank Vogel echoed 
this understanding of a legal division in pre-modern  Muslim legal systems, which 
consisted  “of two partly overlapping legal subsystems….first, fiqh , meaning the body of 
law elaborated from the revealed texts of Islam…and second, siyasa, meaning the 
authority of the head of state or ruler to act in legal matters (including legislating) in 
order to achieve the public good consistently with the provisions of the sharia.”150  
   Abd al-Hakeem Carney has suggested as well that “it has been commonplace for 
Muslim thinkers…to posit their own bipolar distinctions inside their communities: 
between milat (the religious nation) and dawlat (the state)…[and] between shariah 
(divine law) and siyasah (politics),”151 but  institutionally, he suggests, “throughout 
history there has always been a clear divide between these domains, particularly in the 
court system, where shariah judges would always stand alongside ‘secular’ (meaning, in 
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this case, non-shariah) courts, which often did the bulk of the work.”152  
 Yet even Carney acknowledges the fact of the matter is that state law, particularly 
in the realm of “siyāsat,” encompassed punishment alone while Islamic judges often 
oversaw marital, business, and numerous other disputes.  Carney’s easy division also 
denies more theological tensions, as religious scholars prior to the twentieth century often 
debated the extent of their role in social and political life – despite whether or not in fact 
they had the power and position to make good on those theoretical constructs.153   
Religious Experience, Law, and Authority  
 
Distinctions between siyasa and shari`a  were never firmly delineated and the 
ascription of various sets of authorities over siyasa has also been commonplace.  In this 
section I examine the Islamic repertoires Muslims draw on to navigate contestations over 
the relationship between Islam law and politics in the Islamic Republic of Iran.  In 
contesting the jurists’ assumption of political authority, the two authors I survey—
Abdolkarim Soroush and Muhammad Shabestari—locate themselves within long-
standing debates within Islamic traditions that prioritize inner states and self-conscious 
(rather than merely bodily) practice over legal authority.    I suggest that the formation of 
the Islamic Republic highlighted a historically contested relationship between inner faith, 
law, and the state.  The works of Soroush and Shabestari exemplify this debate and 
require us to nuance received views of traditional authority, orthodox Islam, and the ways 
in which both the secular and Islamic tradition mediate Muslim experience in modernity.   
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Philosophical-Mysticism and Secularist Histories 
One place to examine Muslim thinking about the political and Islamic scholarship 
is the work of Iranian reformist Abdolkarim Soroush.  Soroush presents a particularly 
interesting example here in terms of the continuity of Islamic discourses within these 
dissident arguments.  Much English-language scholarship has focused on Soroush, yet his 
engagement with specifically Islamic traditions has been largely overlooked.154   Soroush 
himself was an early supporter of the Islamic republic who, like many Iranians, quickly 
became disillusioned with the new government.  During the 1990s, he began publicly 
critiquing the state though veiled discussions of the contingent nature of religious 
knowledge.  In these early epistemological arguments, Soroush drew on European 
philosophy of science to suggest that “all religious knowledge is contingent on external 
non-religious knowledge for its development and growth and likewise is subjected to 
flow in the sense that the context of its presuppositions is unfixed.”155  Soroush argued 
that because religious knowledge itself is limited and contingent, modern Muslims must 
analyze religious precepts in light of extra-religious reason.156  
More recently, Soroush has called for the separation of religious and political 
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authority, the separation of Islam from political systems of power.  In August 2006 
Soroush suggested explicitly that “political secularism” is necessary in Iran. According to 
Soroush, by definition “political secularism has two major pillars.  One pillar consists of 
the question of legitimacy and the other consists of the political system’s neutrality 
towards religious and theoretical schools.  I believe that religious intellectuals have so far 
argued well that the system’s legitimacy hinges on justice, not on any particular type of 
religion, and the acceptance of the system comes from the people.” 157  
Here, I focus largely on a 1998 article of Soroush’s, “Spiritual Guardianship and 
Political Guardianship158” (“valāyat-i bāṭanī va vilāyat-i siyāsī”) to explore Soroush’s 
thinking about the relationship between Islam and political secularism.159  Unlike in his 
more recent writings, Soroush does not use the term “secularism” in this piece; however, 
he does attempt to establish Islamic grounds for the separation of political governance 
from Islamic jurisprudence.   In this article, Soroush draws on an alternative discipline of 
Islamic scholarship called philosophical mysticism (ʿirfān) to contest the dominance of 
Islamic jurists and jurisprudence in the Islamic Republic’s theory of governance.  In 
doing so, he prioritizes “religious experience” (tajribat-i dīnī) and a spiritual or interior 
(bāṭanī) theory of divine authority.   
                                                 
157 Abdol Karim Soroush, "I am not the Reformists’ Godfather," Shargh (2006).,5. 
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As I discussed above, the Islamic Republic is legitimized by a theory of the 
(general) “guardianship” –  wilayat/vilāyat – of Islamic jurists after the occultation of the 
Shiʿi  Imams.   Soroush’s essay “Spiritual Guardianship and Political Guardianship,” 
draws upon two central questions from the history of Shiʿi theology regarding the nature 
of wilāyat: who represents the Imams during the post-occultation period and what 
elements of the Imams’ authority devolve upon those representatives?  Soroush’s 
dissident political claim, focused against the authority of the jurists, is the following: (1) 
the Shiʿi  Imams possessed both the absolute spiritual (baṭānī) authority and limited 
political (siyāsī) authority, (2) the conjunction of political and spiritual authority was 
unique to the Imams, and therefore, (3) during the occultation the correct form of 
government for Iranian Muslims is a political democracy, not the vicegerency of Islamic 
jurists.   This argument revolves around a separation of religious authority from political 
authority – an argument that draws on a historical opposition to Islamic jurisprudence and 
is marked, at the same time, by modern understandings of interiority and mysticism.  
In this article, Soroush contrasts the guardianship or authority of the jurists with 
political authority and the friendship—walayat/valayat--of the Imams.  Here, the 
contested semantic field at the root of the Islamic Republic’s “guardianship of the jurist” 
opens up and presents a complex dissident discourse of personal Islamic spirituality 
outside the confines of state oversight and juridical authority.  Soroush critiques the 
current instantiation of the Islamic Republic by prioritizing the Imams’ nearness to God, 
or valayat, deemphasizing their political authority, and denying juridical claims to 
represent the Hidden Imam in his absence.   To make this argument Soroush draws on 
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Islamic philosophical-mysticism, or irfan160, a discipline that has held a tenuous place 
within modern Sunni centers, but has continued contested though unabated in Shiʿi  
scholastic circles.     
Central to Soroush’s critique is the figure of the wālī, the friend.  Within 
specifically Shiʿi circles of philosophical-mysticism, as Soroush notes, the wālī—or 
friend—identifies the Shiʿi  Imams. 161  As the noted Iranologist Henri Corbin argued, 
“For Shiʿism…the final phase of prophecy…was the initial phase of a new cycle, the 
cycle of walāyah [vilāyat] or Imamate….The word actually means friendship, protection.  
They are the ‘Friends of God’….; strictly speaking, they are the prophets and the 
Imams.”162  One of the most significant moments in Shiʿi historical memory occurred at a 
well called Ghadir Khumm where the Prophet Muhammad designated the first Shiʿi  
Imam, Ali ibn Abi Talib, as his wālī.  Looking back, the future Shiʿi  community read 
Muhammad’s statement as a designation of both political authority and, as Corbin 
suggests, the new cycle of the Imamate that followed the end of prophetic cycle sealed by 
Muhammad.     Sunni communities do not contest the event of Ghadir Khumm itself, but 
rather understand the term wālī here in a more limited meaning, simply as a close 
companion of the prophet.  In Sunni Sufi writings, outside the context of Ghadir Khumm, 
                                                 
160 Scholars have offered a number of different translations for `irfān.  Here, I follow the suggestion of 
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the term wālī again takes on a more significant meaning, but is understood apart from the 
Shiʿi  Imams (despite the fact that Ali ibn Abi Talib holds a prominent place in almost all 
Sufi lineages).   
Soroush’s essay draws on a complicated connection between the friendship of god 
(walāyat/valāyat) held by the wālī and the theory of the Islamic jurists’ guardianship or 
authority (wilāyat) that undergirds the Islamic Republic.  Vincent Cornell notes that in 
Sufi discourse “walāya [valāyat] and wilāya [vilāyat] are best seen as semantic fraternal 
twins that coexist symbolically…Each relies on the other for its meaning.”163  This 
coexistence, as Cornell puts it, revolves around grammatical and theological debates over 
the precise meaning of these two terms.  For example, while the fourteenth century Sunni 
scholar Ibn Kathir defined wilāyat in terms of authority and walāyat in terms of closeness 
to God, the fourteenth century Indian Sufi Nizam al-Din Awliya’ reversed Ibn Kathir’s 
distinctions and argued “it is wilāya that connotes closeness or love, whereas walāya 
connotes authority.”  In Nizam al-Din Awliya’s words, “‘that which takes place between 
the Shaykh and God is called wilāyat.  That is a special kind of love…His walāyat, on the 
other hand, he can confer on someone else, whomever he wishes.’”164  While Cornell 
noted long-standing Sufi debates over the exact connotations of walāyat and wilāyat 
(meaning, which connotes authority and which proximity to God), Soroush draws on 
permutations of these debates in philosophical-mysticism to define the friend of god as 
close to God and a figure of absolute spiritual, but not political, authority.  To make this 
argument Soroush must recast the theory of the political and religious authority of the 
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Shiʿi  Imams that dominates in contemporary Shiʿism. 
Soroush’s argument draws on the most significant figures of philosophical-
mysticism, including Ibn `Arabi, Sadr al-din al-Shirazi, and Jalal al-Din Rumi.165  
Though Ibn `Arabi and Jalal al-din Rumi hold prominent places in Sufism, in the Iranian 
context they have been incorporated in the lineage of philosophical-mysticism, a 
discipline that both aligns with and differs from better known Sufi practices.  One way in 
which philosophical-mysticism and Sufi discourses do align, however, is a contentious 
relationship with Islamic jurisprudence and sharia.  In this sense the history of 
philosophical-mysticism in Iran demonstrates an ongoing contestation over the ways of 
reasoning and practice that constitute the center of Islamic scholarship, a contestation 
which many of the religious reformists in Iran, and Soroush in particular, draw on in 
order to debate juridical authority.166   
As an identifiable school of thought, philosophical-mysticism bridges Sufism and 
Islamic philosophy.  Historically, the concept stems from centuries of contestation among 
Shiʿi  Muslims over the legitimacy of Sufi practice and identifies a school of thought 
located against practical institutionalized Sufism (taṣavvūf).167  According to the Iranian 
scholar Nasrollah Pourjavady, Shiʿi authors were almost uniformly opposed to Sufism 
                                                 
165 The lineage that Soroush outlines for the history of ‘irfan echoes that suggested by the revolutionary 
ideologue Morteza Mutahhari (d.1979CE), who himself noted not only the origin of `irfān in the discourses 
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them (see, Murtaza Mutahhari, ʿIrfan-e Hafez (The ʿIrfan of Hafez) (Tehran, Iran: Sadra, 1378/1999-2000), 
15).  
166 For another discussion of `irfān theories of guardianship, see Mohsen Kadivar, Hokumat-i Vilayi 
(Tehran, Iran: Nashrani, 1999).  
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prior to the thirteenth century.  Early Shiʿi writers viewed Sufism as “a form of 
Sunnism,” and outside the bounds of Shiʿi  practice.  The eleventh century author Jamal 
al-Din al-Murtada al-Razi echoed the sentiment of this early period and argued, “‘the 
Sufis are Sunnis, and all the Sunnis consider them to be saints (awliya) and people of 
miraculous deeds.’”168  Following the fall of Baghdad in the thirteenth century, several 
Shiʿi  authors, such as Sayyid Haydar-i Amuli (b.1320), began to “incorporate Sufi ideas, 
especially the doctrine of Ibn `Arabi (d.638/1240) into Shiʿi  theology and philosophy.”169  
While one of the greatest scholars of philosophical mysticism, Sadra al-Din al-Shirazi 
(b.1640) lived during the Safavid period in greater Iran (1501-1736), during this same 
period the Safavid authorities moved violently against institutional Sufi orders.  On the 
one hand, both Shahs Safi (r.1629-1642) and `Abbas II (r.1642-66) showed great interest 
in Sufi topics and both admitted religious scholars with Sufi leanings into high circles of 
power in order to counter the authority of a “clerical elite.”170  On the other, the reign of 
Shah Safi was marked by numerous messianic uprisings that initially curtailed Safi’s own 
interest in Sufism.171  Both the well-known Shiʿi  scholar Fayz-e Kashani (d.1679) and 
Sadra al-Din al-Shirazi echoed the concerns of the ruling Safavid shahs regarding Sufi 
communities, and spoke “of the ways in which the popularization of Sufism and the 
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dervish cult were creating social discord.” These early Shiʿi scholars of philosophical-
mysticism worked to distinguish themselves from such Sufis and “exaggerationist” 
(ghuluw) groups of mystics.172   
Although Shiʿi scholars formulated philosophical-mysticism against 
institutionalized Sufism, the two did not fully diverge in the Iranian context.  Indeed, 
Pourjavady seems to suggest that the very terminology of the debate—philosophical-
mysticism as opposed to Sufism—may have been a purely defensive measure in some 
cases, a terminological choice designed to “avoid the negative connotations” of Sufism 
rather than a fully-fledged difference in thinking or practice.173   
  While for much of its history philosophical-mysticism was an elite discourse, in 
the twentieth century these discourses became increasingly public and firmly enmeshed 
in contests over the governance of the Iranian state.174  Khomeini himself delved deeply 
into philosophical-mysticism – he not only studied Sadra al-Din al-Shirazi’s Four 
Journeys (the Kitab al-Asfar), but wrote his own treatises on philosophical-mysticism. 175 
Intriguingly, Matthijs Van den Bos has suggested as well that the Islamic Republic 
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attempted to ground its own authenticity in the language of philosophical-mystiicsm after 
Khomeini’s death.176   Hamid Algar, a noted scholar of Iran and admirer of Khomeini, 
used the language of philosophical-mysticism to position Khomeini as beyond even the 
rank of the highest religious scholars (the Sources of Emulation, or marja` taqlid) and 
instead as the “perfect person” (insān al-kāmil) from philosophical-mysticism, whose 
oversight fuses Islamic and political authority.177 Such discourses surrounding Khomeini 
continue in Iran.   In 2008, the Iranian newspaper Hamshahri published a piece entitled 
“A brief look at the philosophical-mystical and philosophical (falsafī) thought of Imam 
Khomeini,” which detailed Khomeini’s own engagements with philosophical-
mysticism.178 
Soroush’s essay is embedded in this complicated field.  Drawing on 
philosophical-mysticism he contests the centrality of Islamic jurisprudence and the 
Islamic jurists, as the same time he emphasizes a disjuncture in the history of Shiʿism.  
The Shiʿi  Imams, he suggests, were the perfect persons of philosophical-mysticism and 
none after them hold such authority.  Moreover, as suggested by the title of Soroush’s 
article “Spiritual guardianship and political guardianship,” Soroush separates the political 
authority of the Imams from their spiritual authority. He argues that while their absolute 
spiritual authority stems from their status as friends of God, their status as Imams relates 
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to a limited political authority.  The conjunction of political and spiritual authority, 
Soroush argues in an implicit critique of the Islamic Republic, ended with the occultation 
of the twelfth Imam.179       
In making this argument, Soroush identifies the central figure of spiritual 
guardianship as the friend of God (again, the wālī).    Soroush draws on theories of divine 
manifestation to suggest that the “perfect person” (insān al-kāmil) is the manifestation of 
all the divine names.”180  The friend of God reflects God in the world and is so close to 
God that he is defined by “annihilation in God and existing through God.”  Moreover, 
Soroush argues that the Perfect Person, as the Shiʿi Imam, is necessary for Islamic 
practice.   Citing Rumi’s Masnavi, Soush argues that a person cannot practice on his or 
her own without the consultation of a guide.  As Rumi argued, without the “shade” or the 
guardianship of a religious leader, it is impossible for an individual to reach God.181  This 
guide’s authority is absolute and, in this context, “testing the Sheikh and raising 
objections are absolutely inadmissible.”182      
This absolute spiritual guardianship, Soroush argues, is more central and enduring 
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than political guardianship.  Although the Imam is in occultation, he continues to give 
“spiritual and inner guidance to people…from behind the veil,” but not, Soroush 
suggests, “political leadership.”  The Imam continues to take “the hands” of Muslims and 
leads them, “indirectly (in absence)….toward God.”183   While the political and external 
guardianship of the Imams ends with the occultation of the Hidden Imam, his spiritual 
and inner guidance and authority remains.   
 Soroush’s focus on the continuation of the inner guidance of the Hidden Imam 
does not completely preclude the relevance of “rituals, observances, laws, and 
scriptures;” yet they are entirely secondary, well behind an inner spiritual relationship to 
the divine.  It is in this context that Soroush draws on language of religious and prophetic 
experience (tajrobeh)184, a rather novel move that marks the modernity of these 
discourses and Soroush’s own engagement with protestantism.  “Prophetic experiences” 
are experiences of “tasting” and “unveiling” associated with the experiences of Sufis or 
masters of philosophical-mysticism.  Soroush argues that “the prophets have laid down 
the path of prophetic experience for their communities and followers,” one which 
encompasses “the instructions of worship that have entered religion, such as waking for 
prayer in the night (tahajjod), fasting, prayer, giving alms, being generous (enfaq).”  Yet 
these bodily practices are not valued in their own right but as “parts of the prescriptions 
that open for people the inner door of philosophical-mystical and prophetic experiences.” 
This hierarchical reading of embodied religious practice decenters discourses of Islamic 
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jurisprudence and bodily worship and suggests, in contrast to the Islamic Republic’s 
focus on legal performance, that “the condition for imitating the prophet is imitating his 
experiences, not only following his commands and prohibitions.”185 
 This emphasis on interiority and the utility of bodily worship as only a first step 
on the path to divine union has much in common with prior discourses from both Sufism 
and philosophical-mysticism.  On the one hand, Ibn `Arabi himself emphasized the 
necessity of bodily practice and argued that an individual “must discipline himself 
according to the norms of the Shari`a and the Ṭarīqa (the spiritual path) under the 
direction of a spiritual master or ‘shaykh’ who has himself traversed the path…[The] 
‘godfearingness’ which prepares the disciple for God’s teaching entails his complete 
absorption in putting the revealed Law [sharia] into practice and invoking (dhikr) the 
name of God under a shaykh’s guidance.”186  Yet the later evolution of philosophical-
mysticism complicates this presentations.  William Chittick has argued that, while Ibn 
`Arabi himself emphasized the role of bodily practice, even his immediate commentators 
(such as the thirteenth century scholar Qunawi) focused instead on the philosophical 
aspects of Ibn `Arabi’s writings.  This philosophical—rather than formal—reading of Ibn 
Arabi informs academic work as well.  According to Chittick, both Toshihiko Itzutsu and 
Henry Corbin—noted scholars of Islamic philosophy and philosophical-mysticism—fail 
“to bring out the practical sides to Ibn al-‘Arabī’s teachings and his insistence on 
weighing all knowledge in the ‘Scale of Law,’ the norms revealed through the Koran and 
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the Sunna of the Prophet.” 187   
Chittick’s critique here is useful in reorienting academic portrayals of Ibn `Arabi’s 
own work, but his evaluation of Ibn Arabi’s reception history also highlights the ways in 
which philosophical-mysticism, as an Islamic discipline, very quickly focused on 
philosophical truths over practical application.  Soroush’s presentation not only echoes 
these early rights, but also revolution-era writings from Iran.  Morteza Mutahhari 
(d.1979) foreshadows Soroush’s own valuation of inner experience over formal practice.  
Mutahhari was a major figure in pre-revolutionary Iran, a popularizer of works by the 
Islamic philosopher and Qur’an scholar Tabatabai, and the other of numerous volumes on 
Muslim women, politics, and jurisprudence.188  Mutahhari, in detailing the relationship 
between the fourteenth century Persian Sufi poet Hafez and philosophical-mysticism, 
argued as well that external practices were worthless without subduing the inner self 
(nafs).189  He argued that “the master of philosophical-mysticism in the past suggested a 
theory for arriving at Truth and encountering God (liqa’ allah); they understood all 
Islamic laws as being for just such a goal and conclusion.”  Like Soroush, Mutahhari did 
not deny the significance of bodily practice; he defined philosophical-mysticism itself as 
“a practice consisting of traversing the stages of practices (suluk) from the beginning to 
the end; in other words, it is the states and stations (maqamat) of the human (insan) from 
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the beginning of the stage of awakening (tanabbuh) and wakefulness (bidari) to the last 
stage, which is annihilation in god (fana’ fi allah) and subsistence through God (baqa’ 
billah).”190  The role of practice here is not incidental; yet it exists within a hierarchical 
framing in which, as Mutahhari suggested, “all laws” are geared towards disciplining the 
inner self.  Significantly, Mutahhari connected individual acts of piety to social and 
political reform.  According to historian Vanessa Martin,   
To Mutahhari religious duties and responsibility of asserting the validity of 
religion repose in the individual. Both preservation of the religion and 
pursuit of religious ideology depended upon the conscience of the 
individual and his religious activism.  The goals of the individual must 
first be to empower himself, and then acting collectively with other 
individual to change and lead society -- in other words to function as a 
vanguard.  In so doing the individual has to challenge quietist piety and 
abstinence from involvement.  Mutahhari believed that social reform must 
originate in the masses....In order to achieve this goal, public culture and 
lifestyle have to be changed.  In pursuit of activism, Mutahhari questioned 
all passive understanding of piety (zuhd) and endeavored to give the term 
a radical meaning compatible with an activist, politically responsible 
individual, an example [for Mutahhari] being Gandhi." (87) 
In contrast, Soroush argues for the separation of Islamic virtue and political 
governance.  Denying the conjunction of political and Islamic authority that marks the 
Islamic Republic, Soroush argues that “the guardianship of the jurist has no part of `irfānī 
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and spiritual valāyat...and the word is only used so that a group [of people] can mix this 
velāyat (which means…political leadership) with that valāyat (which is suitable for and 
specific to the friends of God and the elite of His threshold).  It is better thus for this to 
use the phrase “political rule of the jurist” (ze`āmat-e faqīh) so that sophistical 
associations [of the jurists] might collapse.”191   
Whereas the Islamic Republic asserts the authority of the jurists in the Imam’s 
absence,  Soroush argumes that the conjunction of these two spheres in the Imams was 
unique and ended with the occultation of the Twelfth Imam.  This argument is certainly a 
secularizing one – it demands the differentiation of religious and political spheres of 
authority as integral to a correct understanding of Shiʿsm and any post-occultation 
government.   
 Soroush’s argument for a rationalist democratic politics, therefore, relies upon 
the delineation of two spheres of authority: spiritual and political.  Intriguingly, however,  
even here it is worth noting that distinction between  Islamic and political authority that 
Soroush draws is not merely a politically secularist intervention, but one Khomeini 
himself suggested in validating his own claims to political authority.  In an attempt to 
assuage concerns that Khomeini was setting himself at the level of the Imams, he argued, 
“To prove that government and authority belong to the Imam is not to imply that the 
Imam has no spiritual status.  The Imam does indeed possess certain spiritual dimensions 
that are unconnected with his function as ruler.” 192   
                                                 
191 Soroush, "Spiritual Guardianship and Political Guardianship (Vilayat-i Bāṭanī va Vilayat-i Siyasi)," 
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 As I discussed in the previous chapter, Khomeini’s theory of jurists’ 
guardianship, and the Islamic Republic’s institutionalization of that theory, extended the 
authority of the jurists as the deputies of the Hidden Imam and  remains a novel and 
contentious theory of post-occultation history.193   Despite Khomeini’s claim to the 
absolute authority of the jurists, Muslim scholars have debated the extent of the 
guardianship of Islamic jurists since the ninth century occultation of the twelfth Imam – 
long before Soroush’s re-reading of the rupture of the occultation as the fragmentation of 
political from religious authority.194  Soroush’s arguments on the whole are embedded in 
long-standing debates over authority (both religious and political) in post-occultation 
Shiʿi  Islam.  The theory of relative guardianship relegated to the jurists the responsibility 
"of their exercising a juridical supervisory function over matters for which no legally 
responsible individual could be identified."195  The often cited cases here were those 
involving orphans and the insane196; in short, a quite delineated subset of the population 
in comparison to the authoritative governmental guardianship institutionalized in the 
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Islamic Republic.  
 As Said Amir Arjomand noted, the Islamic Republic propagated a specific 
understanding of guardianship of the jurist and, in the 1980s, made “statements to the 
effect that obedience to the clergy as ‘those in authority’ (Koran IV. 59; a term hitherto 
invariably taken to refer to the twelve Infallible Imams in the Shiʿi te tradition) is 
incumbent upon the believer as a religious duty were often excerpted from the will and 
made into headlines in bold letters.”197  Historically, Shiʿi  political theory had been 
rather inclined to locate political power outside of the legal establishment.  For one, the 
late nineteenth century Ayatollah Mirza Hassan Shirazi, one the most important legal 
scholar of the Qajar period, assumed a “two swords” theory of power in which political 
authority and spiritual authority rest in two separate hands.198 Noted jurists of the 
nineteenth century offered interpretations of juridical authority that explicitly contradict 
those later articulated by Khomeini in the 1960s.  As Said Amir Arjomand notes,  
“Shaykh Mortaza Ansari (d. 1865), the most important jurist of the second half of the 
nineteenth century…sought first, ‘to demonstrate how absurd it is to reason that because 
the Imams should be obeyed in all temporal and spiritual matters, the faqihs are also 
entitled to such obedience; and second . . . that in principle no individual, except the 
Prophet and the [infallible] Imam, has the authority to exert wilāya over others.’”199  As 
several scholars have shown, the practical reach of the jurists’ authority, as well as the 
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theological claims associated with that authority, drastically increased during the 
eighteenth and nineteenth century with more central collection of religious taxes (khums) 
and the theological construction of theories of Emulation  – the notion of a single pre-
eminent jurist for each generation who would guide the community in religious 
matters.200  Based on this increasing assumption of authority during the Qajar period, the 
noted scholar of Iran Hamid Algar has suggested that the Iranian revolution and 
Khomeini’s theory of guardianship represent the natural evolution of Shiʿi  political 
theory, such that the assumption of political authority by Khomeini represents the final 
grappling with the “practical implications” of the Twelfth Imam’s occultation.201  Yet 
while it is true that the post-Safavid period saw the increasing authority of Muslim jurists, 
even during the nineteenth century Qajar period Islamic scholars largely assumed the 
position of representing the Imam alongside, rather than in the absence, of the authority 
of extent political leaders.202   
 The central debate that lies behind Soroush’s essay is a long-standing one in Shiʿi 
history: who represents the Imams during the post-occultation period and what elements 
of the Imams’ authority devolve upon those representatives?  Significantly, the distinction 
between these two modes of authority is not a purely secularist one.   In Soroush’s essay 
on guardianship, he supports in certain ways an earlier reading – suggesting that the 
holders of spiritual authority are purely the Imams, without reference to the legal 
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scholars.  Soroush’s argument that contemporary Shiʿi  Iranians ought to separate the 
spiritual and political authorities of the Imams in constructing models of political rule, 
relates to a prior precedent through which Shiʿi Muslims understood political authority 
following the occultation of the Imams.   
Etiquette, Ethics, and Legal Limitations 
 
Soroush is not the only Iranian to draw on contestations within Islamic 
scholarship in order to rethink the relationship between Islamic law and the political 
authority of the state.  While Soroush constructs his argument for the interiority of 
religious experience by drawing on philosophical-mysticism and arguing the Islamically-
sanctioned political authority ends with the rupture of the twelfth Imam’s occultation, 
others draw on different disciplines of Islamic learning in order to critique the state’s 
emphasis on juridical authority and oversight of bodily Islamic practice.  
One exponent of this position is Muhammad Mujtahid Shabestari (1936 - ).  Like 
Soroush, Mujtahid Muhammad Shabestari contests the authority of the jurists, and the 
role of Islamic jurisprudence, in regulating Muslim religiosity.  Shabestari is a 
Hojjatoleslam, a mid-ranking classically-trained Islamic scholar and, like Soroush, he 
supported the Islamic Republic early on.  During the first years of the Islamic Republic 
Shabestari served in the parliament for a term before, like many Iranians, becoming 
disillusioned with the new government.  During the 1990s, Shabestari became part of the 
“Kiyan circle,” a group of intellectuals (including Soroush) who published reformist 
articles in the monthly journal Kiyan.   
Shabestari’s critiques in particular focused on questions of hermeneutics and the 
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multiplicity of interpretations of religious texts.203  Like Soroush, Shabestari critiques 
religious bases for democratic government.  Counter to several of Shabestari’s critics who 
suggested that equality of religions, democracy unbound by “the laws of god,” and the 
“anthropological presuppositions” of democracy contradict Islam, Shabestari argues that 
the choice Iranian Muslims must make is “not between Islamic and non-Islamic 
democracy, but between democracy and dictatorship.”204 According to Shabestari, if the 
state takes on responsibility for propagating religion, “it will promote a particular 
interpretation of religion, since without some kind of interpretation, the promotion of 
religion is impossible.”205  
Shabestari does not suggest that a “democracy of Muslims” would require the 
removal of religious values from the political establishment, but rather only that Islamic 
legal scholars be removed from the state apparatus.206  He suggests that “the preservation 
of the independence of religion and the independence of the religious scholars, from the 
perspective of protecting and respecting religion, is an indisputable and definite 
duty”207—one that requires the institutional separation of the hawzah from political 
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structures of governance.  Beyond this concern with scholastic independence, Shabestari 
calls into question the ways in which Islamic jurists have thought about political 
governance and suggests, jurisprudence becomes merely worldly (dunyavī)—rather than 
articulating and connected to sharia—when tied to powers of political governance.  
   To make this argument, Shabestari interrogates what he sees as a confusion 
between Islamic law, the political, and religious practice.   Shabestari, in contradistinction 
to Khomeini and the institutional formation of the Islamic Republic, locates his critique 
against the equation of bodily worship with religious practice and asserts instead the field 
of adab, or etiquette as a kind of embodied worship that effectively reconstructs the self 
only when taken on as a self-conscious, rather than legally determined, practice.  
Contrary to Soroush’s positing of a philosophical-mystical religiosity, Shabestari 
argues that the majority of Muslims orient their religiosity not around philosophical-
mysticism (which he suggests is based on “love” (ʿishq)), but rather around following the 
“commands and prohibitions of God (amr va nahī-ye khudāvand).”208  He argues that 
“the spiritual message, which the community of Muslims took from the prophetic mission 
of the messenger of Islam, was a message of orders and prohibitions.”  In terms of 
Islamic jurisprudence in particular, he concedes that in the past Islamic jurisprudence 
“fulfilled the most central religious need of the public” by “clarifying the orders and 
prohibitions of God.”209   
Scholars of Islam outside of Iran in many ways have echoed Shabestari regarding 
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the centrality of the “orders and prohibitions of God” within Islamic discourses generally, 
but also within the Islamic Republic in particular.210  In terms of post-revolution Iran, 
Mehrangiz Kar has argued that government agencies justify their invasion of “the lives of 
private individuals” and attacking “their personal preferences” by appealing to “the 
imperative of enjoining the good and forbidding evil as stated in Article Eight of the 
constitution.”211  This Article reads,  
In the Islamic Republic of Iran, commanding the good and forbidding the 
evil (al-amr bil maʿrūf wa al-nahī ʿan al-munkar) is a universal and 
reciprocal duty that must be fulfilled by the people with respect to one 
another, by the government with respect to the people, and by the people 
with respect to the government. The conditions, limits, and nature of this 
duty will be specified by law…. 212  
Article Eight suggests, rather explicitly, that the responsibility to pursue the moral 
perfection of Iranian society resides not only in individual citizens, but in the state as 
well.  This Article “grounds the laws governing the rights and duties of the security forces 
and police.”213  Kar suggests that by referencing the moral authority of this Qur’anic 
command to “command the good and forbid evil,” the Iranian state authorizes its 
surveillance of citizens’ personal and public lives.   
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 Shabestari concedes to the Islamic Republic that the orders (amrha) and 
prohibitions (nahīha) referenced in Article Eight of the constitution represent integral 
aspects of Muslim religiosity.   Notably, Shabestari’s contention here mirrors some 
elements of Soroush’s argument that I discussed above.  Soroush too refers to the 
commands and prohibitions of God.  In particular, he argued “the condition for imitating 
the prophet is imitating his experiences, not only following his commands and 
prohibitions.”214  Shabestari echoes this argument that commands and prohibitions are 
insufficient and, likewise, includes the language of religious experience.  At the same 
time, however, Shabestari argues not for the historical centrality, not of philosophical-
mysticism, but of a different form of embodied practice, which he identifies as adab, or 
etiquette.      
 Yet Shabestari argues that the orders and prohibitions relevant to worship and 
social duties remain pertinent to contemporary Muslim life, Islamic constructions of 
politics require serious reformations. In formulating this critique Shabestari notes a 
“taxonomy of three kinds of orders and prohibitions in the Islamic religion – worship 
(‘ibādat), social transactions (muʿāmalat), and political governance (siyāsat),” which are 
“linked to the Islamic legal scholars,” but also “in agreement with the Holy Qur’an and 
the tradition (sunnat) of the Prophet.”215  As I discussed above, the category of siyāsat, 
which Shabestari includes as one third of his taxonomy of Islamic jurisprudence, has a 
variety of interpretations.  The sixteenth century scholar Fayd al-Kashani divided Islamic 
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jurisprudence into two sections: “one on acts of devotion and social duties (al-‘ibādat 
wa’l-siyāsat) and the other on ordinary affairs and transactions (al-‘adat wa’l- 
muʿāmalat).” 1  While Kashani’s terms mirror Shabestari’s in some ways, though not in 
the divisions, Kashani’s combining of devotional acts (‘ibādat) and social duties (siyāsat) 
seems to point to an entirely different moral economy than Shabestari’s construction. 
Under each of these headings, worship, social transactions, and politics, Shabestari 
groups a certain subset of activities.  Matters of devotion include activities “such as 
prayer, fasting, alms, and pilgrimage,” social transactions include “marriage, divorce, 
buying, and selling,” and siyāsat includes activities “like punishing stealing, retaliation, 
compensation for manslaughter, penal laws, and the rules of general guardianship).”216  
This category revolves around matters of political governance in that it includes theories 
of political authority (such as the guardianship of the jurists) and punishments; however, 
it is notable that other elements where the legal sanction of the state is often present—
including market transactions and family life—are not matters of political governance per 
se in the sense given by Islamic jurisprudence.  Shabestari argues that the issue is that the 
orders and prohibitions touted by Islamic legal scholars in the realm of politics do not 
apply to the present Iranian context.  He suggests that 
on the issue of devotional acts and social transactions, the original 
framework of the suggestions and religious opinions of legal scholars 
(fatwas) still agrees with the rational foundation [of Islamic jurisprudence] 
and in the present age no logical reason necessitates that the original 
framework of Islamic devotional acts or social transactions be put 
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aside….On the issue of political governance (siyāsat), the matter is 
completely the opposite….in the present age, most of the suggestions and 
religious opinions of legal scholars on the issue of political governance do 
not have a rational explanation.217 
The arguments of Islamic jurists regarding political governance are irrational, Shabestari 
continues, because they mistake the formation of political power in the present.  
Shabestaris argues that contemporary political governance is unlike the main concerns of 
Islamic jurisprudence historically and cannot be managed by putting eternal divine orders 
and prohibitions into effect in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries.  Contemporary 
politics, he argues, have nothing to do with taking vengeance for killings, tribal relations, 
and allegiance (bayʿat) to a single ruler.218  Shabestari suggests that legal opinions are 
only rational if in agreement with democratic processes.  Muslims must rethink 
significant legal opinions from the past that, on their surface, suggest the incompatibility 
of Islam and democracy.   For Shabestari, the question of democratic transformation 
escapes the transformation of subjectivity – he is not concerned with the “anthropology” 
that democracy presumes, but rather what he sees as a simple fact that democracy 
represents the best life for contemporary Muslims. 219   
Shabestari’s critique of Islamic legalism extends, however, beyond the 
compatibility of Islamic jurisprudence and democratic governance.  In addition, his 
search for alternative forms of religiosity, like Soroush’s, does rest on a certain 
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understanding of human “anthropology” or subjectivity in relation to the divine.  While 
Soroush’s discourses of philosophical-mysticism focus on the individual, the individual’s 
relationship to the Imam, and the individual’s relationship to God, Shabestari draws on 
discourses that take a more social perspective.  In particular, he draws on the language of 
adab – or etiquette, to connect religious experience to the believer’s practice – a 
connection, he argues, that Islamic legal discourses ignore in focusing only on bodily 
worship and tying Islamic jurisprudence to political governance. 
Scholars have translated adab in a variety of ways, often as “civility” or, as I 
glossed it above, “etiquette.”  In modern usage the term connotes “literatures” in Iran, 
and South Asia, as well as the Arab Middle East.  Yet in terms of Islamic scholarship, 
adab is more complex than literature, civility, or etiquette.  Ebrahim Moosa has given a 
fuller definition of adab that provides insight into Shabsetari’s critique of legal practice.  
According to Moosa, adab is “that pedagogy that results in the cultivation of a virtue and 
motivates all human practices.  It is both the education itself and the practical formations 
of norms for right and exemplary conduct.”220  Discourses surrounding adab contain 
complicated theories of the relationship between bodily practice and the human self.  As 
Barbara Metcalf argues, “Adab in all its uses reflects a high valuation of the employment 
of the will in proper discrimination of correct order, behavior, taste....The term…is 
difficult for us to grasp because, although adab seems to refer to external behavior, it in 
fact encompasses inner qualities as well.”221  Significantly within the context of the 
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Islamic Republic, adab provides a radically egalitarian theory of the formation of the self.  
According to Metcalf, “there is no notion [in discourses surrounding adab] that moral 
exemplification…comes only from religious specialists set apart from the faithful.  In 
fact, Islam cherishes the notion that the most perfectly realized person of the age may be 
anyone….The theory of adab at least assumes all Muslims capable of spiritual discipline 
and realization.”222    For Shabestari, centering Islam on adab provides a path for 
contemporary Muslims to cultivate moral selves, a cultivation that he argues is 
impossible to achieve through enforced observance. 
To make this argument, Shabestari draws on the seminal Muslim scholar Abu 
Hamid Muhammad ibn Muhammad al-Ghazali (1058 - 1111).   Histories of Sunni Islamic 
thought often identify Ghazali’s writings as the turning point in Sunni theology, law, 
philosophy, and Sufism;223 yet scholars have focused less on the ways Ghazali impacted 
Shiʿi thinking.  His influence on philosophy (falsafa) was certainly not the same and the 
discipline of Islamic philosophical thinking remains strong in Shiʿi  centers today.    This 
citation of Ghazali is essential here.  Ghazali himself represents a seminal critique of 
legalistic Islam, and instead drew on Sufi approaches to religious practice.224  What 
Shabestari finds useful in Ghazali, however, is not his relationship to mystical forms of 
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religiosity, but rather the hierarchy that Ghazali articulates between worldly and other-
worldly sciences.   
The work Shabestari draws on, The Revival of Religious Sciences is one of 
Ghazali’s most significant works.  Although Ghazali’s writings were important for the 
later development of Islamic jurisprudence, the early portions of the Revival are critical 
of Islamic jurisprudence.    According to Moosa, “Ghazali was disillusioned with the 
jurists (fuqahaʾ) for their inability to discern what he deemed to be the true meaning of 
things, namely the transformation that the practices prescribed by the law should bring 
about in the legal and moral subject.”225  Within the Revival internal states—and the 
Islamic disciplines that develop them—are valued over the dictates of the jurisprudents.  
Ghazali argued that “concerning Islam the jurisprudent discourses on what renders it 
sound or unsound as well as on its conditions, but only pays attention to outward 
concerns.  The heart, however, is removed from his domain.”  Ghazali used the example 
of prayer to further this point about the limits of jurisprudence:  while the jurist might 
oversee “whether or not it has been correctly performed in according with the prescribed 
regulations;” however, regarding  “submitting and presenting the heart [to God], 
however, both of which are works pertaining to the hereafter and through which works 
[such as prayer – KF] are rendered efficacious, the jurisprudent does not address himself; 
and in the case he does, he oversteps his bounds.”226   
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(University of Chicago, 2005), 42-3.  See also, Ghazzali, The book of knowledge, being a translation with 
notes of the Kitab al-ilm of al-Ghazzali's Ihya ulum al-din, trans. Nabih Amin Faris (Lahore,: Sh. 
Muhammad Ashraf, 1962), 33-38. 
  
116 
 
Jurisprudence, Ghazali argued, deals only with matters of this world (al-dunya) 
and has little relevance for al-ākhira, the “other world.”227  According to Ken Garden, 
within the Revival Ghazali himself advocated “the science of the path of the other world 
[ʿilm ṭarīq al-ākhira], which is an “otherworldly” discipline that leads to salvation, “the 
main goal of religion.”  All other sciences, including Islamic jurisprudence, therefore 
“deal with the affairs of this world, and thus, while not without religious significance, are 
nonetheless of secondary importance.”228   
Drawing on Ghazali, Shabestari argues that “when you open a book like The 
Revival of the Religious Sciences, you see that from Ghazali’s perspective that which 
must be observed…are not the laws (qavānīn) of life, but the adab of …life.”229   Indeed, 
Ghazali’s Revival draws heavily on the concept of adab.230  Ghazali divided his Revival 
into four sections:  “Acts of Worship (al-ʿibādat)”, “Norms of Daily Life (al-ʿādat)”, 
“The Ways to Perdition (al-muhlikat),” and “The Ways to Salvation (al-munjiyat).”   The 
second section, the “Norms of Daily Life,” is itself divided into ten sections.  Eight of 
these sections focus on particular categories of adab, different modes of behavior, from 
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ways of eating (kitāb ʿadab al-akl) to imitating the manners of the prophet.231   
He argues that early Muslim gnostics (‘urafa’), despite their emphasis on 
individual relationships with the divine, did not locate these religious experience within 
some private sphere of family or personal life.  The gnostics asked, “What are the adab of 
commerce? What are the adab of traveling? What are the adab of socializing?...They use 
this term ‘adab’ in worship, social ethics, and in politics.” 232   
Shabestari draws on Ghazali’s reconstruction of adab as “the heart of law 
(fiqh)”233  to orient his critique against a particular reading of Islam that links bodily 
worship to state governance and the authority of jurists.  In contesting that reading, 
Shabestari draws on registers of critique within the Islamic tradition that highlight the 
experience of the religious subject outside of legal commandments and prohibitions.  
True shariʿa, Shabestari argues, is not relatable to civil law as activities of state; rather, it 
marks the practices that “nourish religious experience.”234  
He argues that at the point when “Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) became separated 
from religious experience and spirituality, the clarifying of God’s orders and prohibitions 
turned into merely clarifying ‘forms of practices,’ and the connection between obeying 
God [on the one hand] and the religious care, the ultimate concern, and unconditional 
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commandment of the Muslim people [on the other] was severed; in the words of Ghazali, 
this science [fiqh] became merely worldly (dunyavī).”.  
As a response to the legal authority of the Islamic Republic, Shabestari’s 
construction reiterates the extent to which embodied worship (the focus of the Islamic 
Republic as it relates to correct action) is linked to individual conscience rather than legal 
authority and enforcement.  Salvation, Shabestari suggests, stems from a close 
relationship with God outside the confines of the state. Defining religion as “finding 
one’s path toward the presence of God,” Shabestari argues this movement takes place 
only in individual communication with God and never under the authority or trusteeship 
of others.235 Yet this inner faith (īmān) is not severed entirely from correct practice.  
Shabestari suggests that Muslims during the time of Mohammad (correctly) understood 
god’s law (qanūn) to mean submitting to the “orders of God” (hukm Allah) and being 
cultivated through the discipline of devotion. These scholars, in contrast to today’s 
jurisprudents, argued that these conscientious practices of the self were central to 
religiosity.   
 It is significant that Shabestari fails to note Ghazali’s own reading of the necessity 
of linking Islamic orders and prohibitions to state power.  As Ebrahim Moosa suggests, 
“the ethics of conduct is central to Muslim salvation practices….for Ghazali, there was a 
dialogical relationship between macro and micro politics, namely, between the 
governance of the polis and the governance of the body.”236    Ghazali’s text imagines an 
interlocutor asking “’Why have you appended jurisprudence to secular [worldly] sciences 
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and grouped jurisprudents among secular [worldly] scholars?’”237  Intriguingly, and not 
entirely within Shabestari’s aims in citing The Revival, Ghazali’s reply is not merely that 
the role of jurisprudence is limited, but also that jurisprudence is integral to the practice 
of Muslims in the world.  He suggest “It is the jurisprudent…who has the knowledge of 
the rules of government and the methods of mediation between the people whenever, 
because of their greed, they contend…I declare that jurisprudence is also connected with 
religion, not directly but [indirectly] through [the affairs of] this world, because this 
world is the preparation for the hereafter and there is no religion without it.”238   
 Roy Mottahedeh has suggested another element of Ghazali’s thought that 
Shabestari overlooks.  In explaining the limits of jurisprudential thinking, Mottahedeh 
noted a startling development in the various divisions of Islamic learning:  “It is a 
curiosity,” he notes “that jurisprudence did not take on two related topics, the ‘moral 
ends’ of the law (maqāṣid) and the ‘norms’ (qawā’id) of the law….There seem to have 
been two streams of ethical thinking [before the nineteenth century], one tradition not 
primarily focused on the law [referred to as ethics, or akhlaq], and another tradition that 
is a pietistic exposition of the law, often much simplified [referred to as jurisprudence, or 
fiqh].  Only in such works as the `Iḥyā’ [The Revival of Religious Sciences] of al-Ghāzzalī 
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(d.505/1111) do the traditions of law and ethics meet.”239   
Shabestari not only ignores Ghazali’s enmeshment in political government, but 
also this conjunction of jurisprudence and ethics.  What is important for Shabestari’s own 
thinking about Islamic practice, however, is that the connection between jurisprudence 
and political power limits the role of jurisprudence in cultivating pious Muslim subjects. 
Shabestari draws on the formative text of the Revival in order to ground his critique of the 
authority of the Islamic Republic (as a state based in law) over religious morality.  In this 
critique of purely formal jurisprudence, Shabestari obliquely condemns the Islamic 
Republic, the instantiation of “commanding the good and forbidding evil” from which the 
state draws a good deal of its authority, and the state’s assumption that fiqh represents the 
highest form of religious experience.  Shabestari does suggest that a renewed 
examination of religious jurisprudence related to politics will demonstrate that Islamic 
principles are not incompatible with democratic ones;240 yet he argues as well that true 
Islam cannot flourish under any sort of “trusteeship” responsible for the religious and 
moral activities of its citizens.  The goal of Islamic practice—the cultivation of the 
heart—is outside the jurists’ domain.241   
Conclusion 
 
The expansion of authority of Islamic jurisprudence in the Islamic Republic re-
imagined the relationship between Islamic law and the state.  In the introduction to 
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Khomeini’s The Guardianship of the Jurist (Vilāyat-i Faqih), he exhorts his readers to 
“introduce Islam to the people so that…they don’t imagine …[the legal scholars] have 
nothing to do with politics (siyāsat).  This idea that religion must be separated from 
politics and the scholars of Islam must not become involved in social and political 
matters is voiced and spread by imperialists.”242   Pre-modern officials, in particular the 
market regulator (muhtasib), were charged to “command good and forbid evil,” yet their 
roles were strictly limited.  Mottahedeh and Stilt, in analyzing the writings of Muhammd 
Ghazali—who Shabestari engaged with above—and Ibn al-Ukhuwah (-1329), suggest 
that these earlier scholars understood an individual as carrying “his privacy with 
him.”  An example Mottahedeh and Stilt raise is the drinking of wine.  In terms of the 
individual home, a market regulator had no authority (at least in these theoretical 
discussions) to enter a quiet home in search of wine drinking.  If the market regulator 
however heard noises of drunkenness from the street then his authority permitted him to 
enter the house but only if he were certain of the activities going on.  In the street, an 
individual might roam freely with a bottle of wine in his coat as long as “there was no 
‘particular sign’” of the prohibited bottle. 243  
 Frank Vogel adds to this argument in suggesting that legally a market regulator 
could enforce only a “categorical sharia principle” that required no interpretation on the 
part of the market regulator. Vogel’s analysis compares the writings of the eleventh 
century scholar al-Mawardi (974 - 1058) to the actions of the contemporary Saudi 
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state.  Al-Mawardi argued for the essentially limited nature of the state’s authority (and 
the market regulator’s authority as the hand of the state) to enforce public 
morality.  According to al-Mawardi the market regulator “’has no right to force his 
conviction on the people or to hold them to his opinion in religious matters (din), given 
that ijtihad [independent reasoning] is to be encouraged.’”244  In order to maintain space 
for free debate on most issues of Islamic law, al-Mawardi limits the authority of the state 
to regulate morality to only a handful of issues about which all religious scholars agreed. 
      The Islamic Republic extends this pre-modern oversight of both bodily comportment 
and religious reason.  As Kar suggests, the surveillance machine of the Islamic Republic 
not only records telephone conversations of dissident writers, but extends its moral 
authority to matters of dress and association both inside and outside the home.14 The 
Islamic Republic assumes the activities of sanctioned religious reasoning as part of the 
state apparatus.  While the eleventh century scholar al-Mawardi ( -1058) placed 
independent reasoning in the hands of individual legal scholars and allowed the market 
regulator authority only on issues that required no interpretation, the Islamic Republic 
positions numerous regulative bodies to control and condemn non-sanctioned legal 
reasoning.    
  The Iranian scholars I discussed above contest these transformations.  In doing so, 
make clearly secularizing arguments – not only are they “statist” in the manner Asad 
suggest, but they also call for the differentiation of Islamic and political authority; yet 
they also draw on historically Islamic commitments to debate the very ways in which 
                                                 
244 Vogel, "The Public and Private in Saudi Arabia: Restrictions on Powers of committees for Ordering the 
Good and Forbidding Evil," 754. 
  
123 
 
scripture, law, and ritual should be read and practiced.  My argument here is that reading 
transformations in Islamic arguments as merely a battleground between secular logic and 
Islamic ones blinds us to the nuances of these post-colonial articulations.    
John Bowen recently interrogated such anthropological renditions of global 
secular transformation.  In a certain sense, one might summarize his argument simply as a 
particularist one, demanding a nuanced emphasis on the local. He argues, that 
secularism—unlike the secular—is  
a political problem rather than a historical process. It concerns how states manage 
to encompass or govern religions while not denying their truth claims or social 
rights. Now, one surely can study particular structures and strategies while also 
looking at broader processes, insofar as both converge on, say, how France 
governs Islam or how India regulates marriage. But in the one case we see France 
or India as instantiations of an historical force or condition, “the secular,” whereas 
in the other we treat them as outcomes of particular regimes and dilemmas.   
He contends that, although one might link the study of the secular and the study of 
secularism, “does not mean that we can best understand how states govern religious 
authorities in particular countries by referring to the broad linkages [that mark the 
secular]. Indeed, those of us interested in studying how such governance works (from 
history, politics, anthropology, and other disciplines) can best do so if we start with the 
regimes specific to each case, and examine how they carry out projects of 
encompassment.”245  
  I do not entirely agree with Bowen’s assessment here; indeed, I think much would 
                                                 
245 Bowen, "Secularism: Conceptual Genealogy or Political Dilemma?," 681-82. 
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be lost if local secularisms were studied without reference to the global transformations 
of secular subjectivities, modes of law, and ways of knowing.  This is perhaps most 
significant, I suggest, for Muslim politics where it is still too common to link the 
vicissitudes of Muslim governance to a problem inherent in Islam.  At the same time, I 
think Bowen’s argument for attention to the local constitution of secularism is significant.   
In this sense, as Bowen argues, secularist discourses within Iran map onto not only the 
global formations of the secular, but present unique elements. 
 In the Iranian contest, debates over the meaning of Islam engage with—and are 
constructed by—not only the secular parameters of the nation-state, but also a state that 
claims Islamic legitimacy through the pre-eminence of Islamic jurisprudence.  It is in this 
sense that historically situated debates over the post-occultation authority of the jurists 
and the centrality of Islamic jurisprudence to religious life of a Muslim subject become 
meaningful.  My contention is not that the existence of particular forms of imaginaries 
(the market, the secular) would have existed in Muslim-majority contexts without 
colonial and post-colonial impositions, but rather that given the existence of such forms, 
our scholarship would be better served by attending to their imbrications.     
In the post-revolution Iranian context we must pay at least equal attention to the 
ways in which the claims of the Islamic State are contested through alternative Islamic 
imaginaries.  In this sense, Muslim thinking involves not a singular approach to text and 
practice, but as realms of contestation in which, and through which, theological and 
political debates are articulated and fought, but never fully resolved.  In the following 
chapter I continue to examine debates over the role of Islamic scholarship in the modern 
world and to trace the formations of the secular within those debates.  I extend my 
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analysis here and in the previous chapter by focusing on the modes of reason Muslims 
scholars employ to engage with the present; specifically, I examine contests in which 
these scholars address overtly their own relationship to the differences that—in their 
view—mark modernity.     
 
  
 
 
 
Chapter Four: Thinking the Scholar  
 
In this chapter I examine Muslim Iranian debates over the nature of Islamic 
reason and the role of critique in modern scholarship.    In particular, I focus on the ways 
ḥawzah (madrasa or seminary) journals incorporate notions of criticism to define the 
practice of modern Islamic scholarship.  While in the previous chapters Muslim scholars 
drew on the memory of the Shiʿi Imams to think about justice and non-legal Islamic 
disciplines of learning to undermine a state-sanctioned reading of Islamic jurisprudence, 
in this chapter I explore how Muslim scholars conceive the practice of scholarship itself 
and compare these Islamic understandings of scholarship to debates over “secular 
critique” in the Euro-American academy.   
My argument in this chapter is that the nature of “critique” and its (perhaps 
necessary) relationship to modern knowledge is a subject of debate not only among 
theorists within the Euro-American academy, but also among contemporary Muslim 
Iranian scholars.  In so far as the assumption of a secular critical stance defines our 
academic enterprise—as well as the construction of both the political and thinking subject 
within post-Enlightenment theories—these Iranian Islamic debates suggest the need to 
reassess the academic representation of modern Muslim thinking and its relationship to 
Islamic tradition.  I take up that conversation further in the afterward.  
In this chapter I first briefly survey how discourses in the Euro-American 
academy construct “secular criticism” as the opposite of religious reasoning.  The term 
“critique” here, at perhaps the most basic level, suggests a practice or sensibility of “not 
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being governed” by any authority outside the individual.246 The question of whether 
critique is secular –an ongoing debate within the American academy that I turn to later in 
the chapter—asks whether there are metaphysical assumptions behind critique and 
whether the practice of critique itself reinstates certain structures of power.  One 
longstanding distinction between the operations of religious scholars and secular 
intellectuals rests in the nature of critique; that is, while religious scholars hold 
unreasoned or unassailable commitments, secular intellectuals publically debate 
knowledge.  As I discuss below, only recently have scholars of Islam retorted that Islamic 
practices of offering judgments—to end argument—should not be understood as failure 
to allow reasoned debate. 247  Second, rather than delimiting a distinctly Islamic form of 
reasoning opposite secular criticism, I explore sites within the Islamic Republic of Iran 
that lay claim to “critique” as integral to Islamic modernity; namely, the scholastic 
journals of the Islamic ḥawzah.   I do not suggest that understandings of critique—naqd 
or intiqād—in the ḥawzah overlap entirely with notions of secular criticism; yet the 
debates over criticism in the ḥawzah do provide insight into how classically-trained 
scholars understand and mark the operations of scholastic reason in modernity. Finally, I 
compare the presentations of critique within the ḥawzah journals to those of an influential 
                                                 
246Michael Foucault, "What is Critique," in The Essential Foucault: Selections from the Essential Works of 
Foucault, 1954-1984, ed. Paul Rabinow and Nikolas Rose (New York: New Press, 2003), 265.; The authors 
cited here disagree in part over the nature of critique – not simply its secularity, but its practice.  The 
definition from Foucault seems a benchmark.  For a brief comparison of the ways in which Talal Asad, 
Wendy Brown, Raymond Williams, Adorno, Deleuze, Hannah Arendt, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, 
Edward Said, and Walter Benjamin, see Judith Butler, "The Sensibility of Critique: A reply to Asad and 
Mahmood," in Is Critique Secular? Blasphemy, Injury, and Free Speech ed. et al. Talal Asad (Berkeley 
University of California Press 2009), 108-11. 
247 See Baber Johansen, Contingency in a sacred law : legal and ethical norms in the Muslim fiqh, Studies 
in Islamic law and society, (Leiden ; Boston: Brill, 1999)..  See also Talal Asad’s reading of Johansen in 
Asad, "Secularism, Nation State, Religion," 255-56. 
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Iranian intellectual publication, in order to highlight the significance of public reason for 
both communities.   
Reason, Critique, and the Public 
 
It is necessary to disentangle certain assumptions surrounding the relationship 
between the secular and the religious, the critical and the authoritative, prior to examining 
Muslims’ representations of “critique” itself.    A normative distinction between “critique” 
and religious argument rests on long-standing assumptions about scholarship, 
subjectivity, and the construction of rational discourse.  This model of public criticism—
and its necessary removal from religious discourse—continues a Kantian lineage in 
understandings of modern reason. In his famous essay “An Answer to the Question: What 
is Enlightenment?” Kant situated religious knowledge in opposition to the critical attitude 
of Enlightenment.  According to this Kantian formation, in contrast to the scholar—who 
carefully tests the arrangements and assumptions of religion—the clergyman “is bound to 
lecture to his catechism students and his congregation according to the symbols of the 
church which he serves….For what he teaches as consequence of his office as an agent of 
his Church, he presents as something about which he does not have free reign to teach 
according to his own discretion, but rather is engaged to expound according to another’s 
precepts and in another’s name.”248   
Although Kant does not represent the entirety of the Enlightenment tradition or its 
trajectory in Euro-American thought, scholars return repeatedly to the necessarily secular 
tradition of public criticism posited by Kant in order to articulate and delimit the bounds 
                                                 
248 Emmanuel Kant, “An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?,” translated by James Schmidt in 
What is Enlightenment?  Eighteenth-Century Answers and Twentieth-Century Questions, edited by James 
Schmidt (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), 60.  
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of critical scholarship and political praxis.  Twentieth-century scholars including Edward 
Said and Michael Foucault looked to “secular criticism” as a defining characteristic of the 
reasoned discourse emblematic of modernity.249  In the current scholarship, descriptions 
of “religious” discourses in many ways default to descriptions of non-reasoned or 
irrational commitments. 
As Saba Mahmood suggested in a 2008 post on the Social Science Research 
Council's The Immanent Frame, “Insomuch as the tradition of critical theory is infused 
with a suspicion, if not dismissal, of religion’s metaphysical and epistemological 
commitments, we…[want] to think 'critically' about this dismissal.”  This interrogation of 
the opposition between criticism and religion raises—for Mahmood and others who care 
to think “'critically'” about critical theory's rejection of religion—a series of questions, 
including:  
how are epistemology and critique related within this tradition? Do 
distinct traditions of critique require a particular epistemology and 
ontological presuppositions of the subject? How might we rethink the 
dominant conception of time—as empty, homogenous and unbounded, one 
so germane to our conception of history—in light of other ways of relating 
to and experiencing time that also suffuse modern life? How do these 
other ways of inhabiting time complicate the rigid opposition between 
                                                 
249 Edward W. Said, The world, the text, and the critic (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1983); 
Foucault, "What is Critique."Recently, Iranian studies scholar Hamid Dabashi returned to Said’s invocation 
of secular criticism as marking the role of the diasporic intellectual.  See, Hamid Dabashi, Post-
orientalism : knowledge and power in time of terror (New Brunswick N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 2009). 
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secular and sacred time so common to everyday practices of modern 
life?250    
While much scholarship examines and presumes the modernity of various forms 
of Islam and Muslim thinking, the notion of critique raises an aligned—but more 
nuanced—set of questions.  Whereas I explored in previous chapters the secular 
formations of law, the political, and the state, debates over “secular critique” highlight the 
subjectivities and understandings of knowledge linked to those secular social and 
political formations.  In short, critique presumes a measure of individual autonomy and 
reflexivity that defines the Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment tradition.  I expand 
on—and interrogate—this connection between rationality and Enlightenment below. 
 Academic debate over the nature of critique arose in large part out of a 2007 
symposium organized by Berkeley’s Critical Theory Initiative.  The Critical Theory 
Initiative, directed by Judith Butler and historian Martin Jay, asked a variety of academics 
to interrogate the boundaries of the critical impulse from which the seminar itself took its 
name.251 The notable outcomes of this conference was Talal Asad's blog post on the 
SSRC website in which he interrogated the Foucauldian genealogy of criticism and 
Foucault's own indebtedness to a Kantian understanding of modernity.  He examined 
Michel Foucault’s reading of Kant’s “What is Enlightenment” in which Foucault seemed 
to set aside his genealogical project to locate himself at the heart of Kant’s Enlightenment 
tradition. In particular, Foucault reinscribed Kant’s reading of the intellectual’s role as a 
                                                 
250 Saba Mahmood, "Is Critique Secular? ," in The Immanent Frame: Secularism, Religion, and the Public 
Sphere (the Social Science Research Council) (http://blogs.ssrc.org/tif/2008/03/30/is-critique-secular-2/). 
251 See Mahmood 2008a.  For information on the Critical Theory Initiative see: 
http://townsendcenter.berkeley.edu/swg_crittheory.shtml 
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critical practice that establishes the free use of reason against external authorities and 
limitations on the subject.  Asad not only argued that this story depicts a specifically 
liberal heroic model of the subject, but also that Foucault’s reading of his own work as 
continuation of a Kantian Enlightenment project raised the question of criticism’s 
secularity—that is, its grounding in a particular authoritative tradition of knowledge and 
power.252   
Concurrent with these, a virtual industry of publications and conferences arose 
interrogating the foundations—or defending the anti-foundationalism—of the American 
academy.   While most scholars agree that secular critique arose within the European 
tradition—and not outside of it—scholars debate whether that practice of secular critique, 
and concurrent disassociation of religious discourse from critical debate, is a necessary 
and positive aspect of modern life or, instead, an imperial imposition on non-European 
polities.  This debate, in part, coalesces on the question of the Enlightenment’s legacy and 
whether one reads that legacy as the generally (read: universally) beneficial, though 
always imperfect, liberal project or, instead, at best a particular Western tradition and at 
worst an inherently racial (if not racist) and imperializing one.  Within these debates, the 
term “critique” suggests, at the most basic level, a practice or sensibility of “not being 
governed.”253 The question of whether critique is secular asks whether there are 
                                                 
252Talal Asad, "Historical Notes on the idea of Secular Criticism 
http://blogs.ssrc.org/tif/2008/01/25/historical-notes-on-the-idea-of-secular-criticism/," in The Immanent 
Frame: Secularism, Religion, and the Public Sphere (the Social Science Research Council) (2008).   In the 
2009 volume Is Critique Secular: Blasphemy, Injury, and Free Speech, Asad, Mahmood, Judith Butler, and 
Wendy Brown continued this interrogation of critique’s (presumed lack of) foundations.  See, Talal Asad, Is 
critique secular? : blasphemy, injury, and free speech, The Townsend papers in the humanities (Berkeley: 
Townsend Center for the Humanities Distributed by University of California Press, 2009). 
253 Foucault, "What is Critique," 265.; Various authors disagree in part over the nature of critique – not 
simply its secularity, but its practice.  The definition from Foucault seems a benchmark.  For a brief 
comparison of the ways in which Talal Asad, Wendy Brown, Raymond Williams, Adorno, Deleuze, Hannah 
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metaphysical assumptions behind critique and whether the practice of critique itself 
reinstates certain structures of power.  The literature scholar Stathis Gourgouris, for 
example, has argued emphatically “yes,” suggesting the “answer to this question is 
unequivocal: Yes, critique is secular, and, to go even further, if the secular imagination 
ceases to seek and to enact critique, it ceases to be secular."254  By definition, according 
to Gourgouris, “the task of secular criticism…is to oppose any heteronomous politics,” 
any politics that is not autonomous, that is based in external domination.255  In this sense, 
Gourgouris echoes Foucault and reaffirms the emancipatory potentials of secular critique.   
Other scholars echo Gourgouris’s concern that disavowing critique opens the way 
for domination and violence.  Both the literature scholar Amir Mufti and the Iranian 
studies sociologist Ali Mirsepassi have expressed concerns with efforts to destabilize the 
universality of the secular.   Mufti, for example, argued that postcolonial theorists have 
painted religious discourses with an “aura of authenticity.” While Mufti discussed the 
works of the Indian scholar Ashis Nandy, he saved his most scathing criticism for Talal 
Asad’s writings on Muslim approaches to politics.  He argued that, in situating Islamist 
and/or traditionalist understandings of Islam as alternatives to secular modernity, Asad 
disregarded the violent potential of these “solutions.”256   
                                                                                                                                                 
Arendt, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Edward Said, and Walter Benjamin, see Judith Butler, Judith Butler, 
“The Sensibility of Critique: A reply to Asad and Mahmood,” in Is Critique Secular? Blasphemy, Injury, 
and Free Speech (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009): 108-111.  
254 Stathis Gourgouris, "Detranscendentalizing the Secular," Public Culture 20, no. 3 (2008): 437. 
255 Stathis Gourgouris, "Antisecularist Failures: A Counterresponse to Saba Mahmood," Public Culture 20, 
no. 3 (2008): 454. 
256Aamir R. Mufti, "The Aura of Authenticity," Social Text 18, no. 3 64 (2000): 87-103.  In particular, Mufti 
is concerned that "the charge that Islamist movements are antidemocratic can only be for Asad an instance 
of the Western-liberal characterization of Islamism, and perhaps of things 'Islamic' in general, as 
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Critical Scholars? 
 
Here, I suggest that Muslim scholars are engaged as well in this debate over the 
meaning and limitations of critical practice, as well as its relationship to authority.  The 
practice of critique has become not only debated by Islamic scholars, but part of both 
their scholastic and political vocabulary.  It is significant, as I demonstrate below, that 
these discourses of “critique” cannot be attributed entirely to a Kantian Enlightenment or 
broadly “secular” genealogy.  In this sense, they are different from secular liberal 
criticism in their history, function, and—most importantly—relationship to religious 
knowledge.   This is not to say, however, that these debates are unimpacted by that 
secular history; indeed, I would suggest that these debates demonstrate not the 
continuation of Islamic modes of reasoning, but rather the imbrications of Islamic 
reasoning in categories often marked as not only modern, but secular as well.   
To exploration these Muslim constructions of critique, I draw largely on debates 
among classically-trained Islamic scholars that take place within the context of the 
Islamic ḥawzah; that is, within journals published and distributed by the Islamic 
seminaries in Qom, Iran.  The robust production of journals and other media is a 
remarkable element of the public landscape in post-revolution Iran. Censorship of public 
texts—including these seminary materials—varied greatly over the twentieth century in 
Iran.  The circulation of texts in Iran was limited by government censorship prior to the 
                                                                                                                                                 
antimodern" (91).  So that, "when it comes to an examination of the claim of Islamists themselves to be 
above politics and simply in continuity with religious 'tradition,' we get no demystification of this particular 
story [from Asad] and are left with the following affirmation: 'to themselves they are simply proper 
Muslims'" (92); Mufti’s understanding of secular critique is indebted to the work of Edward Said as well as 
Walter Benjamin.  See Said, The world, the text, and the critic.  and Walter Benjamin, " The Work of Art in 
the Age of Mechanical Reproduction," in Illuminations, ed. Hannah Arendt (New York: Schocken, 1969), 
217-53. I return to Said in the conclusion of the dissertation.  
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Iranian revolution of 1978-79 and, with a brief period of proliferation immediately 
following the revolution, has been limited since the revolution.  The extent of limitations 
and the degree of enforcement vary with the political mood, at times there is greater 
openness and at time greater censorship.  According to Communication Studies Scholar 
Hossein Shahidi, the “Revolution liberated Iranian journalism, leading to the appearance 
of more than 700 newspapers by the time of Iraq’s invasion of Iran in September 
1980.”257   In theory, the constitution of the Islamic Republic—first ratified in 1979—
provides protections for the freedom of the press.  Article twenty-four (“The Freedom of 
the Press”) guarantees that “Publications and the press have freedom of expression except 
when it is detrimental to the fundamental principles of Islam or the rights of the public.  
The details of this exception will be specified by law.”258  Publications must apply for 
press permits from the Ministry of Culture and Guidance and any suggestion that their 
activities are or will be “detrimental to the fundamental principles of Islam or the rights 
of the public” are grounds for the denial or revocation of the press permit. 
Most of the new publications that arose around the revolution were critical of the 
increasing political authority of classically-trained Islamic scholars and so were greatly 
censored during the 1980s as the new system attempted to consolidate its authority. 
Within months of the revolution—and even prior to the drafting of a new constitution—a 
Press Law was put in effect.  New journals and newspapers were shut down and long-
running ones were taken over by authors and agencies close to the new governing 
                                                 
257 Hossein Shahidi, "From mission to profession: Journalism in Iran, 1979–2004," Iranian Studies 39, no. 
1 (2006): 1. 
258 See the International Constitutional Law website, http://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/ir00000_.html.   
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authorities.259   
At the end of the war with Iraq in 1988 these restrictions again relaxed.  
Muhammad Khatami—who later would be a reformist President of Iran for two terms in 
the mid and late 1990s—served as Minister of Culture and Guidance from 1988 until his 
dismissal in 1992.  Khatami implemented a relatively lenient attitude toward the press as 
well as film and media generally260, which, as I suggested in a previous chapter, is often 
credited with providing the providing the space and materials that established the Iranian 
Reform Movement of the 1990s. 261   
In the later 1990s many of these journals were shut down at the same time that the 
government increased censorship of online media.262   At this point, much of the 
conversation in Iran moved online.263  Some sites were blocked by the Iranian authorities 
on grounds that they were harming national interests, as were many more sites based 
abroad; approximately “10,000 sites were reported to have been blocked by the end of 
2004, putting Iran alongside China at the top of the world’s list of countries with 
                                                 
259 Shahidi, "From mission to profession: Journalism in Iran, 1979–2004," 2. 
260 Ibid.  
261 See Z. Merat, "Pushing back the limits of the possible: the press in Iran," Middle East report (New 
York, N.Y. 1988), no. 212 (1999): 32-35.; Adam Tarock, "The muzzling of the liberal press in Iran," Third 
World Quarterly 22, no. 4 (2001): 585-602. During this period anthropologist Ziba Mir-Hosseini was able 
to survey debates over gender in Iran that had taken place in the press and interview the editors of journals 
organized around that issue.  See, Ziba Mir-Hosseini, Islam and gender : the religious debate in 
contemporary Iran, Princeton studies in Muslim politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999). 
262 Shahidi, "From mission to profession: Journalism in Iran, 1979–2004," 1-28. 
263 Ibid., 22. 
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restricted Internet use.”264  
Classically-trained Islamic scholars have been part of this history since the early 
twentieth century. In the 1930s ʿAbdulkarim Haʾeri Yazdi (1859-1937) was active in 
establishing the provincial town of Qom, Iran as the new center of Shiʿi learning.  As part 
of this project he gave his support to the journal Homayun in the 1930s, the first journal 
to be published out of the seminary city.  According to Farhang Rajaee, Ha’eri intended 
the journal to be “the voice of the newly emerging Shiʿi center" and to reach out to 
Iranian Muslims who had stopped attending to the voices of the classically-trained 
religious scholars.265   
Since that time, scholars have consistently engaged in the production of specialty 
journals as well as more popular works.  Today, the majority of high-ranking scholars 
maintain websites, where they answer questions from followers on a range of issues from 
daily prayer to political practices.  The centers of learning in Qom also maintain a 
collective web presence at www.ḥawzah.net, a site that publishes not only advice on 
religious practice and catalogues of religious biographies, but also re-prints scholastic 
journals and debates that take place among the scholars themselves. 
The numerous journals published from within the ḥawzah evidence the breadth of 
seminary debates and scholarship.  The institution’s web portal—www.ḥawzah.net—
provides access to over fifty journals as well as information about the lives of religious 
authorities, religious books, hadith collections, and numerous other sources.  The journals 
                                                 
264 Ibid. 
265 Rajaee, Islamism and Modernism: The Changing Discourse in Iran, 60.   According to Rajaee, 
Homayun and the journals published in the decades after it all addressed the "novel and comprehensive 
challenge of modernity," (73). 
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themselves cover the traditional areas of Islamic learning, including theology (kalām), 
jurisprudence (fiqh), and legal theory (usūl al-fiqh).  The site also categorizes the 
journals’ articles by subject.  Some of these subject headings replicate the fields of 
traditional Islamic learning: “exegesis (tafsīr) and the Qur’anic sciences;” “theology 
(kalām) and beliefs (ʿaqāʾid); “the Prophet and his Family.”  Yet there are novel elements 
here as well – jurisprudence (fiqh) for example, is grouped with state law (ḥuqūq) and 
sixty articles are listed under the heading “Islam, tolerance (mudārā), and violence” – a 
replication of an issue from the prominent reformist journal Kiyan in the 1990s. 
Here, I examine journals and single-authored articles within those journals that 
suggest “critique” is integral to Islamic modernity.  My goal is to interrogate further the 
opposition between secularizing Muslim intellectuals and traditionalist seminary 
scholars.  Significantly, Muslim Iranian discourses—whether reformist or conservative, 
explicitly modernist or traditionalist—assert the necessity of “critique” (naqd or intiqād) 
for engaging with modernity.   
I begin with the seminary journal Critique and Perspective (Naqd va Naẓar).266  I 
show that the journal’s editor positions critique as at once central to engaging modernity 
and an integral element of Islamic traditions of scholarship.  I then contrast those 
positions to reformist understandings of critique.  Finally, I conclude by highlighting the 
political context of these positions, in particular the claims they make towards religious, 
political, and civil authority and the place of religious reasoning in the Iranian state.   As 
much as concern with the practice of “critique” extends beyond these two journals, I do 
                                                 
266Charles Kurzman has used articles from this journal (see Charles Kurzman, "Critics Within: Islamic 
Scholars' Protests Against the Islamic State in Iran," International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society 
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not intend that readers take these two instances as representative of all Muslim Iranian 
scholastic debates.  This is a limited example.  It does, however, suggest the incorporation 
of critique—as not only a category, but a model of reflexivity—into understandings of 
scholarship within centers of Islamic learning.   
Over the course of the twentieth century, the semantic field of “naqd” in Persian 
Iranian writings shifted to include not only literary and textual methods, but also political 
and fundamentally epistemological projects.  The Encyclopaedia of Islam gives some 
sense of how Muslim scholars understood “naqd” prior to the twentieth century.  
According to the Encyclopaedia, in “mediaeval times” naqd was “most commonly used 
in the construct…‘criticism of poetry.’… The term originated in the figurative 
use…of naḳd in the sense of “assaying (coins) and separating the good from the bad.”  
The discipline of criticizing poetry coalesced in the tenth century; the goal of the critique 
was to determine whether the authorship attributed to earlier poetry was accurate.  In this 
sense, it “seems evident…that the metaphorical application to poetry of the term naḳd 
originated in the context of distinguishing genuine from spurious, rather than good from 
bad poetry, although the dividing line between the two pairs can be rather fuzzy.”  In 
addition to determining authorship, the term “naqd” also seems to have been used in the 
study of hadīth, records of the statement and practices of the Prophet Muhammad and, for 
Shiʿi  Muslims, the Imams.  This use of naqd in hadith criticism the Encyclopaedia of 
Islam cites an eighteenth-century text from India,267  where the author references as well 
                                                 
267 "Nakd,"  in Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition. (Brill Online , 2012.), 
<http://referenceworks.brillonline.com.libproxy.lib.unc.edu/entries/encyclopaedia-of-islam-2/nakd-
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the metaphor of separating out weak (or false) coins.268  In the twentieth century, naqd 
came to designate “[literary] criticism” in modern Arabic,269 but through Marxist and 
other discourses also came to be part of the apparatus through which Arab intellectuals 
understood the contemporary world.270   
In my own work, where intellectuals seem to have incorporated critique into their 
theoretical lexicon, Persian discourses seem to have mirrored these Arabic developments.   
While Steingass’s late-nineteenth century Persian-English dictionary includes only 
monetary connotations for naqd,271 by the 1940s numerous titles were being publishing 
surrounding literary and cultural criticism.272  A recent, non-specialist, Iranian dictionary 
still suggests largely monetary definitions for naqd, although it includes the notion of 
literary analysis (taḥlīl) as well.  It defines another variation of the word – intiqād – as 
either finding fault with a person or, in the context of literature, simply as “naqd.”273  A 
monograph from 2008 provides further insight to Iranian understandings of critique in 
                                                 
268 al-Tahānawī, Kashshāf (Calcutta, India: Sprenger, 1381 / 1862), s.v. intiqad. 
269 "Nakd." 
270 For an insightful analysis of how political and cultural critique intermingled over the twentieth century 
in arab writings, see: Elizabeth Suzanne Kassab, Contemporary Arab thought : cultural critique in 
comparative perspective (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010). 
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that it specifically details the “critical” lineage of Emmanual Kant.  In addition, that 
monograph, entitled A Comparison of Kant and Mutahhari’s Epistemologies (Muqayase-
ye Marafat-Shenasi-ye Kant va Mutahhari)—positions the twentieth century writer 
Murtazea Mutahhari,274 whom I discussed in preceding chapters, as a critical voice 
himself.  This positioning of Mutahhari as the voice of Iranian criticism runs throughout 
seminary writings on critique, and I discuss this in detail below.   
To examine Iranian discussions of critique in further detail, I draw on the Islamic 
scholastic journal Critique and Perspective (Naqd va Naẓar).  Critique and Perspective 
has been published by the Department of Philosophy and Theology at the Islamic 
Sciences and Cultural Academy275 in Qom, Iran from winter 1994/1995 (1373) through 
2011.  The editorial staff changed in 2002 (1380) as did the goals of the journal.  In its 
first incarnation—which I draw on here—the journal “did not aim to publish a 
specialized, academic journal; rather it was much like a popular magazine dealing with 
issues of interest to educated people general from a religious standpoint: issues such as 
challenges to the principles of Islamic jurisprudence (feqh) and some theological (kalami) 
issues, in particular issues about the rationality of religion and how it might cope with 
                                                 
274 See, for example, Davari, The political thought of Ayatullah Murtaza Mutahhari : an Iranian 
theoretician of the Islamic state. ;Michael M.J. Fischer, Debating Muslims: Cultural Dialogues in 
Postmodernity and Tradition (Madison: University of Wisconsin, 1990).; Hamid Dabashi, Theology of 
discontent : the ideological foundations of the Islamic Revolution in Iran (New York: New York University 
Press, 1993). 
275The Islamic Sciences and Cultural Academy is a fascinating institution in its own right.  In 2011, for 
example, it hosted an international conference on “Religious Doctrines and the Mind-Body Problem.”  
Keynote speakers included Lynne Rudder Baker, Charles Taliaferro, Gareth Matthews, Edward Wierenga, 
Uwe Meixner, Richard Taylor, and Roxanne Marcotte. The call for papers was reposted on the website for 
the Society of Christian Philosophers, suggesting a global religious rapprochement.  As far as I am aware, 
no scholarship has been done on the academy or its efforts at international inter-faith scholarship.  For the 
conference program, see <http://seminars.ir/portal.php>.  For the Society of Christian Philosophers, see 
<http://www.societyofchristianphilosophers.com/category/news-and-events/conferences/page/2/> 
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modernity. The focus on fundamental feqhi and kalami issues (which are associated with 
challenges of the modern time) is one of the salient feature[s] of this administration.”276   
Critique and Perspective describes itself as a theology (kalam) journal, with a 
particular emphasis on the “modern theology (kalam-ī nu).”277   Each issue maintains 
largely the same format, beginning with a statement from the editor, followed by a sort of 
roundtable, a series of articles, one or more interviews, and a review of books.  The 
roundtable may involve seminary students or may be limited to faculty.  The articles and 
interviews may either be original pieces or reprints; reprints are often of English-
language materials, such as an interview with philosopher Alasdaire MacIntyre and 
writings from religious studies specialist Ian Barbour on the relationship between science 
and religion. 
The journal presents its task as “analyzing the truth of modern (jadīdī) religious 
issues,” presenting the new formations that arise “in the realm of religion,” and fulfilling 
the need to acquaint seminary scholars with “modern viewpoints in the realm of 
religion.”278  For these reasons, the journal hopes to fill a gap in “Islamic research” and to 
                                                 
276 Personal correspondence, September 2011. 
277A later issue of the journal explores in detail the notion of “modern theology.” The concern with a 
specifically modern theology is not limited within the ḥawzah to Critique and Perspective; even the 
important-and generally very socially and politically conservative--Source of Emulation Javadi Amuli 
oversees publications on the Kalam-e Jadid. My understanding is that debates over “modern” (jadīdī) 
theology take place outside of Iran as well.  For one, an early issue of Critique and Perspective locates the 
origins of the term in the works of the South Asian scholar Shibli Nomani (d. 1914 CE). 
278 All following quotations from the journal are from the "Editor’s Introduction ", Critique and Perspective 
(Naqd va Nazar) 1, no. Winter (1373 / 1994-1995): 
<http://www.shareh.com/persian/magazine/naqd_n/001/index.htm>.  All translations are my own. Harvard 
library catalogues the journal as follows: Naqd va Nazar (Qom, Iran: M. M. Faqihi) and possesses issues 
from 1994 to 1998.  Intriguingly, during 2011 the journal seemed to disappear from the general 
ww.ḥawzah.net website. At the time of writing, it is still available at the www.shareh.com site that I noted 
above.  (Large thanks are due to Charles Kurzman who suggested I download all these onto my computer 
during Fall 2010.  Sadly, I was unable to download the reformist journal Kiyan which likewise has 
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“make room in its pages for new viewpoints and learned (ʿilmī) criticism in the realm of 
religious issues and to present the modern horizons of …[those] issues for ….[its] 
readers.”     
The editor—in the introduction to the journal's first issue in 1994/5 (Winter 
1373)—establishes the journal’s enterprise as one of attaining knowledge (shinākht), an 
enterprise for which critique is necessary.  Here, knowledge defines the human enterprise, 
the beginning of history (tarīkh) and the site of connection to divine truth (ḥaqīqat).   
“Scientific and cultural rivalry”—such as that between Islamic civilization and others that 
allow humanity to evaluate their systems of thought (andīsheh)—assist “better 
understanding”  and arriving more quickly at “truth” (ḥaqīqat).279   
Criticism, the editor argues, is the method through which that evaluation—or 
weighing—of knowledge takes place: 
Humanity is the most beautiful cultivator of creation, and thought 
(taffakur) is the most important essence of its existence.  It is self-evident 
that thought begins with questioning… [It is] indispensible to plant the 
tree of critique in the sphere of thought and to clear the way for the most 
natural path for the blossoming of thought.280 
                                                                                                                                                 
disappeared from the Iranian academic databases with which I am familiar.  Conspiracy theories are not 
inappropriate here.) 
279 The editor clearly relates the comparison of Christian, liberal, and Islamic perspectives that takes place 
in the journal itself to the early debates between Islamic and Christian theologians in earlier periods of 
Islamic civilization.   
280 "Editor’s Introduction ". 
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Aside from the metaphor of a garden of learning and human existence that the 
author deploys, the above quotation clarifies two further aspects of critical practice: (1) it 
relates to “questioning”; (2) it is a natural aspect of human existence.  The second point is 
significant in that—unlike the relationship between critique and questioning which in 
some ways mirrors a Kantian understanding of critique—the notion that critique is 
integral to human history—since its inception—contrasts strongly with the narrative of a 
critical Enlightenment-era turn found in the Euro-American debates surveyed above.   
However, as the editor continues his exposition on critique more familiar 
elements appear.  The editor suggests a realm of knowledge in which various distinct 
areas of thought fall under critical practice: “If the reach of 'critique' spreads to all 
spheres of thought, it is inevitable that religious thought (andīshe-ye dīnī) will also fall 
under the power of critics.  These critics will not necessarily be internal [to religion], but 
rather will take form outside of religious thought and the external critique of religion will 
not necessarily be achievable from a place of faith (imān).”  What is of interest here is not 
so much the tension between critique and faith—a tension that, as we will see, the editor 
proceeds to overturn as he grounds critique in an Islamic genealogy—but rather the 
presupposition that religious knowledge is not in itself all encompassing.  Critique is an 
enterprise of knowledge in general that is required of specifically religious knowledge as 
well. 
Although the exposition above acknowledges a possible tension between faith and 
critique, the article moves to locate critique within a strong genealogy of Islamic thinkers 
and traditions of learning.  I unpack three elements of this genealogy which dominate the 
editor's exposition and, intriguingly, parallel some of the commitments and categories in 
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the reformist “intellectual” publications as well as those of the Euro-American debates.  
First, the editor makes a strong claim that earlier Islamic thinkers—some of the sages of 
Islamic scholarship—advocated and practiced critique; Second, he relates this critical 
practice to an assessment of specifically Western knowledge; Third, he suggested a 
historical rupture—named 'modernity'--that requires critical practice to re-establish the 
efficacy of Islamic knowledge.   
In Critique and Perspective's presentation, the sages of Islamic learning become 
exemplars of critical practice.  The editor draws on the seminal Muslim scholar Abu 
Hamid Muhammad ibn Muhammad al-Ghazali (1058 - 1111) to support his argument that 
faith is not opposed to critique—that critique instead is required for true “knowledge” 
which is itself “attained when it opens the mind to the thoughts of others.”  In Chapter 
One I discussed Mujtahid Shabestari’s engagement with Ghazali’s theories of adab, a 
kind of embodied religious practice.  Here, the editor of Critique and Perspective, draws 
on a different work written by Ghazali in Arabic and commonly rendered in English as 
The Deliverance from Error (the version cited by the editor is a Persian translation 
entitled Doubt and Knowledge (Shakk va Shinākht)).281   According to the editor, Ghazali 
argued  
'I became certain that no person is able to discover what is defective in any 
knowledge (dānish), unless he learns that knowledge well and equals the 
most learned in that knowledge and he excels in knowledge (maʿlūmāt) of 
it and surpasses their knowledge of it and attains such an understanding of 
                                                 
281Muhammed Ghazali al-, Shakk va Shenakht: al-Munqidh min al-dalal (Doubt and Knowledge: The 
Deliverance from Error), trans. Sadiq Ainah’vand (Tehran, Iran: Muʿassasat-i Amir Kabir 1360 / 1981 ).  
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its truths that even its original proponents never had.  Once this happens, 
then he can critique (naqd) that knowledge.’282 
In this sense, it seems critique is embedded in a mode of argument – not only the 
evaluation of other systems of knowledge but also an evaluation predicated on the desire 
to expose the faults of that system.  To simply view this endeavor as a fault-finding one, 
however, would mistake the impetus of Ghazali’s Deliverance from Error.  Indeed, the 
narrative of Ghazali’s autobiography is a search for truth, one whose outcome and source 
Ghazali is not sure of at the beginning.  And, indeed, the editor of Critique and 
Perspective does not suggest a blanket opposition to what his readers might find in other 
systems of knowledge.  Instead, he suggests the possibility (and certainty) of finding both 
error and value – a topic I return to shortly. 283    
For the editor—and articles throughout the hawzah—naqd is a method of inquiry 
embedded in overcoming doubt through the reasoned appraisal of differently positioned 
presentations of knowledge.  The editor makes this turn to method—the overcoming of 
“doubt” for “knowledge” (as reads the Persian translation of Ghazali's text)—more 
explicit by drawing on a different work by Ghazali.  The Incoherence of the Philosophers 
                                                 
282 Montgomery Watt translates the Arabic version of this passages as: “ I was convinced that a man cannot 
grasp what is defective in any of the sciences unless he has so complete a grasp of the science in question 
that he equals its most learned exponents in the appreciation of its fundamental principles, and even goes 
beyond and surpasses them, probing into some of the tangles and profundities which the very professors of 
the science have neglected. Then and only then is it possible that what he has to assert about its defects is 
true” (Ghazzālī and W. Montgomery Watt, The faith and practice of al-Ghazzālī, Ethical and religious 
classics of East and West (London,: G. Allen and Unwin, 1953).).  
283Intriguingly as well, the deployment of the quote from Ghazali makes direct use of the word critique 
(naqd) even in the Arabic original.  Yet, this is the only place in the entirety of the Deliverance from Error 
where Ghazali uses the word in any of its forms.  A simple CRTL F search of the Arabic document 
available on the http://www.ghazali.org/works/md-ar.htm website verifies the limited use of the term.  That 
document is the version edited by J. Saliba and K. Ayyad 7th edition, available at 
www.ghazali.org/works/md-ar.htm 
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(Tahāfut al-Falāsifa) catalogues a number of objectionable views held by Muslim 
philosophers and, beyond this, does not provide a substantive position of Ghazali’s own.  
Ghazali wrote The Incoherence of the Philosophers shortly before the Deliverance from 
Error that Shabestari drew on to question Islamic jurisprudence, and scholars of Islam 
often point to it as marking the decline of philosophy in Islam, although philosophy 
continued to flourish in Muslim Spain, greater Iran, and South Asia.284  Here, the editor 
explains that Ghazali  “understood that we first [must] review and verify the truth of their 
method (of the philosophers) and then raise objections.  Thus, before a school (mazhab) 
is well understood, objecting to it is like shooting an arrow in the dark.”   
The editor continues to argue that other systems of knowledge contain not only 
errors, but also some value.  For this argument, he draws on a philosophical text (a 
somewhat intriguing opposition given his use of Ghazali’s Incoherence of the 
Philosophers).   Like Ghazali, however, the editor draws on noted Islamic philosopher 
Ibn Sina, or Avicenna, (980-1037) to detail the methods and uses of criticism.   According 
to the editor, Ibn Sina himself outlined the practice of criticism (adāb-i naqd) and 
detailed six kinds of “spiritual sophistries (mughālaṭe-ye maʿnavī)” in his Remarks and 
Admonitions (al-Ishārāt va al-Tanbīhāt).   The number of these spiritual confusions, 
however, has grown since Ibn Sina’s time, in particular in the West.  Scholars, the editor 
suggests, must be aware of these errors; yet, at the same time, they must attend to 
                                                 
284 For a somewhat outdated—although detailed—overview of Ghazali’s life, work, and influence, see 
""al-Ghazālī.." http://referenceworks.brillonline.com.libproxy.lib.unc.edu/entries/encyclopaedia-of-islam-
2/al-ghazali-COM_0233; see also The Muslim World 101, no. 3 and no. 4 (2011), which were devoted 
entirely to al-Ghazali; Moosa, Ghazali and the poetics of imagination; Corbin, History of Islamic 
philosophy; Garden, "Coming Down from the Mountaintop: Al-Ghazālī's Autobiographical Writings in 
Context." 
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elements in the west that might assist Muslims’ own theological endeavors, including the 
Western “discipline of literary criticism (naqd-i adab)” which may be of use to fields 
such as hadith criticism.   
  While understandings of critique within the hawzah draw on seminal Islamic 
writers and texts to detail the method of criticism, the journals argue as well that such 
critical practices are necessary for understanding Islam in the modern age.  Critique 
cannot operate without understanding the specificities of the contemporary world and 
uniquely modern transformations.  First, the journal asks whether there are in fact 
realities that differ from the past and, if so, whether a “modern [form of] independent 
reasoning (ijtihād)” is necessary.  He then asserts that there are indeed such new realities 
– including economic realities – that require new forms of engagement.  In this sense, 
“One with knowledge of religion must necessarily have knowledge of the age (zamān-
shenās) and one who has knowledge of the age is someone who is familiar with the 
serious and true questions of that time relevant to the historical conditions, states, 
exigencies, and affairs of that period.”  This language of “time and place” draws from a 
noted speech of Ayatollah Khomeini’s and, indeed, the journal quotes Khomeini to 
emphasize the importance of the present for religious thinking.  According to Khomeini, 
even if two issues—one addressed by Muslims in the past and one in the present—appear 
the same on the surface, in the present “politics, society, and economy” these are in effect 
new issues and require new Islamic rulings (hukm).285  This temporal recognition of 
modernity—as a new space removed from earlier understandings—marks Critique and 
                                                 
285Khomeini’s statement on “time and place” has been quite influential in the Shiʿi  seminary debates and 
appears in numerous articles and monographs.  In the future, it would be interesting to explore the ways in 
which Khomeini’s own understanding of modernity has informed later Shiʿi scholarship in Iran. 
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Perspective’s project.  The editor perhaps summarizes this perspective best when he 
asserts that legal (fiqhī) arguments must be grounded in specific realities of “our time.”   
Earlier Islamic scholars wrote from the perspective of their times and “with the realities 
of their lives one can only fulfill the needs of their own time.  For our time—and the 
problems of our time—they are not sufficient.” 
The editor’s remarks from Critique and Perspective are not unique in the Islamic 
journals published out of the hawzah.   Numerous articles from the seminary journals 
focus on the question of critique.  In particular, the seminary journals attend to the 
writings of Murtaza Mutahhari, who I discussed briefly above as well as earlier in the 
dissertation.  The journals draw on, dissect, and situate broadly what they label 
Mutahhari’s understanding of critique.  One example of this study of critique is an article 
titled “The Martyr Mutahhari’s Perspective on the Practice of Critique and the Method of 
Criticism” (Adab-i Naqd va Ravesh-i Intiqād dar Naẓar-i Shahīd Muṭahharī).  I 
explained above that the basic definition of naqd included in the Encyclopedia of Islam 
involves separating out the good and bad coin.  This understanding is referenced here as 
well, but the object of critique is not only text—as in poetry or hadith criticism—but all 
realms of knowledge.  The author draws on a verse from the Qur’an and Imam Musa al-
Kazim’s interpretation of that verse to clarify the religious foundations of critique.  The 
verse is “Who listens to the word (kalām) and follow what is best of it.  Those are the 
ones Allah has guided, and those are the people of understanding’” [39.18].  
According to the author, the Qurʿanic phrase “‘they follow the best of it’” means 
“they practice critique…they choose what is better and they follow the better choice.”  
Again, as in the article above, this Qurʿanic practice of critique marks the place of reason.  
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He continues,  
from this verse and the hadith it is clear that one of the most evident qualities of 
reason (ʿaql) for humanity is this very [act of] distinguishing and 
separating…good speech from false speech…logical speech from illogical 
speech.286    
  The author continues to link the practice of criticism and the quality of 
reason:  Serious students must bring themselves to adopt the teachings of a 
philosophical school whose characteristics and distinguishing features they 
perceive gradually. Because our job is knowledge (ʿilm) and philosophy we 
expose our own beliefs to the highest level of learned analysis and we respect the 
theories of serious students; meaning, any of the [male] students, whatever 
perspective or question they might have, and however they might talk outside of 
the class or present their own views in written form, we politely offer our own 
view about that [theory] with complete gratitude and pleasure.  Luckily, we are 
followers of a religion that counts reasoning (taʿaqqul)—thinking and following 
reason and wisdom—as one of the principles of its teachings.  The Holy Qur’an 
says with complete clarity: Call people to the path of God through wisdom, 
rational and learned argument…[16:125] …We will not find any other religion or 
school that as emphatically and clearly commands its own followers to the path of 
wisdom – meaning, [one in which] the path of reason and knowledge enters into 
                                                 
286 Sayyid Mehdi Mussavi, "The Martyr Mutahhari’s Perspective on the Practice of Critique and the 
Method of Criticism (Adab-i Naqd va Ravesh-i Intiqād dar Naẓar-i Shahīd Muṭahharī).  ," Paygah-i 
Hawzah 63(1388 / 2012). 
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existential issues.287   
Significantly, the author argues that this is not unconditioned reason, but rather 
that humanity must know its own limits: “It is necessary for humanity [to consider] its 
own intellectual limits in terms of its species prior to anything; meaning, [to consider] 
what the limit of human understanding is [for the species] and also for individual person,   
to accept the field of his own personal knowledge and learning and to ascertain the limits 
of his own possibilities…Within those limits he is immune from error and missteps.”288  
Yet, while the individual must ascertain his own limits in order to practice critique 
correctly, it is significant that no individual is beyond critique.  Here again citing 
Mutahhari, the author concludes that even “the Sources of Emulation are not above 
criticism …I was and am a believer that every station (other than that of the Innocent 
[Imams]) that is un-criticizable is a danger to itself and to Islam.”289    
 The Hawzah writings on critique are difficult to place in terms of their political 
positioning in regards to the Islamic Republic.   The statement above, for example, might 
be read as a veiled critique of the ruling structures of the Islamic Republic and/or systems 
                                                 
287 Ibid. 
288 Ibid.  Articles from the journal Islamic Theology (Kalam-i Islami) offer detailed expositions of the 
differences between religious and Islamic reason, on the one hand, and modern reason, on the other.  
Ayatollah Sobhani, who I discussed in Chapter One, himself has overseen the journal Islamic Theology 
(Kalām-i Islāmī) since its inception in 1371/1992.   One example is the article “Examining the issue of 
reason in religious knowledge,” published in 1379/2000.  There, reasoning is not only connected to human 
nature, but to the guiding fitra of all people that is instilled by God at the act of creation.  The articles 
argues that “the goal of this reason is not ‘a common theoretical reason that sees in its own view 
the…goals ..of life, ..and divine control over humanity and the world….Rather, the point of the verses of 
the Qurʾan [on reason] is a [kind of] reason that works in harmony with ..fitra..for a ‘rational (maʿqūlī) 
life.’” See, "Examining the issue of reason in religious knowledge," Islamic Theology (Kalām-i Islāmī) 
(1379/2000).        
289 Mussavi, "The Martyr Mutahhari’s Perspective on the Practice of Critique and the Method of Criticism 
(Adab-i Naqd va Ravesh-i Intiqād dar Naẓar-i Shahīd Muṭahharī).  ." 
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of authority within the hawzah itself.  The foundation that oversees Critique and 
Perspective describes the journal as a “religious intellectual” (rūshanfikr-i dīnī), a 
designation that would link it to political reformists and critics of the Islamic Republic.290  
Other well-known religious intellectuals, however, have argued that the journal was 
produced to counter religious intellectual productions, although this designation may 
apply most aptly to the second period of Critique and Perspective’s production, after its 
editorial staff changed.291    
Critique and Perspective's format gives some sense of how the editors perceive 
their critical task.  As much as the introductory issue’s discussion of critique focuses on 
finding truth and error, the issues themselves take a very comparative, and almost 
descriptive, approach.    One issue of the journal, devoted entirely to the topic of justice,  
is representative of the journal's format generally.  This issue includes an editorial 
introduction, a sort of roundtable, a few book reviews, a series of articles, and an 
interview.  The interviews, as well as the articles, may be original pieces or translations of 
English or Arabic works. The issue on justice includes articles such as “The Definition of 
Justice in the words of Imam Sadiq,” but also essays on and by political philosopher John 
Rawls, economist Friedrich Hayek, philosopher of religion Alvin Plantinga, and moral 
philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre.   
On the whole, the element linking the articles on critique from the hawzah seems 
to be a demand for just such comparative studies.  While such comparison might not 
seem like a political project to those unfamiliar with the hawzah system or the politics of 
                                                 
290 Personal Correspondence.  
291 Personal Correspondence. 
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knowledge in Iran292, reading Euro-American authors is hardly a neutral activity within 
the Islamic Republic.  Indeed, the journal Ḥawzah demonstrates these politics in printing 
what amounts to an article censoring its own activities.  There Ayatollah Mohammad Taqi 
Misbah Yazdi (1934 - )293, a very conservative, politically engaged, and senior Islamic 
scholar, questions the activities of the journals.   In the rather ominously titled article 
“Ayatollah Mohammad Taqi Misbah Yazdi’s guidelines in meeting with the writers of the 
journal Ḥawzah,” Yazdi suggests that the journal has gone too far in airing “dissenting 
viewpoints.”  Notably, however, while Yazdi calls on the journal to curtail the boundaries 
of appropriate discussion, he embeds this recommendation within the language of 
critique, suggesting that the journals are practicing critique incorrectly rather than that 
they desist in the practice altogether.294  
Islamic Argument and Secular Criticism  
 
If secular criticism, as I suggested above, denotes the activities of the academy 
and the intellectual in a Kantian lineage of Enlightenment, how are these Islamic 
evocations of criticism—as a method, integral to the reasoning individual, and necessary 
for modern scholarship—relate to those secular models of criticism?  One solution to this 
dilemma is found in an earlier interrogation of the liberal practice of public criticism that 
                                                 
292 For one discussion of Iranian concerns over social scientific or humanistic studies, see: Kurzman, 
"Reading Weber in Tehran." 
293 Comparative politics expert Mehran Kamrava has argued that Ayatollah Misbah Yazdi represents the 
“traditionalist” strand of Iranian conservative scholars; however, Kamrava does not fully define this term 
and it is unclear what such a designation implies in his analysis. See, Kamrava, Iran's Intellectual 
Revolution, 85. 
294 "Ayatollah Mohammad Taqi Misbah Yazdi’s guidelines in meeting with the writers of the journal 
Ḥawzah," Ḥawzah 131-132(1384 / 2005-2006). 
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Asad first raised in an essay titled “The Limits of Religious Criticism in the Middle East: 
Notes on Islamic Public Argument.”295  There, Asad positions the possibilities of a 
differently critical project—one embedded in an Islamic tradition of public reasoning—
against that of the Kantian Enlightenment project; namely, the (post)Enlightenment 
assumption of a free individual.  This tradition of criticism is not, for Asad, defined by 
the person who enunciates it—a Muslim—but rather by the site and manner of 
enunciation—that is, from within an Islamic mode of argument. In this way Asad's 
argument for an Islamic tradition of public criticisms rests—uneasily perhaps—in his 
understanding of an Islamic discursive tradition.   
Here, Asad attempts to break apart a presumed opposition between the 
authoritative adherence to Islamic prescripts and public reasoned debate.  To do so, he 
examines one example of these institutional traditions of criticism in the context of the 
modern kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the opposition of classically-trained Islamic 
scholars to US presence in Saudi Arabia during the gulf crisis of 1990.  Rather than the 
Enlightenment right to critique a legitimate political authority, Asad discovers a different 
model of addressing (and highlighting concerns with) a legitimate Muslim ruler. Like 
Kant, these Saudi Islamic scholars view their government as a legitimate political system 
and, within that framework, publically censure the actions of the government, such as 
allowing US troops to station in Saudi Arabia itself.  Central to this Muslim framework of 
criticism is the fact that “the Saudi government explicitly claims to be based on the 
shariʿa.  Thus, what the critics offer is ‘advice’ (naṣīḥa), something called for by the 
                                                 
295Talal Asad, Genealogies of religion : discipline and reasons of power in Christianity and Islam 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), 200-38.   This is the only essay in Genealogies that 
Asad had not published previously.   
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shariʿa as a precondition of moral rectitude (istiqāma), not ‘criticism’ (naqd), with its 
adversarial overtones.”296  Furthermore, the site of naṣīḥa, the Friday sermon, links this 
advice to the collective duty of the `Islamic scholars – one of their obligations as those 
who uphold the shariʿa.  
Asad acknowledges that some may disagree with his argument that such 
discourses represent a form of reasoned public debate – indeed, the Saudi Islamic 
scholars abstain from “the post-Enlightenment idea of moral and political progress” and 
focus instead on maintaining the fulfillment of God’s commands within new social and 
technological spaces297.  In so much as Islamic scholars bow to religious tradition rather 
than seek “progress”, it is possible—Asad acknowledges—that one might read this 
discourse as non or anti-modern.  Asad argues however that this position assumes an 
overly limited concept of modernity as such, and its opposition to (religious) “tradition.”  
Instead, the criticism of the younger Islamic scholars—graduates from new Islamic 
institutions of learning—addresses new issues (like television and radio) not in a way that 
marks their criticism as untraditional – it continues to partake in frames and modes of 
reasoning of Islamic traditions of naṣīḥa and religious authority, but instead “because 
modern institutions (administrative, economic, ideological) and modern classes 
(especially those who have received a Western education) have come into existence, 
creating a new social space that is the object of critical discourse and practice.”  Because 
the religious discourses of the Islamic scholars presuppose and are in part constituted by 
                                                 
296 Ibid., 212. 
297 Ibid., 220. 
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these new social spaces, “they are a part of modernity and not a reaction to it.”298  In 
short, instead of subscribing to this secular self-assessment of Enlightenment tradition, 
Asad calls for the anthropological recognition of difference, particularly for the 
investigation of non-secular traditions and institutions of public criticism. 
In Asad’s analysis of the Saudi Islamic scholars, it is notable that the Friday 
prayer serves as the institutional location of public criticism, the Islamic scholar as its 
mouth piece, the shariʿa as its normative content, and the monarchy as its object.   
Other studies of Muslim education argue, like Asad, that classically-trained 
Islamic scholars hold a particular role within Islamic tradition that marks them as authors 
of and participants in the discursive tradition of Islam.299  One support for reading Islamic 
seminaries in Iran specifically as bastions of Islamic tradition is that the Shiʿi Iranian 
seminaries were unmarked by the colonial influence that decimated much of the seminary 
influence elsewhere.  Muhammad Qasim Zaman has argued that while in Egypt, for 
example, it was typically at the direction of the state that important reforms...were 
undertaken at the Azhar [seminary]" and in South Asia new madrasas were "established 
in the wake of the consolidation of British colonial rule as a way of preserving an Islamic 
identity," the scholastic centers of Iran and Iraq did not feel the "pressures of colonial 
rule" in the same way.   This was not only a geographic distinction but, according to 
Zaman, particular to the Shiʿa as "informal styles of learning have...persisted more 
                                                 
298 Ibid., 226. 
299 Robert Hefner, for example, has argued that “Islamic schools are not merely institutions for teaching 
and training young believers – they are the forges from which the ideas and actors for the Muslim world’s 
future will flow” (Hefner, "Introduction: The Culture, Politics, and Future of Muslim Education," 4.) 
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resolutely, and longer, in Shiʿi  scholarly circles than they did among Sunnis, for instance 
in South Asia or Egypt."  Zaman suggests that comparatively "there is no parallel in 
Sunni Islam to the sort of independence from [the state that] the Shiʿi ʿUlama have long 
enjoyed," a fact that Zaman attributes to the Shiʿi practice of paying a portion of their 
income each year to a ranking religious scholar (a practiced called khums, “the fifth”).300    
  Many changes, however, impacted the institutions of Islamic learning in Iran over 
the course of the twentieth century.  The main site of the Islamic seminaries (ḥawzah) in 
Iran was founded only in the first decades of the twentieth century.  And, as I discussed 
above, even in the thirties the seminaries had begun to publish journals assessing their 
own relationship to “modernity,” and by the 1960s were convening conferences on the 
topic.  In the twenty-first century, the seminaries are sprawling complexes which not 
only, at times, include volleyball courts and girls’ schools, but also internet access and—
as I discussed above—a substantial web presence.   
   However, this independence has been compromised under the Islamic Republic.  
In fact, the post-revolution period creates a far more complicated situation for educational 
institutions and concomitant “traditions” of learning than suggested by other colonial 
examples of university elites and traditionalist madrasas.  Rather, following the Islamic 
revolution in Iran, not only do the universities come under stringent critique as sites of 
secularizing and Westernizing forces, but the seminaries—largely independent until the 
early 1980s—are incorporated—uncomfortably and with much dissent from ranking 
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Islamic scholars—as appendages of the state system and its claims to indigenous 
authentic authority.  
As Zaman suggests, the ḥawzah maintained a much greater degree of 
independence from the state over the course of the twentieth century and was able to, 
more or less, direct its own affairs.  Yet, while the relative isolation of Iran from colonial 
forces aided the Iranian Islamic scholars, they were not immune to the centralizing drive 
of the new Iranian nation-state. 301   It is worth recalling that even in the Iranian context—
despite the unique history of institutional independence that Zaman highlights—the 
seminary and the state became interlinked following the formation of the Islamic 
Republic. In short, of the markers of an Islamic tradition of public criticism that Asad 
highlights—that is, the Friday prayer, the shariʿa, the scholar, and the monarchy—in Iran 
the state lays claims to each of these not only through its claims to represent Islam (a 
move the Saudi states makes as well), but also through its claim to Islamic scholarship 
and knowledge as the basis of the “guardianship of the jurist.”  The Iranian scholar Yusefi  
Eshkevari, for one, highlights this transformation when he insists that "'from a historical 
perspective, with the advent of the Islamic Republic...the coming to power of the clerics 
and their assumption of all responsibilities...the clergy entered a new phase."302  In short, 
there are numerous difficulties in mapping Asad’s “Islamic tradition” of public argument 
onto the Iranian sphere.  Iranian scholars do attend to and evoke Islamic figures and texts, 
yet the institutional bases have themselves been disrupted.  These new spaces—the 
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public, the state—are not only the object of Islamic contestations, but also have shifted its 
foundations.    
At the same time, differences remain between the discussions of critique located 
in the hawzah and those among new religious intellectuals elsewhere.  To highlight these 
differences, I briefly turn to the journal Madrasa.303  Madrasa—unlike Critique and 
Perspective—was a short-lived project.304  It ran in four volumes from 2005-2006 (1384-
1385).  As a self-described “intellectual” (rūshanfikr) journal, Madrasah builds on the 
publications and identifications of the early and mid-1990s as well as the position of the 
intellectual in contradistinction to that of the seminary scholar.305  While Critique and 
Perspective grounds the practice and method of critique in a lineage of Islamic thinkers—
Ghazali, Ibn Sina, Baqir al-Sadr, and Khomeini—in order to assess and comes to terms 
with the changes in “time and place” that mark modernity, Madrasa situates critical 
practice as constitutive of being and becoming modern.   
Each issue of Madrasa took on a central topic, including the “nation-state,” “love 
(ʿishq),” and the thought of Fazlur Rahman.  Not all articles in any given issue would 
pertain to that topic however, and articles on art and literature were common as well.  
                                                 
303The journal is printed with a two table of contents – one in Persian and one in English.  The remainder 
of the writing is entirely in Persian.   All translations—except for, when noted, the titles of articles—are my 
own.  The journal itself spells its title as “madreseh” in the English table of contents; however, here I use 
the common American spelling instead. 
304 Although Madrasa itself did not run  for very long, it continued and echoes projects by other 
intellectual journals in Iran, including Kiyan from the 1990s and Aftab from the late 1990s and early 2000s.  
Although neither of those journals espouse a specifically “critical” project, “critique” runs throughout their 
discussions.  Significantly, many of the same authors who wrote for both Kiyan and Aftab took part in the 
journal Madrasa. 
305 On the history of the term “intellectual” within Iran, see Boroujerdi, Iranian intellectuals and the 
West : the tormented triumph of nativism; Ali Gheissari, Iranian Intellectuals in the Twentieth Century 
(Austin: University of Texas Press, 1998). 
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Like Critique and Perspective, the journal included works by and assessment of Euro-
American intellectuals, including Jacques Derrida and Michael Ignatieff.  While some of 
the authors who contributed to Madrasa would be unknown outside of Iran, others—such 
as the philosopher Abdolkarim Soroush—have been much discussed.  It is important to 
note that, while Soroush is a presence in the journal, his views do not go uncontested or 
define its content; instead, detailed articles appear alongside his own writings that 
critique Soroush’s views of Islam, modernity, and the nature of reason. 
Madrasa orients itself to the search for and analysis of knowledge (shinākht) in a 
manner both similar to and markedly different from Critique and Perspective. It defines 
its project by eight goals, not all of which I will discuss here.  The first however, is to 
position itself as both a cultural (farhangī) and philosophical  (falsafī) journal. Whereas 
culture defines “the collection of values (arzesh) of a society, customs (hanjar) that they 
follow, and the works that they produce”—all of which connect to a “way of life”—
philosophy represents “a kind of learning (dānesh) which has theoretical issues of 
knowledge (shinākht) at its heart….Philosophy shines a light on these theories [of 
science, history, ethics, religion, and politics].  It analyzes them [and] distinguishes their 
internal contradictions.”  The philosophy of Madrasa intends to move “on the ground” 
rather than exist above matters of lived existence.  
Critique, here, is defined as the operation of the intellectual – it is the “on the 
ground” theorizing that the philosopher undertakes.  As the editor’s introduction asserts: 
Madrasa …maintains an intellectualist concern for itself; meaning, it 
understands the critical (intiqādi) inclination as its most significant 
characteristic, and for this reason it believes that both society and 
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government (hokuma) need intellectuals… The intellectual is the critical 
conscience of society…. We believe that government—for its own 
survival—needs intellectuals, critics, opponents, and must not drive them 
away. 
Intellectualism—this critical inclination—not only preserves government, but also 
brings modernity to the people.    In this sense, intellectualism  
understands itself [as] the conscience of modern desires and ideals and as 
addressing the people who are not acquainted with these ideas and it 
believes—by affecting the people—one can move towards the realization 
of these [modern] ideas.  Madrasa seeks to acquaint readers with modern 
ideas, to help with the maturation of their personalities (shakhsi), to 
increase their wisdom, and [their] questioning perspective. 
This understanding of intellectualism—and the practice of critique as marking the 
role of the intellectual—invokes implicitly the Kantian formation at the root of the Euro-
American debates over secular criticism.  There, as Asad suggested in “The Limits of 
Religious Criticism in the Middle East,” the intellectual—in contrast to the clergyman—
practices criticism through public reasoning.  Indeed, it was this lack of free reasoning by 
scholars in the Middle East that led outsiders to mark the actions of the Saudi Islamic 
scholars as unmodern.   
Madrasa does not suggest explicitly either that it follows Critique and 
Perspective in ascribing criticism to Islamic tradition or that it accepts the Euro-American 
discourse wherein criticism arises out of the Enlightenment; yet, it does (implicitly) 
define itself against the ḥawzah as a site of learning.  In this sense, whereas Critique and 
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Perspective saw a need to interrogate, assess, and perhaps learn from modern forms of 
knowledge, Madrasa sees itself as rising out of modernity itself.  Whereas the key terms 
of the ḥawzah journal built on a tradition of reasoning, engagement, and scholastic 
method from within Islamic scholastic traditions, Madrasa implicitly interrogates the 
location of Islamic learning.   
It does this in part through the very name of the journal.  Over the course of the 
2000s, “madrasa” made its way into English and is now included in the Oxford English 
Dictionary where it is defined as “In Muslim countries: a school of Islamic theology and 
law; (also more generally) a school (esp. a secondary school) or institution of higher 
Islamic education.”306  Most readers are probably familiar with this first meaning—“a 
school of Islamic theology and law”—or, even more simply, the media-representation of 
a madrasa as a religious school and, most likely, a site of conservative or even radical 
indoctrination.  In Iran, this more general meaning of a “school” was quite common at 
through the beginning of the twentieth century, and used for elementary and secondary 
schools. However, by the time Sulayman Hayyim published his New English-Persian 
Dictionary in 1934—accompanying a wave to nationalize Iranian Persian and remove 
words derived from Arabic307--the public government schools were marked by different 
word with clear Persian roots, rushdiyya, with implications of maturity and growth.   
                                                 
306“madraseh”, Oxford English Dictionary 
<http://www.oed.com.libproxy.lib.unc.edu/view/Entry/112073?redirectedFrom=madrasa#eid> 
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While the word madrasa retains the general sense today, as a “place of teaching 
and learning,”308 the journal Madrasa clearly marks this site of learning as a modern 
edifice by linking its own title to the Rushdiya Madrasa (madrasa-ye rushdiya), 
purportedly the first “modern madrasa in Iran.”  The editor claims to follow the founder 
of that school, Mirza Hasan Rushdiya (1851 - 1944) 309 as a project of reform (islah).  
This reform project is not a political one, he argues, but instead looks to create a more 
“rational” society.   
As much as Madrasa positions itself as disseminating a modern rationaity, this 
reason is not entirely distinguishable from the religious reason understood by the writers 
of the hawzah journals.  Indeed, it is difficult to ascribe a single position to the writers of 
Madrasa.  Contributors to the journal include Abdolkarim Soroush, whose secularizing 
arguments regarding religious authority I discussed in the preceding chapter, as well as 
Mohsen Kadivar, whose constructions of Shiʿi political ethics I surveyed in Chapter Two.  
Although both authors participate in Madrasa, they hold diverse views on not only Iran’s 
political future, but also the relationship between human reasoning and the divine and the 
location of Islamic traditions of learning in modernity.  Soroush, for example, calls 
unabashedly for an Islamic Enlightenment.  He suggests, “We cannot say that rationalism 
or secularism was absent from the scene [of early Islamic history].  In theology or kalam, 
you have the rationalist and quasi-secular Muʿtazilites [in the eighth through tenth 
centuries C.E.], who relied on reason in coming to know God and in moral thinking.  
Unfortunately the rationalism of the Mu`tazilites was Aristotelian.  This was very 
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inauspicious: the European Enlightenment is based on a nominalist rationalism, whereas 
Islamic rationalism was Aristotelian and non-nominalist.  Mulla Sadra’s philosophy [from 
the sixteenth century], despite its appearance, is totally nominalistic; it might bring a kind 
of modern Enlightenment.”310  In other words, Soroush views the history of the 
Enlightenment, and the post-Enlightenment West, as a standard by which Muslim 
thinking should be judged.  He has hopes that the sixteenth century Islamic philosopher 
Mulla Sadra might contribute to that project, but only in so far as Mulla Sadra’s 
rationalism might accord with Enlightenment rationalism.   
Kadivar, on the other hand, looks for a more limited understanding of human 
reason and hesitates over giving full authority to the human interpreter.  In a published 
debate with Soroush Kadivar raised this issue, asking: "My question is, why are you 
negligent of 'divine wisdom'? Does not 'divine wisdom'...offer general directives in 
regards to correcting human understanding of the supreme and sacred, which is called 
religion? This is the claim of divine religions, that God has provided us with such general 
guidance through His prophets."311    
In this sense, given the diversity of viewpoints contained within, Madrasa is not a 
uniform publication, but neither—as I showed—are the hawzah journals.  Finally, like the 
hawzah journals, Madrasa too positions itself as a specifically Islamic project.  The 
journal is not without religious identification.  This is evident in part through its content – 
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its third issue, for example, is devoted almost entirely to crafting a modern ethics of love 
(ʿishq) out of an Islamic genealogy of writers.   In addition, in its first editorial 
introduction, Madrasa authorizes its own project of knowledge and learning through 
Qurʾanic citation: “‘It is He [God] who lays defilement upon those who will not reason.” 
[10:100].     
The Muslim Public and Secular Reason 
 
These discussions of “critique,” “reason,” and the role of scholarship in modernity 
raise significant questions for how to represent Muslim thinking and the imbrications of 
such thinking in categories whose genealogies at least overlap with, if not originate 
within, secular Western concepts and categories.   Secular critique, as I discussed above, 
marks in many discourses the operations of a specifically modern (perhaps liberal) 
individual.  As Gorgouris argued, the “task of secular criticism…is to oppose any 
heteronomous politics.”312  In itself, the ascription to the modern rationality arising out of 
modern education might align Madrasa’s project with the type of hermeneutics that 
Gourgouris and Mufti defend.  Yet, the journal also does not express the “suspicion, if not 
dismissal, of religion’s metaphysical and epistemological commitments” that Mahmood 
attributed to secular-critique.   
I am not interested here in suggesting that either the hawzah journals or the 
religious intellectual projects represent secular critique as understood by Gourgouris or 
Mahmood.  I am intrigued, instead, by the ways in which both projects define their own 
engagements—specifically with ruptures they mark as modern—through reasoned 
critique.  Both these terms have genealogies specific to Muslim contexts.  While 
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“critique” has bases in authenticating texts, reason too is part of the historically Shiʾi 
scholasticism.  Soroush above noted the early rationalist arguments of the Muʿtazilite 
school; yet that Muʿtazilite rationalism was to a large extent incorporated into Shiʿi 
learning, a tradition that finds echoes in the uses of “reason” throughout these journals.  
The Muʿtazilites themselves argued that the “justice of God meant that certain of His 
laws could be found by reason alone, although the most correct form of these laws and of 
the way to fulfill them (such as how to worship Him), could be found only through 
revelation.”  While “for Sunnis there are rational presuppositions such as the use of 
reason in interpretation of the sources of the law….Shīʿīs, on the contrary, embrace 
reason/intellect as one of their four major sources….The Shīʿī acceptance of Muʿtazilism 
was signaled by the adoption of a Mu`tazilite slogan, ‘Everything that reason ordains 
divine law [shariʿa] ordains’ (and, it is understood to be implied, vice-versa).”313  Little 
work has been done on contemporary Shiʿi engagements with reason (ʿaql), yet the 
twentieth century Iraqi Shiʿi scholar Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr affirms the harmony of 
reason and revelation: “There is nothing whatsoever in them [the Qurʾan and traditions of 
the Prophet and Imams] that conflicts with the assured dictates of reason.’…The 
Lawgiver cannot be in conflict with reason, so He must have intended something other 
than the prima-facie sense of the unclear text [when the text seems to contradict 
reason].’”314   
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Despite the history of critique and reason within Islamic learning, however, both 
the ḥawzah journals and public intellectual projects are marked by a singular interested in 
critique—as an operation of thinking subjects necessary for attaining true knowledge 
(whether of modernity or of Islamic truths) and approaching and evaluating modern 
problems.  In addition, that critical practice must be—as suggested by the editors of both 
projects—divorced in some measure from the learned traditions of the past.  Even for 
Khomeini—as the editor of Critique and Perspective suggested—the quality of the 
present demands a radical redefinition of the practice of even Islamic reasoning.  In this 
sense, a specifically modern notion of critique has become embedded in not just Muslim, 
but Islamic scholastic discourses. It is a part of the intellectual and theoretical apparatus 
of the Iranian Islamic scholars and their attempt to theorize not only the Iranian political 
situation, but Islamic knowledge in general.   
 
 
  
 
Epilogue 
  
 My argument throughout this dissertation has been that the writings of Muslim 
scholars—both classically-trained and new kinds of intellectuals—displays the 
imbrications of secular forms and Islamic reasons.   I have suggested that attempts to 
represent contemporary Islam struggle between emphasizing the continuity of Islamic 
practices, as well as connections to texts, figures, and commitments and highlighting the 
modernity, and therefore discontinuity, of contemporary Islam.  
 This problem is particularly fraught in the study of contemporary Iranian Islam, 
both because the Islamic Republic bases its own legitimacy in claims to Islamic tradition 
and because of the ripple effects the institutionalization of the “guardianship of the 
jurists” through the Shiʿi religious establishment.  Scholars of Iran, such as sociologist 
Ali Mirsepassi, worry that affirmations of “Islamic tradition” against the universality of 
secular modernity lead inevitably to “political definitions … centered on authenticity and 
thus based inevitably on the exclusion and denial of other ideas and experiences.”315  
Mirsepassi sees little utility even in re-forming of Islamic traditions for democratic 
projects (in his view, such re-formations simply re-inscribe claims to a wholistic and 
authentic self.  They cannot provide a path for “open and democratic societies [that] 
avoid the imposition of a narrative of authenticity as a principle or basis for inclusion and 
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exclusion within modern society”316).   Others who study Iran, however, are more open to 
religious visions. Farzin Vahdat, for example, has examined the writings of Iranian 
reformists—including Abdolkarim Soroush who I discussed in Chapter Three—as 
examples of a modernist reincarnation of Islam.317    The non-authoritarian possibilities of 
this reincarnation, however, are limited.  Muslims can only surmount violent readings of 
religion, Vahdat suggests, by ascribing to a liberal model of subjectivity that denies the 
authority of external forms.  
 This scholarship in Iranian studies conflicts with recent studies of Islamic 
tradition that distinguish historically Muslim modes of reasoning and practice from 
concepts and categories that mark secular liberal ways of knowing and understandings of 
the self.  Vahdat’s work on Muslim subjectivity, for example, is directly counter to the 
arguments Mahmood put for in her Politics of Piety – that (at least some) Muslim 
practices and understandings of authority are embedded in those Muslims’ life world.  
For Mahmood, remaking those “sensibilities, life worlds, and attachments so that” 
Muslims might “be taught to value the principle of 'freedom'” is itself a violent task.318   
 Despite the limitations I see in arguments for Islamic tradition apart from secular 
transformations, it is significant that scholars who emphasize continuity do so in large 
part from an ethical commitment to difference outside the hegemony of secular 
imperialism.  As anthropologist Talal Asad suggested, the demand to highlight continuity 
in Muslim traditions, but discontinuity in Western conceptions of self, is motivated at 
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least “partly by a liberal concern that time and place should be made for weaker groups 
within spaces and times commanded by a dominant one.”319  In this sense, the concern 
with continuity echoes the commitments that Islamic studies scholar William Cantwell 
Smith articulated decades ago, that “no statement about a religion is valid unless it can be 
acknowledged by that religion’s believers.”320  In this sense, as Ernst and Martin 
suggested, scholars who emphasize continuity draw significance from the claim that 
“Muslim societies must be understood on their own terms and not a superimposed 
Western model.”321   
 In my view, two problems arise from this division: (1) scholars of Islam inevitably 
become wrapped up in defining Islam as they attempt to distinguish Islamic categories 
from secular ones; (2) this very act of definition limits the possibilities of representing 
Muslim scholars who engage with specifically modern categories, concepts, and 
problems as Islamic scholars; that is, as engaging with the present through commitments 
and categories that are at once Islamic and turned to problems specific to the modern 
world.  I suggested at the outset that considering Muslims as engaged in—rather than 
separate from—the secular forms of modernity expands the possibilities for representing 
Muslim engagements with the present.  I want to return to this possibility here.  How 
might these Muslim debates over democratic, religious, and scholastic practices inform 
work on Islam in religious studies? 
 One option is to take seriously the suggestion, offered by scholars of Islam in the 
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new field of comparative political theory, as well as scholars of religion outside the study 
of Islam, to consider contemporary Muslim scholarship as part of a global humanities, 
outside the limits of secular critique or the lineage of a Euro-American academy.  In the 
study of Islam scholars within comparative political theory have taken up this initiative.  
Political theorist Roxanne Euben , for example, examines how Muslim discontent with 
modernity mirrors concern with modernity voiced by Euro-American philosophers.  For 
Euben, the writings of the Egyptian Sayyid Qutb (1906 - 1966) echo concerns with 
authority, morality, and community voiced by Robert Bellah, Hannah Ardent, and 
Alasdair MacIntyre.   She argues that, given these commonalities, Muslim 
“fundamentalist thought can be understood, at least in part, as engaged in a common 
critique [with Western theorists] of rationalist epistemology, and in a project to 
‘reenchant’ a modern world defined by disenchantment.”322  Euben explains the reasons 
behind this common critique as a kind of syncretism arising out of shared history, 
suggestive of the “transcultural problematic of modernity.  This problematic does not 
simply arise out of perennial questions derived form ahistorical, transcendent needs and 
human dilemmas, but rather emerges because the history of colonialism and imperialism 
and the imperatives of globalization ensure that Western paradigms will continue to 
frame the sensibilities of non-Western, indigenous critics.”323   
 Euben’s work differs significantly from studies of Islam that look for liberal 
interlocutors in that she focuses on modern discontent rather than the affirmation of 
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political positions.  These differences are evident when Euben’s work is compared to 
others who analyze Muslim political thought.  Political theorist Andrew March, for 
example, has conducted  an exemplary study of Muslim writings—including those of 
Tariq Ramandan and Muhammad Abu el-Fadl—in order to construct an Islamic 
affirmation of a core liberal value, the legal equality of religious minorities.  Drawing on 
philosopher John Rawls’ work in Political Liberalism, March positions Islam as a 
“reasonable comprehensive doctrine,” which understands “the wider realm of values to 
be congruent with, or supportive of, or else not in conflict with, political values as these 
are specified by a political conception of justice for a democratic regime.’”  He suggests 
that “‘except for certain kinds of fundamentalism, all the main historical religions…may 
be seen as reasonable comprehensive doctrines.’”324   
 To this extent, March sees his project—and the ascription of Islam as a 
“reasonable comprehensive doctrine”—as an important acknowledgment of Muslim 
thought.  In response to anthropological studies of Islam, March argues that “debating 
Islamic moral commitments in the context of a rich and long-standing tradition is a lived 
practice, one of many lived practices for actual Muslims.”  Beyond this, and more 
significant for my own thinking about Islam, is March’s suggestion that “interest in 
formal doctrine is deeply affirmative of Muslim fellow citizens because it regards Islamic 
commitments not just as socially contingent responses to external circumstances, but also 
as semiautonomous expressions of first-order moral commitments that ought to be treated 
in a certain way in the public context of civic discourse.”325  
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 I find much of value in March’s work, in particular his willingness to take 
seriously the commitments of contemporary Muslim interlocutors.  I do not want to 
suggest, however, that the only utility of engaging with Muslim thinkers is to further a 
liberal reading of modernity or to discover compatible Muslim theories and arguments.  
Indeed, March’s project assumes liberalism’s neutrality toward Islamic commitments, an 
assumption that—particular in discussions of citizenship and minority populations—has 
been soundly critiqued.326     
In this sense, I am far more interested in March’s suggestion—which he leaves 
largely unexplored—that “our own (liberal or critical) understanding of the sources and 
meaning of contemporary moral disagreement will emerge altered from the inquiry into 
Islamic ethical discourses.”327  This is where Euben’s approach differs. Her concern is 
less whether or not Muslim writings and commitments might align with liberal, secular, 
or broadly democratic positions, but instead whether they share modernity’s discontents.   
I think that not only political theory, but the broader study of Islam could gain 
much from Euben’s analysis here.  In particular, her focus on the commonality of 
concern—rather than political alignments—between “fundamentalist” Muslims and 
Euro-American theorists pushes us to envision Muslim thinkers as critical interlocutors of 
                                                 
326 Asad, for one, has suggested that that “The ideology of political representation in liberal democracies 
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freedom (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2005).  
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modernity and to highlight common feature of discontent beyond ascription to liberal 
doctrines.  In my own work, Euben’s perspective provides an entryway into engaging 
seriously with work that—in its political commitments—might be counter to my own.  In 
Chapter Two I discussed Ayatollah Montazeri and Mohsen Kadivar’s critiques of the 
Islamic Republic and its repression of protestors.  Yet Montazeri continued to affirm a 
limited understanding of the jurists’ guardianship, which from my own perspective is 
hardly an ideal system.  Ayatollah Sobhani even more fully ascribes to the authority of 
Islamic legal scholars over the general population of Iranians.  Yet, from Euben’s 
perspective, both these cases have the possibility of demonstrating not only their 
incorporation of secular forms or their indebtedness to Islamic commitments, but also 
how the modernity is perceived from a vantage point outside the Euro-American 
academy.     
While Euben stops at the diagnosis of modernity, scholars in decolonial studies 
have suggested that religious traditions located elsewhere might themselves be 
incorporated as the grounds of theory.  This work in many ways returns to the debates 
over secular criticism that I surveyed in the previous chapter. In the previous chapter I 
reviewed debates over the nature of secular criticism and whether, as proponents suggest, 
secular critique is, in fact, “secular”; that is, whether it resists and undoes transcendental 
foundations or, instead, reinscribes normative liberal models of the subject. I compared 
these constructions of secular criticism to Muslim Iranian constructions of “critique,” not 
to suggest the secularity of those Muslim writings, but instead only the commingling of 
categories from the historically Islamic and the (post-) Enlightenment corpus.  Yet 
affirmations surrounding secular critique do more than identify religious discourse as an 
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“other,” they also inscribe religious tradition as foreclosing reasoned debate.  This 
argument on behalf of secular criticism runs throughout postcolonial studies – the term 
“secular criticism” itself was coined by Edward Said.328  Amir Mufti, whose scholarship 
focuses on religious minorities and national identity, continues Said’s arguments on 
behalf of secular criticism.  Mufti, as I noted in the previous chapter, argues that situating 
Islamist and/or traditionalist understandings of Islam as alternatives to secular modernity 
disregards the violent potential of these “solutions.”329  While Mahmood, Asad, and 
others attend to the domination secular liberal categories and the precarious existence, 
within that domination, of Muslim life worlds, for Mufti the source of violence that 
requires attention is the majoritarian writing of group identity, ideology, and community.  
For Mufti, then, the necessary role of secular criticism is precisely to disrupt the 
universalistic, nationalist, and communitarian forms of identity that—he suggests—
undergird such majoritarian ideologies.  Instead of emancipation—the goal of critique—
claims from religious traditions have only violent potentials.    
 
Breaking from Said, many scholars in decolonial and postcolonial studies concerned with 
religion disagree.  Walter Mignolo, for example, has attempted to  
reveal in an elegant way the epistemological limits of Western thought 
and …[the] epistemological potential [of non-Western thought], as sustainable 
knowledge and not as a relic of the past to be ‘studied’ and ‘fixed’ from the 
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perspective of Western disciplines.  As sustainable knowledge, the 
epistemological legacy of [say, the] Confucian legacy dwells in the possibility of 
showing the limits of modern epistemology, in both its disciplinary and its area 
studies dimension.  As such, there is no longer the possibility of looking at 
‘translation’ or ‘information’ from ‘other cultures,’ by which it is implied that 
‘other cultures’ are not scientific and are knowable from the scientific approaches 
of Western epistemology.”330  Specifically, such an approach is distinct from 
religious studies.  The point is that such border thinkers are “not interpreting, 
translating [their own traditions] from the Western hegemonic perspective, or 
transmitting knowledge from the perspective of area studies.  Their analytic and 
critical reflections (rather than ‘religious studies’) are engaged in a powerful 
exercise of border thinking from the perspective of epistemological 
subalternity.331 
For Mignolo, this perspective moves beyond both Orientalism and area studies, each of 
which suppressed the “other” or the “Third World” “as a producer of cultures but not of 
knowledge.”332   Mignolo argues that postcolonial studies is not “just a new field of 
study…but the condition of possibility for constructing new loci of enunciation as well as 
for reflecting that academic ‘knowledge and understanding’ should be complemented 
with ‘learning from’ those who are living in and thinking from colonial and postcolonial 
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legacies.”333   Without “learning from” those whose locations of theorizing are elsewhere, 
postcolonial and subaltern studies will only continue the hegemony of (post)colonial 
knowledge, rather than promote “new forms of cultural critique and intellectual and 
political emancipations.” 334   
 Mignolo does not completely deny, however, Mufti’s and Said’s concerns with the 
violence of religious traditions; indeed, he attempts to distinguish the type of “border 
thinking” he finds attractive from “fundamentalism.”  Border thinking and the 
decolonization of knowledge, for Mignolo, is a “culture of transience and its dynamics” 
distinct from fundamentalism.  The difference “‘involves a realistic review of the ethos 
we introject through our primary socialization.  Like any ethos, the interjected ethos also 
has contents and processes.  The assumptions and processes underlying the ethos tend to 
become masked by the ossified content, forms and rituals.  These cannot be revived and 
deployed in the present.  That would be the way of fundamentalism.”335  According to 
Mignolo, the “‘past is forever present in our interjected ethos.  It is a heritage and source 
of dynamicity, but it is also a pathology and a source of immobility and degeneration.  
The past can be regenerative if we can decode the processes and use them to unleash the 
energy held in the cultural identity.’”336   
 While Mignolo attempts to define “border thinking” outside of “fundamentalism,” 
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I do not think he fully succeeds in articulating the difference between forms of thinking 
that are aware of and engage critically with the problems of modernity from 
“fundamentalist” affirmations of tradition.   Considering Euben’s contribution that I 
surveyed above, I am in fact not certain that such a differentiation is possible or even 
desirable.  It might be more honest, and beneficial, for Mignolo to argue instead that he 
finds certain articulations unproductive then to move those articulations beyond the realm 
of border thinking.  In many ways, I would suggest,  distinguishing the “underlying 
ethos” that drives a tradition from its “ossified content, forms and rituals” simply 
duplicates the problems with defining Islamic tradition that I have discussed throughout 
the dissertation.   
Others in religious studies itself, however, are less concerned with defining the 
bounds of border thinking and more concerned, instead, with opening the grounds of 
theory to religious traditions unlimited by “fundamentalist” labels.   I find that recent 
work in religious studies, outside the study of Islam, adds to the work above by 
examining the ways in which religious studies, as a field of study, distinguishes between 
the theoretical work undertaken in the Euro-American academy and locations of 
theorizing elsewhere.  These works largely arise out of questions regarding the secular 
indebted to work by Talal Asad, but even more so historian Dipesh Chakrabarty and the 
“decolonial” moves by scholars such as Mignolo.   
Arvand Mandair, a scholar of Sikh studies, contests this affirmation of secular 
criticism and notes a discrepancy in the relationship between scholars of religion and the 
subjects they study.  Mandair wants religious studies to interrogate “the mechanism that 
continues to foreclose the South Asian or non-Western from the supposed ground of 
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theory.”337     In particular, he argues that this mechanism is in large part a historical one.  
He suggests,  
few if any social scientists working in the history of religions—or for that matter 
in the philosophy of religion, or cultural theory—would ever try to make the 
concepts of these [South Asian religious] traditions into resources for 
contemporary critical theory.  And yet ‘past Western thinkers and their categories 
are never quite dead for us in the same way. South Asian(ist) social scientists 
would argue passionately with a Marx, or a Weber without feeling any need to 
historicize them in their European intellectual contexts.’338   
Mandair argues that a key difference is that traditions located elsewhere are seen as 
history, culture, or theology while “in the Western intellectual traditions key thinkers who 
are long dead and gone are treated not only as people belonging to their own times, but 
also as though they were contemporaries;”339 that is, it is not presumed odd—or a 
betrayal of tradition—that they are made to speak to the present.  In contrast, as Mandair, 
argues, the “thinkers and traditions of South Asia, however, once unbroken and alive in 
                                                 
337 Arvind-pal Singh Mandair, Religion and the specter of the West : Sikhism, India, postcoloniality, and 
the politics of translation (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), 39. 
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their native languages, are now matters of historical research.  These traditions are treated 
as truly history.”340 
Mandair’s argument here echoes my own concern with representing Islamic 
tradition and Muslim writings.  To return to the debates I discussed in Chapter Two, how 
might Mandair’s identification of a historical difference between European “theory” and 
South Asian “history” impact the representation of Muslim political thought?  In that 
chapter I examined the ways that classically-trained Islamic scholars—of competing 
political persuasions—drew on Shiʿi understandings of just rule and divine guidance in 
order to construct novel political theologies.  These political theologies assuredly, as I 
argued, are marked by secular transformations, specifically the presence of the state.  It is 
possible to see those engagements as, to use Mandiar’s language, a “betrayal of tradition” 
– that is, as incorporating modes of reasoning and commitments that align more clearly 
with Euro-American genealogies than Islamic ones.  What Mandair suggests, instead, is 
the possibility of representing those Islamic just rulers and divine guides—the Shiʿi 
Imams—as themselves grounds for theorizing in contemporary Islam or, at the very least, 
if others do not accept those grounds, identifying that Kadivar, Sobhani, and Montazeri 
the Imams are sources of theory.     
He explored this mechanism himself by examining the European translation of a 
specifically Sikh concept, sabda-guru, into “Sikh theology.”  He redeployed “sabda-guri 
with the intention of re-ontologizing the question of language” to open up Sikh concepts 
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as sites of postsecular theory and/or political theology. 341   Mandiar argued that, counter 
to the colonial-era projects of European translation, “the very effect that makes Western 
ideas seemingly ubiquitous [today], namely its globalization, paradoxically, makes the 
very ground of theory itself unstable.”  He asks whether it is possible that, as this process 
reverses and “European texts are translated into non-European languages …under a 
geopolitical economy different from the one that exists now, …for non-European host 
languages to displace the very power differential that keeps theory supposedly on its own 
ground?” 342   
The journalistic projects I studied in Chapter Four suggest just this possibility.  
Regardless of whether from the bastions of Islamic institutions in Iran or produced by 
new religious intellectuals, both productions represent attempts to not just to mimic 
Western theory, but to assess its potentials for thinking about contemporary Islam in Iran.  
To what extent these texts are transformed through that translation remains an open 
question and the subject of future research.  I would suggest it is likely, however, the 
positioning Rawls next to Imam Sadiq—as Critique and Perspective did in an issue on 
justice—presents a different economy of translation and interpretation than simply 
translating the writings of the Imams into English.  While the translation into English, as 
Mandair suggests, positions Shiʿi thinking as merely theology, the productions of the 
Iranian journals destabilize that very representation.   
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